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Abstract 
This thesis is comprised of three essays which explore economic and management issues 
of firms in Vietnam. The issues being addressed here are varied but connected to highlight 
(partly) how firms are doing business in the transition economy of Vietnam. The following are 
the summaries of each essays: 
(i) The first essay (chapter 2) examines the role of ownership and market competition in 
Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large 
panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises 
(FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than private-owned 
enterprises (POEs) in terms of TFP levels. However, while FOEs ranked the highest in terms of 
TFP in the period 2001-2006, SOEs “closed the gap” with FOEs in the period 2007-2011. The 
good performance of SOEs may be the result of the state-led development policies undertaken 
during the 2000s. We also find that market competition has been effective in enhancing firms’ 
TFP across industries and reducing the gaps in efficiency among ownership types. Based on 
these results, we put the transition path of Vietnam in comparative perspective with other 
transition models. 
(ii) The second essay (chapter 3) investigates tax-avoidance profit-shifting activities of 
multinational firms out of Vietnam during the period from 2006 to 2012. Specifically, it 
examines how corporate income tax-rate differentials between the home country and Vietnam 
determine a foreign wholly-owned subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit obtained from an 
exogenous income shock. Departing from both the formal theory and most empirical studies on 
multinational profit shifting, we find a negative association between foreign subsidiaries’ 
reported profit and tax rate difference. It means that the higher the corporate income tax rate of 
the home country compared to that of Vietnam, the less profits a wholly-owned subsidiary will 
report in Vietnam. Further analyses then reveal that this negative relationship between reported 
profit and tax-rate difference is mostly driven by the behavior of the firms from two neighboring 
tax havens, Hong Kong and Singapore. These firms from home countries with low corporate tax 
rates report more profits in response to the income shock in Vietnam than the remaining firms 
coming from other countries where corporate tax rates are higher. This study then contributes to 
the literature a puzzling evidence of multinational profit shifting in Vietnam. Through the 
phenomenon of Hong Kong and Singaporean firms putting more money in Vietnam, it suggests 
that cross-border profit shifting by multinational firms is more complicated than what has been 
known given the role of tax havens and the weak institutions of a developing country such as 
Vietnam. 
(iii) Using a sample of JVs from the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (VES) database, the third 
essay (chapter 4) is devoted to strategic implications of conversion of JVs to either WOSs (100% 
foreign ownership of MNEs) or fully domestic firms (DOMs– 100% domestic ownership) in 
Vietnam. For the case when JVs turning to WOSs, after matching the converted WOSs with 
selected comparable continuing JVs and analyzing the accumulated changes in their performance 
in a difference-in-differences framework, we do not find any persistent improvement in terms of 
financial profitability of the converted JV-to-WOSs compared to the matched continuing JVs. 
Here, no superiority attached to WOSs as an organization mode in compared to JVs has been 
found. The converted WOSs seems to experience a temporary negative shock in financial 
performance before conversion and then recover back to its normal trend which is not so 
different from that of the comparable continuing JVs. Besides, we also find some evidence of 
restructuring/adjustment in the converted WOSs in the first few years after conversion. 
Specifically, the converted WOSs have reduced their leverage levels and gradually improved 
fixed assets. Moreover, they have also slightly increased their employment scale and reduced the 
average wage bill per employee at the time of conversion. For the case of JVs turning to DOMs, 
our results suggested that the local owner has invested more on fixed assets after buying out a 
JV. However, the conversion of a JV to a DOM simply brings no effect in terms of financial 
profitability to the firm since, in compared to before conversion, both the converted JV-to-DOMs 
and the comparable continuing JVs have experienced a similar increasing trend in ROA. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction and overview of the thesis 
In their articles to welcome Vietnam’s becoming a middle-income economy, the 
Economist shows many of the country’s “strong” but “underappreciated” growth records 
(Economist, 2016a; Economist, 2016b). All in all, Vietnam is the 2nd fastest growing economy in 
the world in the period from 1990 to 2011, only after China. Its GDP has increased at an average 
pace of 7.3% annually from 1990 to 20111. Once facing famine, the country now turns to be one 
of the world’s main exporters of rice and other farm products. Millions of the country’s people 
have escaped poverty and attained middle-income status (Economist, 2016a; Economist, 2016b). 
It is all thanks to the economic reform process started in 1986 which has essentially liberated the 
country from a central planning economy and transited it towards a market-based one.   
This thesis, hence, aims to look at the micro dynamics underneath such transition using a 
database of Vietnamese enterprises that I am lucky enough to have access to: the Vietnamese 
Enterprise Surveys (VESs) from 2000 to 2012. It is comprised of three essays which explore 
economic and management issues of firms in Vietnam. The issues being addressed here are 
varied but connected to highlight (partly) how firms are doing business in the transition economy 
of Vietnam. The thesis is structured as follows: 
 (i) The first essay examines ownership differential (i.e. state-owned, private-owned, and 
foreign-owned) and competition effect on firm total factor productivity (TFP) as consequences of 
mixed economic reforms in Vietnam (Chapter 2). It describes the big picture: the whole 
transition process/institutional changes in Vietnam and how such changes are reflected in 
competition effect on firm TFP and comparative performance (in terms of TFP) of firms with 
different ownership types.  
                                                 
1 Calculated by Malesky and London (2014) from World Bank’s World Development Indicators  
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(ii) The next two essays deal specifically with foreign firms' subsidiaries in Vietnam. One 
essence of the economic reform of Vietnam is its “open-door policy” to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and international trade. While many benefits of FDI have been identified, in the second 
essay, an unwanted consequence of FDI is dealt with instead. Specifically, it examines whether 
foreign multinational firms undertake tax-avoidance profit shifting out the country (Chapter 3). 
Using a newly developed identification approach in the literature, the essay examines how 
corporate income tax-rate differentials between the home country and Vietnam determine a 
foreign wholly-owned subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit obtained from an exogenous 
income shock in Vietnam. 
(iii) The third essay then investigates post-formation conversion of international joint 
ventures (JVs) to either wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs– 100% foreign ownership) or 
domestic firms (DOMs– 100% domestic ownership) in Vietnam. In this essay, both the drivers of 
such ownership transfers and their performance implications are investigated (Chapter 4). 
The next section of this introduction chapter is a brief overview of the transition process 
of Vietnam economy since 1986. I then describe about FDI in Vietnam. These sections lay the 
background context for my empirical analyses of firm productivity, multinational profit shifting, 
and ownership changes of joint ventures in Vietnam in three subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
The last section concludes the chapter by providing a detailed summary of thesis.     
1.2 A history of Vietnam’s mixed economic reform since 1986 
Before the country’s economic renovation process (also known as “Doi moi” in 
Vietnamese term) started in 1986, Vietnam was facing famines and extreme shortages of basic 
consumer goods (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2004, chapter 4)2. It was partly caused by the Trade 
Embargo imposed by the US after Vietnam War (1954-1975) and the fall in foreign aids from the 
Soviet bloc. However, the main reason lies internally on the “socialist” central planning 
economic system that the government eagerly adopted to recover the country’s after-war 
economy. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the economy while private ownership was 
forbidden. There was no production autonomy inside SOEs as “the State assigned tasks to 
                                                 
2 My outline of Vietnam’s economic situation before Doi moi (1986) in this paragraph is based on chapter 4 
of Van Arkadie and Mallon’s book. Interested readers are invited to cross-refer to this book for more details.  
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production units [i.e. SOEs], gave them the means [i.e. production inputs] and was handed over 
the finished goods”3. Industrial production soon collapsed in the economy once heavily 
dependent on external aids in the war time and now being plagued with distorted incentive 
structures and consequent inefficiency of SOEs. Such extreme economic conditions have led the 
Communist Party-led government to launch “Doi moi”, the economic reform process, in 1986. 
This economic renovation process can be divided into two major periods: a gradual reform 
(1986-1999) and a substantial liberation period (2000-2012).  
1.2.1 First phase (1986-1999): gradual reforms 
In the first phase (1986-1999), learning from the transitional experience of its big 
socialist neighbor China, Vietnam adopted a gradual reform approach. It was featured by (i) the 
allowance but with cautious checking by the state for market entries of non-state enterprises, (ii) 
(i) the experimental reforms of SOEs, and (iii) a gradual relaxation of international trade barriers. 
The Doi moi process began with the recognition by the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) that the heterogeneity in ownership of production assets was needed to solve the extreme 
shortages of necessity goods and to develop the economy (Pincus, 2016). Non-state enterprises 
were then allowed to enter selected industries and service sectors. It was in the Constitution 1992 
that private property rights were officially stated and acknowledged for the first time. This 
change allowed the entry of thousands of small private-owned enterprises (POEs) into the 
market, which liberates underutilized factors of production such as land and labor to address 
market demand unfulfilled by SOEs and to export (Pincus, 2016)4. However, the population of 
private enterprises was still modest in terms of number in the 1990s as the government 
maintained “a cautious attitude” towards non-state sector (Tran et al. 2009). It was reflected in 
the laws with many strict and bureaucratic regulations as barriers to private business activities in 
Vietnam5.  
                                                 
3 Communist Party of Vietnam 1986, p. 17 as quoted in Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2004, p. 41. The text in 
the square brackets are from the author of this thesis to make the sentence’s meaning clearer.   
4 Parallel to this process is the entry of foreign-invested firms into Vietnam following the “open door” 
policy of the government to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). I will discuss in details about FDI in Vietnam in 
a separate section later. 
5 For example, two licenses were needed to establish a private company. The owners first must apply for 
the establishment license of a company. A high legal capital (i.e. required minimum capital) needed to be met and an 
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While still gradually freeing market entry, the government also conducted reforms on 
SOEs, its main economic vehicle. The SOE reform was first introduced through the “three-plan 
system” in 1980s. After fulfilling the production target set by the state, a SOE would be allowed 
to work on its own production plan where a large fraction of profits from such out-of-target plan 
could be retained inside the SOE and “allocated to employees as bonuses” (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon, 2004, p. 49). Privatization was also conducted but at case-based experimental scale on 
selected non-strategic SOEs in the late 1990s (CIEM-World Bank, 2002; CIEM-World Bank, 
2005). However, the most important SOE reform in 1990s was the official legislation of 
regulations on business operations of SOEs. The Law on State-Owned Enterprises in 1995, the 
first of its kind, granted a legal status (as an independent legal person) to each SOEs, which 
enable them to legitimately do business with other business partners, in both state and non-state 
sectors (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38). Decision making was further decentralized to SOE managers in 
terms of employing and dismissing enterprise employees (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38). 
Meanwhile, international trade barriers were gradually relaxed. Key reforms include (i) 
the switch from quotas or licensing towards the tariff regime following international custom to 
manage imports and exports and (ii) the accession to Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as a new member (Nguyen, 2014, p. 44-45; Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2004, p. 186). 
Trade also improved since the Trade Embargo by the US was lifted in 1994. However, Vietnam 
trade system was still considered as restrictive where tariff rates of selected goods could be as 
high as 60 percent (Nguyen, 2014, p. 44-45; Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2004, p. 186). 
1.2.2 Second phase (2000-2012): more liberation and the rising of state capitalism 
The slowdown of FDI inflows and the stagnation of economic growth shortly after the 
1998 Asian financial crisis induced the government to start the second phase of the reform (Tran, 
2009). This second phase was a more substantial liberalization the economy with its peak in 
2007 as Vietnam joined World Trade Organization (WTO).  
                                                 
initial business plan must be presented in the application file for the establishment license. Only after getting the 
establishment license, the company then could register and got the business license to start its business (Private 
Company Law, 1990). Moreover, a private company also need to go through both “pre-inspection” and “post-
inspection” procedures during its establishment process (Nguyen, 2014, p. 41).   
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A first major reform was the adoption of the Law on Enterprises in 2000. This 
evolutionary Law has removed many administrative barriers and made it much easier to establish 
a new private enterprise in Vietnam (e.g. Nguyen, 2013; Nguyen, 2014, p.41). Since its coming 
into effect, the annual number of new-born private firms is booming (e.g. Tran, 2011).  
Further reforms were also happened in the state-owned sector. Corporate governance of 
SOEs changed fundamentally in the early 2000s (2001-2004) as SOEs were converted into 
limited liabilities companies (LLCs) or joint stock companies (JSCs) (Nguyen, 2014, p.38) 6. 
This change came officially into a legislation in the new Law on State-Owned Enterprises 
enacted in 2003. The law also abandoned most priorities and direct subsidiaries being received 
by SOEs and facilitated the privatization process of non-strategic SOEs (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38).  
A legal framework for regulations on enterprises were “relatively complete” with the new 
Law on Enterprises 2005 which came into effect by July 2006 (Vu Thanh, 2014). This law 
applied equally to all enterprises irrespective of their ownership, viz. state-owned, private, and 
foreign-invested enterprises. This law promotes the “national treatment” principle where no 
forms of ownership discrimination can exist (Vu Thanh, 2014). Prior laws such as Law on State-
Owned Enterprises, Law on Foreign Direct Investment, Law on Enterprises 2000 regulating 
specific types of enterprises based on their ownership, i.e. state ownership, private ownership, or 
foreign ownership, were abolished (see article 171 of the Law on Enterprises 2005). By the new 
Law, the state is merely an owner of equity in the SOEs who were being “reconstituted” as joint 
stock companies or limited liability companies (Nguyen, 2014, p.38) 
Other crucial reforms in trade also happened (Nguyen, 2014, p. 46). The Bilateral Trade 
Agreement with the US was signed in 2000. Since 2002, export licenses were abolished and all 
                                                 
6 SOEs are organized as joint stock (or shareholding) companies (either listed or non-listed) when the state 
decides to maintain a majority of ownership. These companies are treated as cases under privatization when the state 
decides to hold just a minority of ownership.  SOEs are converted to limited liability companies when the State 
would like to be the sole owner. About corporate governance structure, the joint stock companies have four 
governing bodies: shareholders’ meeting, board of management (or board of directors) with a chairman, CEO, and 
an internal auditing committee. For limited liability companies, corporate governance structure still has three 
governing bodies: the member’s council with a chairman (with similar role as the board of directors and the chair of 
the board), CEO, and an internal auditing member (or committee depending on company scale). Reader are cross-
referred to Vietnam’s Law on Enterprises 2000 or Law on Enterprises 2005 for more details on corporate 
governance of joint stock companies and limited liability companies.      
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business agents whatever their ownership types can freely undertake export activities. Tariffs 
were gradually reduced. Most important of all was the event of Vietnam’s joining WTO in 2007.  
While the liberation process of Vietnam economy reached a peak with its accession to 
WTO, it also should be noted about the rising state capitalism in the second half of 2000s. On a 
high of obtaining economic successes after two decades of economic renovation, the government 
consolidated smaller SOEs together into State Economic Groups (SEGs) with the hope of 
making these SEGs the “national champions” referencing to Korean chaebols and Chinese state-
owned business groups (Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016). Vietnam came into a period 
of rising state capitalism when the government emphasized more the role of SOE sector as 
“leading engine” of economic growth (Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016). Such “state-
led developmentalism” were in doubt as a gloomier picture shadowed the economy since then 
(Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016). Vietnam was hit by three consecutive macro and 
financial crises in late 2007, 2009, and 2011.  
1.1.3 Key features of Vietnam’s mixed economic reform  
From the “Doi moi” economic reform process that we have experienced so far, it could be 
said that Vietnam is transiting into a mixed market economy (i.e. a combination of both planning 
and market systems) (e.g. Pincus, 2016). Two features have characterized such transition (i) 
liberalization of private property rights and (ii) state-led development policies with an emphasis 
on SOEs.  
First, the state acknowledges private sector as a source of economic growth. Private 
property rights have been liberated with the increasing presence of non-state enterprises in the 
economy. Thousands of private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises (POEs and FOEs) 
operating in labor intensive and export-oriented sectors are “vent for surplus” of economic 
success (Pincus, 2016). See figure 1.1 for export performance of Vietnam which private and 
foreign-invested sectors are the main drivers.         
[Figure 1.1 about here] 
While still freeing private property rights and allowing for market entry of POEs and 
FOEs, the Communist-party led government never wants to abandon state ownership (Malesky 
and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016). It keeps confirming “the dominant role of the SOE sectors as 
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the leading engine of the economy”7. SOEs has been revitalized by privatization and changes in 
corporate governance. Small SOEs which are considered as non-strategic and not necessary to be 
hold by the state were privatized. Traditional SOEs were “reconstituted” into limited liabilities 
companies or joint stock companies (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38). The formation of SEGs with the hope 
of creating the “big fists” of the state in later 2000s has showed the stronger commitment to 
state-led developmentalism in Vietnam (Malesky and London, 2014; Vu Thanh, 2014; Pincus, 
2016).  
1.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Vietnam 
Foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) began to enter Vietnam after the first Law on 
Foreign Investment in 1987. Figure 1.2 shows the annual inflows of FDI into Vietnam since 
then. In general, the number of new projects, registered capital and implemented capital have 
been increasing over the years. However, there are two brief downturn periods in terms of 
investment capital: 1997-1999 and 2009-2011. FDI declined from 1997 to 1999 as the Asian 
financial crisis hit Vietnam’s neighbor and main-FDI-investing countries. The most recent global 
crisis in 2008 again caused a drop in FDI from 2009 to 2011. There is sign of recovery in FDI 
inflows by 2012.   
[Figure 1.2 about here] 
While there is never a formal written requirement that foreign investors must set up joint 
ventures with Vietnamese business partners in FDI laws, joint ventures (i.e. shared ownership 
between foreign and Vietnamese business parties) are the main form of FDI before 1996 (Truong 
and Gates, 1996). After the Law on FDI 1996, in practice, foreign investors are free to choose 
the investment forms (i.e. contracts, joint ventures (JVs), or wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs)) 
they like (Nguyen, 2014, p. 36). The number of WOSs (100% foreign ownership) started to 
increase and dominate the population of foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs). Figure 1.3 presents 
the new entries8  by ownership calculated from the Vietnam Enterprises Surveys (VESs) for the 
                                                 
7 For example, the Communist Party of Vietnam has stated in its 10-Year Socio-Economic Development 
Plan for the period from 2010 to 2020: “The leading role of the State economic sector is to be enhanced, governing 
key domains of the economy; State enterprises are to be renewed and developed, ensuring production and business 
efficiency” (Communist Party of Vietnam 2010, p. 9, recited from Malesky and London (2014)).     
8 An entry is defined at the first appear in the VES database.  
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period 2001-2012. We can see that since 2002, WOSs always account for about 80 percentage of 
new entries. This fact is also reflected in the shares of WOSs and JVs in the annual numbers of 
current FOEs in Vietnam (figure 1.4). The number of JVs with local private partner(s) increases 
steadily from 129 firms in 2000 to 1018 firms in 2012 while the number of JVs with state 
partner(s) gradually decreases from its peak of 534 firms in 2001 to 366 firms in 2012. In the 
same time, the number of WOSs is booming from 823 firms in 2000 to 7329 firms in 2012.  
[Figure 1.3 about here] 
[Figure 1.4 about here] 
The above patterns of FDI shows Vietnam’s strong commitment to attract FDI and create 
a business-friendly environment towards foreign investors, for example, revisions of FDI 
regulations following practical requirements of the investors and establishment of export 
processing and industrial zones. On its side, FDI and FOEs have always been an important 
element of the country’s economic reforms and economic success.  
1.4 Summary of the thesis  
Deeper economic and management issues relating to firms in Vietnam will be dealt with 
in later chapters of this thesis. Specifically, the next chapter addresses the role of ownership and 
competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity in the transition period of 2001 to 
2012. Chapter 3 then will investigate tax-avoidance profit shifting activities of MNEs out of 
Vietnam while chapter 4 examines post-formation ownership changes of foreign joint ventures. 
The following are detailed summaries of each chapters: 
 (i) The second chapter examines ownership differential (i.e. state-owned, private-owned, 
and foreign-owned) and competition effect on firm total factor productivity as consequences of 
mixed economic reforms in Vietnam. Understanding of the role ownership and competition in 
firm productivity throughout the transition path of Vietnam is very important. Vietnam has 
transited itself to a mixed market economy (i.e. a combination of both planning and market 
systems). In which, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the legacy of the communist central 
planning economy, never disappear but being revitalized by the government to be “the leading 
engine of the economy” (Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016). However, in such an 
environment, the private sector including both private-owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign-
owned enterprises (FOEs) still maintains a rapid growth. The business landscape in Vietnam has 
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been constantly altered with a lot of dynamics from the entry of newly private and foreign 
enterprises and the revitalization of the state-owned sector. 
Using a panel dataset of Vietnamese manufacturing firms from 2001 to 2011, we find 
that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) perform better than 
private-owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of TFP. More interestingly, while FOEs exhibit 
higher TFP level than SOEs in the 1st sub period (2001-2006), SOEs close the gap with FOEs in 
terms of TFP in the 2nd sub period (2007-2011) when the state capitalism is rising in Vietnam. 
We submit that the remarkable performance of SOEs may be the result of the effect of the 
restructuring process undertaken by the Vietnamese government to preserve and consolidate the 
internal competences of these firms. However, we cannot exclude, and indeed we discuss, the 
possibility that this result may also stem from the easier access to factors of production (capital 
and land) gauged by SOEs in the period 2007–2011. Second, we find that market competition 
has enhanced firm average productivity across industries and reduced gaps in productivity 
among firms of different ownership types (viz., FOEs, SOEs and POEs).  
These findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks. We show that they are robust 
to Heckman’s 2-stage procedure to control for the possible selection (non-randomness) of 
businesses kept in the hands of the state. Moreover, we control for simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity and the main results of the analysis are confirmed. Results are also robust when we 
replace labor productivity (value-added over an employee) as the dependent variable or when we 
modify the definition of our main regressors of interest: ownership categories. Based on these 
findings, we discuss Vietnam’s transition pattern specifically and in compared to other transition 
models.    
(ii) Around the world, we are witnessing a raise in awareness about tax-dodging profit 
shifting activities by multinational corporations (MNCs) from high-tax to low-tax countries 
(Economist, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014). The study in the third chapter tackles those issues by 
investigating the profit-shifting behavior of MNCs operating in Vietnam, a late development 
country, during the period from 2006 to 2012. Vietnam serves as a good laboratory context since 
there is a lot of suspicion and indirect evidence raised in the media about MNCs’ abuse of 
transfer pricing to siphon profits out of the country (e.g. Nguyen, 2011; Tuoi Tre News, 2015).  
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This study also uses a new identification strategy initiated by Chang and colleagues 
(Chang, 2013) to investigate the profit-shifting activities of multinational firms out of Vietnam. 
Specifically, it examines how corporate income tax-rate differential between the home country 
and Vietnam determines a foreign wholly-owned subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit 
obtained from an exogenous income shock in Vietnam. This identification approach then 
addresses the endogeneity issues raised about the traditional estimation approach developed by 
Hines and Rice (1994).  
Based on a sample of MNCs’ wholly-owned subsidiaries operating in Vietnam during the 
period from 2006 to 2012, our analysis suggests that a foreign subsidiary will report less profits 
in Vietnam the higher the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of 
Vietnam. This contradicts the proposed hypothesis and previous results from the literature since 
the literature would suggest that a subsidiary will report more profits in response to the industry 
earnings shock, the higher the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of 
Vietnam. Further analyses then reveal that this negative relationship between reported profit and 
tax-rate difference is mostly driven by the behavior of the firms from two neighboring tax 
havens, Hong Kong and Singapore. These firms from home countries with low corporate tax 
rates report more profits in response to the income shock in Vietnam than the remaining firms 
coming from other countries where corporate tax rates are higher.  
Why do foreign firms from HS, the two tax havens and also neighboring countries, report 
more profits in Vietnam than the ones from the other countries? It is perhaps too soon to give any 
speculative explanation. We hope, through the study of this chapter, to contribute to the literature 
some puzzling evidence of multinational profit shifting in Vietnam. Through the phenomenon of 
firms from Hong Kong and Singapore putting money in Vietnam, it suggests that cross-border 
multinational profit shifting is more complicated than what has been known given the role of tax 
havens and the weak institutions of a developing countries such as Vietnam.  
(iii) The fourth chapter investigates post-formation conversion of international joint 
ventures (JVs) to either wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs– 100% foreign ownership) of 
multinational enterprises or fully domestic firms (DOMs– 100% domestic ownership) in 
Vietnam. For the drivers of conversion of JVs to WOSs, we observe that a poor average ROA in 
three previous years significantly increases the likelihood of a JV’s conversion to a WOS. The 
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converted JV-to-WOSs seem to experience a temporary negative shock in financial performance 
(an Ashenfelter’s dip) before conversion. Moreover, in the presence of asset specificity proxied 
by high levels of fixed asset ratio, JVs are more likely to convert to WOSs. Meanwhile, foreign 
ownership share has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of JVs switching 
to be WOSs. 
For the drivers of conversion of JVs to DOMs, we find that firm size has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with the likelihood of conversion. It suggests that size might be a factor that 
constraints local owners from buying out the JV. After an “optimal point” in size, the likelihood 
of JVs switching to DOMs decreases. Among other results, foreign ownership share has a 
negative and significant effect on the likelihood of JVs switching to be DOMs. The larger the 
share of foreign ownership in a JV, the less likely that the JV will turn to be a DOM. 
This chapter then contributes to the literature of joint venture evolution by examine 
subsequent performance implications of JV conversion. For the case when JVs turning to WOSs, 
after matching the converted WOSs with selected comparable continuing JVs and analyzing the 
accumulated changes in their performance in a difference-in-differences framework, we do not 
find any persistent improvement in terms of financial profitability of the converted JV-to-WOSs 
compared to the matched continuing JVs. Here, no superiority attached to WOSs as an 
organization mode in compared to JVs has been found. The converted WOSs seems to 
experience a temporary negative shock in financial performance before conversion and then 
recover back to its normal trend which is not so different from that of the comparable continuing 
JVs. Besides, we also find some evidence of restructuring/adjustment in the converted WOSs in 
the first few years after conversion. Specifically, the converted WOSs have reduced their 
leverage levels and gradually improved fixed assets. Moreover, they have also slightly increased 
their employment scale and reduced the average wage bill per employee at the time of 
conversion. For the case of JVs turning to DOMs, our results suggested that the local owner has 
invested more on fixed assets after buying out a JV. However, the conversion of a JV to a DOM 
simply brings no effect in terms of financial profitability to the firm since, in compared to before 
conversion, both the converted JV-to-DOMs and the comparable continuing JVs have 
experienced a similar increasing trend in ROA. 
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Tables and figures  
Figure 1.1 Export as percentage of GDP (1986-2012) 
 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicator 
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=VN) 
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Figure 1.2 FDI in Vietnam (1986-2012) 
 
Source: Vietnam General Statistical Office (http://gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=776) 
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Figure 1.3 New entries by ownership (JVs vs. WOSs) in the VES surveys (2001-2012) 
 
Source: author’s calculation from the VES surveys  
Figure 1.4 Number of foreign-owned enterprises in the VES surveys (2000-2012) 
 
Source: author’s calculation from the VES surveys  
442
936
75
289
80
359
90
466
226
771
116
682
118
766
140
739
154
851
143
790
238
1313
59
446
0
50
0
1,
00
0
1,
50
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
sum of entryJV sum of entryWOS
823
483
129
1365
534
180
1555
528
204
1864
518
238
2326
513
291
2827
486
346
3336
459
410
4006
448
484
4590
423
570
5380
415
709
6014
399
806
7348
422
1019
7329
366
1018
0
2,
00
0
4,
00
0
6,
00
0
8,
00
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
sum of whollyOwned sum of staJointven
sum of otherJointven
15 
 
References for Chapter 1  
CIEM-World Bank. 2002. Report of the study on post-equitization of state-owned enterprises.  
CIEM-World Bank. 2005. Report of the study on post-equitization of state-owned enterprises. 
Communist Party of Vietnam. 1986. On the Eve of the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 
Communist Party Vietnam (2010, Mar 31). Vietnam’s development goals, 2011–2020. CPV 
Online Newspaper. Retrieved from: 
http://www.economica.vn/ChangePages.aspx?IDKey=T68H36363539105330&c=0&f=1. 
Dharmapala, D. 2014. What do we know about Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A review of 
the empirical literature. Fiscal Studies, 35: 421-448. 
Economist (2008, Apr 24). Half-way from rags to riches. Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/11041638. 
Economist (2013, February 16). Tax Havens: the missing $20 Trillion. Economist. Retrieved 
from: https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571873-how-stop-companies-and-
people-dodging-tax-delaware-well-grand-cayman-missing-20  
Economist (2016a, Aug 4). The other Asian tiger – Vietnam’s economy. Economist. Retrieved 
from https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21703368-vietnams-success-merits-closer-
look-other-asian-tiger.   
Economist (2016b, Aug 6). Good afternoon Vietnam – Asian next tiger. Economist. Retrieved 
from https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21703376-having-attained-
middle-income-status-vietnam-aims-higher-good-afternoon-vietnam.  
Hines, J. R., Jr., & Rice, E. M. 1994. Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and American business. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 149-182.  
Law on Enterprises 2005, 60/2005/QH11. An English version available at: 
http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=5953 
Malesky, E. J. & Taussig, M. 2009. Where is credit due? Legal institutions, connections, and the 
efficiency of bank lending in Vietnam. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
25(2): 535-78. 
Malesky, E. & London, J. 2014. The political economy of development in China and Vietnam. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 17: 395-419.  
Nguyen, H. T. (2011, Nov 30). Some solutions to prevent transfer pricing. The People Daily. 
Retrieved from: http://www.nhandan.com.vn/kinhte/thoi_su/item/12901702-.html (in 
Vietnamese). 
Nguyen, C. D. 2013. Registration first and random checking later is the key of Doi moi (in 
Vietnamese). Retrieved at: 
https://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn/NewsandUpdates/tabid/91/ArticleID/224/C%C6%A1-
ch%E1%BA%BF-ti%E1%BB%81n-%C4%91%C4%83ng-%E2%80%93-
h%E1%BA%ADu-ki%E1%BB%83m-ch%C3%ACa-kho%C3%A1-c%E1%BB%A7a-
c%E1%BA%A3i-c%C3%A1ch.aspx   
16 
 
Nguyen, K. T. 2014. Economic reforms, manufacturing employment and wage in Vietnam 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). The Australian National University, Canberra. 
Pincus, J. 2016. Vietnam: In search of a new growth model. In M. Cook & D. Singh (Eds.), 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2016 (pp. 379-397). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.  
Private Company Law 1990, 47-LCT/HĐNN8. A Vietnamese version available at: 
https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Doanh-nghiep/Luat-Cong-ty-1990-47-LCT-HDNN8-
38053.aspx  
Tran, T. B., Grafton, R. Q., & Kompas, T. 2009, Institutions matter: The case of 
Vietnam, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 38(1): 1-12 
Tran, N. H. T. 2011. Reforms in administrative procedures to register and establish new 
enterprises in Vietnam: a 10-year retrospective. Journal of Legal Studies (in Vietnamese), 
135 (08/2011):49-56.   
Truong, D. H. D. & Gates, C. L. 1996. Vietnam in ASEAN—economic reform, openness and 
transformation: an overview. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 13(2): 159-68. 
Tuoi Tre News (2015, Apr 21). Metro Vietnam found owing over $2.92mn in tax in transfer 
pricing inspection. Tuoi Tre News. Retrieved from 
http://tuoitrenews.vn/business/27609/metro-vietnam-found-owing-over-236mn-in-tax-in-
transfer-pricing-inspection 
Vu Thanh, T. A., 2014. WTO accession and the political economy of State-owned enterprise 
reform in Vietnam. GEG Working paper 2014/92, The Global Economic Governance 
Programme, University of Oxford. 
Van Arkadie, B. & Mallon, R. 2004. Vietnam: a transition tiger? (2004 digital ed.). Canberra: 
Asia Pacific Press at the National Australian University. Available at: 
https://press.anu.edu.au/node/456/download 
Vietnam General Statistical Office (GSO). [Statistical data published online by GSO]. Statistical 
data. Available at: http://gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=776. 
World Bank. [primary World Bank collection of development indicators]. World Development 
Indicator. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators. 
 
 
 
17 
 
Chapter 2 From central planning towards a 
market economy: the role of ownership and 
competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Vietnam has achieved tremendous economic growth since the launch in 1986 of the doi 
moi (“renovation”) program, which determined the gradual turning away of the country from 
central planning and its transition towards a market economy (Pincus, 2016; p. 380). Over this 
period, the Vietnamese GDP growth rate has been, on average, around 7% on a year-on-year 
basis (see Minh and Long, 2008; p. 106; World Bank, 2012; Malesky and London, 2014; p. 203).  
The doi moi policy has been based on three main pillars (Pincus, 2016; pp. 380-382). 
First, mobilization of under-utilized land and labor in the production and export of goods: 
indeed, agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing -- conducted by small firms and household 
enterprises-- have spurred Vietnamese growth during this period. Second, the greater space 
allowed for incoming foreign investments (whose number and value gained momentum mostly 
after the revision of the Investment Law in 2005). Third, from the mid-1980s the state began to 
retreat from an omnipresence across the economy while maintaining a strategic control of several 
industries (see Vu Thanh, 2014; p. 16) via state-owned enterprises (SOEs).9  
Recent Vietnam’s development has puzzled scholars for several reasons, leaving the 
explanation for the country success not clear-cut. As for institutions, the political system is a 
Communist single-party regime, where participation to political decisions is limited to few 
people (Malesky and London, 2014; p. 202); property rights protection and legal institutions are 
                                                 
9 Pincus (2016, p. 381) lists these sectors. By looking at the share of SOEs on total firms in our database 
(Appendix A2.4) we observe that SOEs were relevant in 2001 in the following manufacturing sectors: tobacco; 
machinery and equipment; chemicals and pharmaceuticals. The state kept lower but still significant shares in textiles, 
apparel, leather products and footwear and non-metallic mineral products. A quick look at the figures referring to 2011 
shows that SOEs have been decreasing in number in most of these industries during the 2000s. Ngoc and Ramstetter 
(2004; p. 393) confirm these figures. 
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still not fully developed. As for the economy, the expansion of the private sector has gone hand 
in hand with the “state-led development” policy intended to consolidate several SOEs as the 
“leading engine of the economy” (Malesky and London, 2014; p. 2018).10 Moreover, the growth 
model followed by Vietnam from the mid-1980s has been more based on the accumulation of 
resources rather than on productivity growth (around 80% of GDP growth during this period is 
explained by labor and capital accumulation).11  
Even if the not so striking productivity figure together with low wages, widespread 
underemployment and the relevance of the agricultural sector12 may suggest that the doi moi 
model has not been fully exploited yet (see Malesky and London, 2014; p. 207; Pincus, 2016 pp. 
390-392), in the long-run, the Vietnamese growth path will be maintained only through sound 
productivity dynamics. Given this, it is timely to inquire into the determinants of productivity in 
Vietnam. 
In particular, two features of the doi moi program may have had an effect on Vietnamese 
firms’ productivity. First, the recognition and promotion of heterogeneity in ownership types. 
After 2000, several changes in the legal environment (see Section 2.2) incentivized the set-up of 
many private-owned enterprises (POEs) and the entry of foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and 
granted a single unified legal framework to all firms. During the same period, “state-led 
development” policies lead to changes in the governance and the equitization of several SOEs 
(Minh and Long, 2008; pp. 99-100). Second, the number of firms active in Vietnam and, thus, 
market competition has increased precisely because of these changes. The accession of Vietnam 
to the WTO has prompted market competition even further from 2007 onwards.  
Despite the debate on Vietnamese firms’ performance has gained momentum over the last 
fifteen years thanks to the increasing availability of firm-level data (see Ngoc and Ramstetter, 
2004; Nguyen and Le, 2005; Ha and Kiyota, 2014; Nguyen, 2016; among others), general 
                                                 
10 In terms of GDP, the private sector has consistently represented 60% of the economy in 1995, 2005 and 
2010. 
11 For example, Nguyen (2004) calculated the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate to be around 1.5% 
(on average) in the period 1985-2004 (with respect to an average GDP growth rate of 6.7%); in line with this result, 
Minh and Long (2008) have found TFP growth to contribute about 19.7% to the country’s GDP growth during the 
period 1985-2006. 
12 In 2012, almost 50% of the labor force was employed in the primary sector. 
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evidence on the role of ownership and market competition in productivity is still sparse and not 
conclusive (see Huang and Yang, 2016; Baccini et al. 2017; among others). This is unfortunate, 
because at this stage of Vietnam’s development, it is key to deepen our knowledge into these two 
major determinants of firm productivity. 
The study in this chapter take advantage of a large panel dataset of Vietnamese 
manufacturing firms observed over an entire decade (from 2001 to 2011) to empirically assess 
the role of ownership and competition in firm total factor productivity (TFP). The period 
analyzed is one of major changes in the firms’ playing field, as the reforms promoting the private 
sector, the restructuring of the SOEs and the accession of the country to the WTO. The focus on 
manufacturing allows us to analyze the relative performance of different ownership types in 
sectors characterized by relatively low levels of regulation and exposed to international 
competition.  
We get two main results. First, we find that -- once controlled for a large set of firm, 
industry and province characteristics -- both FOEs and SOEs show, on average, higher TFP 
levels than POEs during the period 2001-2011. Actually, while FOEs ranked the highest in terms 
of TFP in the period 2001-2006, SOEs “closed the gap” with FOEs in the period 2007-2011. 
That remarkable performance of SOEs may be the result of the effect of the restructuring process 
undertaken by the Vietnamese government in order to preserve and consolidate the internal 
competences of these corporations. We cannot exclude and indeed we discuss the possibility that 
this result may also stem from the easier access to factors of production (capital and land) gauged 
by SOEs in the period 2007-201113. Second, we find that market competition has enhanced firm 
average productivity across industries and reduced gaps in productivity among firms of different 
ownership types (viz. FOEs, SOEs and POEs), providing some evidence on the role that 
competition has played in the recent Vietnam’s transition path (Pincus, 2016; Nguyen, 2016).  
These findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks. We show that they are robust 
to Heckman’s 2-stage procedure to control for the possible selection (non-randomness) of 
                                                 
13 We also discuss the possibility that this result may also stem from the fact that we may over-estimate the 
TFP of SOEs due to omitted price bias. We conduct an indirect test to confirm this is the result of the effective 
restructuring policies undertaken by the Vietnamese government rather than just a consequence of omitted price-bias 
(see section 2.5.1). 
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businesses kept in the hands of the state. Moreover, we control for simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity and the main results of the analysis are confirmed. Results are also robust when we 
replace labor productivity (value-added over an employee) as the dependent variable or when we 
modify the definition of our main regressors of interest: ownership categories.     
This study contributes to the literature on the Vietnam growth path and its determinants 
(see Minh and Long, 2008; Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 2016; among others), by 
providing a comprehensive overview of TFP in Vietnamese manufacturing during the period 
2001-2011 when relevant institutional and economic changes have taken place. In addition, this 
work contributes to the empirical literature on the joint role of private ownership and market 
competition in firms’ productivity. Indeed, the two have been considered by both scholars and 
policy makers as the major forces for an effective transition from central planning to market 
economies (see Zhang et al., 2001, for an assessment of these two factors on Chinese firms’ 
efficiency; Bartel and Harrison, 2005, for an analysis of manufacturing establishment in 
Indonesia; Asaftei et al., 2008, for an inquiry into Romanian firms; Driffield et al. 2013, for 
some evidence regarding Central and Eastern European countries; among others).14 Finally, by 
discussing our results in the light of the literature on the models of transition and by comparing 
the evidence we get with other countries’ experiences in a comparative perspective, our study 
makes a contribution to the literature on the role and the evolution of state ownership in 
transition countries (e.g. see, Grosman et al., 2016; Musacchio et al., 2015; among others). 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes some major 
institutional reforms occurred in Vietnam in the last three decades. Section 2.3 defines the 
framework of analysis and the research hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the data. Section 2.5 
presents econometric results while Section 2.6 discusses them. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.   
2.2 Reforms in the 1990s and 2000s: the rise of private firms 
and state-led development policies 
                                                 
14 As underlined by Estrin et al. (2009; p. 5), “The so-called Washington Consensus emphasized […] that 
private ownership together with market forces would ensure efficient economic performance”.  
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Since the launch of the “renovation” program in 1986, Vietnam followed the footsteps of 
its big socialist neighbor, China, to transit into a mixed market economy (Pincus, 2016; p. 380).     
The first main ingredient of the economic reforms promoted through the doi moi plan 
(which has successfully lasted for three decades until the crisis that has affected the Vietnamese 
economy in 2011) was the liberalization of property rights, which have been strengthened after 
the Vietnamese Constitution of 199215. This institutional change set under-utilized factors of 
production free and allowed the entry of small POEs into the market. In parallel with this entry 
process, the government started to adopt an “open door” policy to attract foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). However, the relevance of both POEs and FOEs has been increasing in the 
second wave of the reforms started since 2000. Indeed, after 2000, the new versions of the 
Enterprise and Investment laws granted a single unified legal framework to all firms (either 
domestic or foreign, private or state-owned) (e.g. Nguyen, 2014; Vu Thanh, 2014). These laws 
removed many administrative barriers and made it easier to establish new private enterprises in 
the country. Since their coming into effect, the number of POEs and FOEs in Vietnam has 
sharply raised, as Figure 2.2 shows. Accession to the WTO in 2007 has further prompted market 
liberalization.16    
The second ingredient of the transition process has been the role assigned by the 
government to both SOEs and the sectors in which they are more relevant as tools to keep 
dominating “the commanding heights of the economy” (Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 
2016). Before 1986, under a central planned economy, SOEs were the dominant organizations in 
the economy when private ownership was still considered as illegitimate at that time. However, 
these SOEs were characterized as inefficiency since they have no production autonomy and, 
hence, incentives to improve themselves (Van Arkadie and Mallon, 2004-chapter 4). Since the 
“doi moi” program, the government has been conducting series of reforms on SOEs, its main 
                                                 
15 Private ownership is officially stated and acknowledged in the Constitution 1992. The reader is cross-
referred to Malesky and London (2014) and Pincus (2016) for an in-depth description of the reforms undertaken by 
the country in the three last decades.  
16 Indeed, Vietnam had to adjust its legal framework to the underlying values of the WTO such as free trade 
(i.e. via reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers), fair competition (i.e. via a promise of elimination of prohibited 
subsidies to SOEs and fostering competition in domestic financial markets) and non-discrimination (through the 
“national treatment” principle). An in-depth discussion on the reforms that Vietnam had to start to deal with in order 
to join the WTO is presented in Vu Thanh (2014; pp. 5-11).   
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economic vehicle throughout 1990s and 2000s. The Law on State-Owned Enterprises in 1995, 
the first of its kind, granted a legal status (as an independent legal person) to each SOEs, which 
enable them to legitimately do business with other business partners, in both state and non-state 
sectors (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38). Decision making was also decentralized to SOE managers in 
terms of employing and dismissing enterprise employees (Nguyen, 2014, p. 38).  
The government has boosted up its scheme to further “revitalize” SOEs in 2000s. In the 
first years (2000-2006), SOEs were corporatized (i.e. converted into limited liability companies 
or joint stock (shareholding) companies) to have a more “modern” governance structure. This 
corporatization process happens in parallel and pave the way for the privatization of small and 
non-strategic SOEs (CIEM-Worldbank, 2002; CIEM-Worldbank, 2005). Under the unified Law 
on Enterprises 2005, the state is merely an owner of equity in the SOEs who were being 
“reconstituted” as joint stock companies or limited liability companies (Nguyen, 2014, p.38)17. 
These reforms aimed at strengthening SOEs’ efficiency since managers and workers inside SOEs 
are now more motivated to improve efficiency, thanks to the advantages of corporatization with 
the separation of state ownership and management (e.g. Zhang et al., 2001; Aivazian et al., 
2005). State-led development policies have geared up in the second half of 2000s (2007-2011). 
In front of three consecutive macro and financial crises (respectively in 2007, 2009, 2011) and 
the exposure to tougher international competition imposed by the accession to WTO, the 
government has promoted consolidations of several SOEs into State Business Groups (SBGs) or 
State Economic Groups (SEGs) with the aim of reaching economies of scale and scope and 
consolidating their main managerial and technological competences (Vu Thanh, 2014; Pincus, 
2016). 
                                                 
17 SOEs are organized as joint stock (or shareholding) companies (either listed or non-listed) when the state 
decides to maintain a majority of ownership. These companies are treated as cases under privatization when the state 
decides to hold just a minority of ownership.  SOEs are converted to limited liability companies when the State 
would like to be the sole owner. About corporate governance structure, the joint stock companies have four 
governing bodies: shareholders’ meeting, board of management (or board of directors) with a chairman, CEO, and 
an internal auditing committee. For limited liability companies, corporate governance structure still has three 
governing bodies: the member’s council with a chairman (with similar role as the board of directors and the chair of 
the board), CEO, and an internal auditing member (or committee depending on company scale). Reader are cross-
referred to Vietnam’s Law on Enterprises 2000 or Law on Enterprises 2005 for more details on corporate 
governance of joint stock companies and limited liability companies.      
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2.3 Framework of analysis and hypotheses 
The framework of analysis draws from Park et al. (2006) and it is based on the two main 
forces that have re-shaped the economic landscape in Vietnam across 2000s, i.e. the 
liberalization of private property rights and the state-led development policies.  
[Figure 2.1 about here] 
The liberalization of private property rights may have had a direct impact on firm 
productivity via an ownership (per se) effect. Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin et al. 
(2009; p.7) review the advantages that private ownership ensures to firms. Indeed, it reduces 
managerial discretion via better incentives (Morck et al., 1989) and clear monitoring chains 
(Driffield et al. 2013) and by exposing firms to the market for corporate control. Furthermore, 
the state, as the firm’s owner, may impose targets other than profit-maximization (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Hanousek, Kočenda and Svenjar, 2009). Finally, poorly performing SOEs may be 
granted easier access (“soft budget constraint”) to external financial resources than their private 
counterparts (Brandt and Li, 2003). All these factors may positively affect private-owned firms’ 
efficiency with respect to that of their state-owned counterparts.  
 However, these advantages of private ownership are more truly hold in a perfect market 
system (Shleifer, 1998 or Peng et al., 2016). In their seminal article, Musacchio et al. (2015) 
propose that national-level institutions serve as a contingent factor that determines the relative 
performance between SOEs and POEs. In the context of transition economies (as Vietnam), non-
private ownership may be advantageous (e.g. Li, 1996; Che and Qian, 1998). Specifically, due to 
poorly functioning of supporting institutions and market governance, POEs suffer higher costs to 
conduct market transactions (Park et al., 2006) 18. Moreover, state-led development policies in 
the 2000s with aim of revitalizing SOEs seems to work along two main lines. First is the 
privatization of small, non-strategic SOEs and the modernization of governance of SOEs, where 
enterprises’ managers and workers are now more motivated to improve efficiency (e.g. Zhang et 
                                                 
18 Some authors have suggested that non-private ownership may be advantageous in the context of 
transition economies (such as China and Vietnam), where market transactions can be blocked due to government 
regulations (Li, 1996) and property rights are insecure (Che and Qian, 1998). 
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al., 2001; Aivazian et al., 2005)19. Second is the consolidation of medium and large SOEs into 
state conglomerates where economies of scale and scope may have been better exploited (Pincus, 
2016). 
Overall, in the period 2001-2011, the co-occurrence of property rights’ liberalization and 
state-led development policies may have had uneven effects on the efficiency of firms 
characterized by different ownership types. On the one hand, a strengthened recognition and 
protection of private ownership may have granted an advantage to POEs; on the other hand, 
SOEs may have improved their efficiency thanks to the government action. Thus, we propose a 
pair of contradicting hypotheses, letting the empirical analysis telling us which one is supported. 
H1a. POEs outperform SOEs in terms of TFP levels 
H1b. SOEs outperform POEs in terms of TFP levels 
Theoretical works have established the advantage of foreign firms over domestic ones 
(Markusen, 1991; Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996). This is linked to firm-specific knowledge-based 
and intangible assets that ensure to FOEs superior management practices and technological 
know-how. Indeed, several empirical papers have proved FOEs to be more productive than 
domestic firms (Griffith, 1999; Harris and Robinson, 2002; Takii, 2004; Benfratello and 
Sembenelli, 2006). Given that, we expect FOEs to be more productive than both POEs and 
SOEs:  
H2. FOEs outperform domestic enterprises (POEs and SOEs) in terms of TFP levels  
Apart from the ownership effect, the liberalization of private property rights during the 
2000s has implied a rise in the number of POEs and FOEs across industries. This, together with 
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, may have pushed up managements’ effort to enhance firms’ 
efficiency due to a fiercer market competition. Backus (2014) suggests two channels through 
which this may work. First, more competitors allow the owner of the firm to better compare the 
performance of own managers with that of other managers in the same industry (Holmstrӧm, 
1982). Second, the generation of a business-stealing effect raises the necessity to invest in cost 
                                                 
19 Since SOEs were being “reconstituted” as limited liability companies or joint stock companies (Nguyen, 
2014, p.38), the state as an owner of equity exerts control through appointment of state representatives in the board 
and firm CEOs. In practice, state representatives and top management team inside SOEs also held Communist party 
membership and are treated as tenured state officials.   
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reduction (Raith, 2003). As a result of the rise in the number of firms, we expect firms active in 
more competitive industries to be more efficient.  
H3. In industries characterized by a higher degree of market competition, the 
productivity of the “average” firm is higher 
By being exposed to a fiercer competition, less efficient firms –regardless of their 
ownership types-- will be forced to exit the market. Thus, another consequence of the rise in the 
number of firms is the expected convergence in productivity toward “sufficient” levels by all 
firms belonging to the same industry (Hopenhayn, 1992). We expect market competition to 
reduce gaps in productivity across ownership types within industries.       
H4. In industries characterized by a higher degree of market competition, the gaps in 
productivity across different ownership types is lower  
2.4 Data and descriptive analysis 
2.4.1 Data 
Since 2000, the General Statistics Office (GSO) conducts an annual Survey on 
Vietnamese Enterprises (VES), which essentially covers all Vietnamese firms operating in all 
economic sectors (census) in the period 2000-2012.20 The VES survey is rich in terms of 
demographic and balance sheet information regarding firms and these data have been used in a 
number of scientific papers (e.g., Ha and Kiyota, 2014; Newman et al., 2015; Kyburz and 
Nguyen, 2016; Nguyen, 2016; Baccini et al. 2017). 
Each firm in the VES is classified as belonging to an industry following the Vietnamese 
Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC). In order to build our analysis upon the longest feasible 
time-series, we had to develop a probabilistic routine to adjust the industrial classification before 
                                                 
20 The VESs survey all SOEs and FOEs no matter what size they are. For POEs, because the population of 
enterprises has grown, since 2003 GSO has surveyed fully all firms with more than 10 employees (this number is 20 
employees from 2008 onwards) but surveyed only a selected representative sample of firms with less than 10 
employees (or 20 employees from 2008 onwards). However, GSO still includes the micro private enterprises which 
are not surveyed in the database as observations with only variables on their identity (name and tax code) and their 
basic demographic information to generalize and calculate annual summary statistical figures for administrative and 
regulative purposes. 
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2006 (VSIC 93) to the new industrial classification (VSIC 07).21 This has allowed us to exploit a 
longer panel of data than those employed in previous studies using the same survey. A time-
invariant (modal) industry code is assigned to each firm.   
 In order to clean the data and get the final sample, we take the following steps. We select 
manufacturing firms; we drop duplications (a unique ID -- which is derived from the tax code -- 
is assigned to each firm over time), inactive enterprises, and enterprises with no tax code or 
missing values on key information; we drop observations with illogical figures such as negative 
values on sales, total assets, total wages, and material input costs; only observations with 
leverage ratio (total debts over total assets) from 0 to 100 are maintained in the database. Thus, 
our final sample is an unbalanced panel of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, which comprises of 
282,764 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2011.22 It essentially covers about 88.23% of the 
total population of manufacturing firms in Vietnam.23  
As for the information regarding ownership, all Vietnamese enterprises are classified 
(each year) into 14 ownership types. We regroup these 14 types into three mutually exclusive 
categories: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private-owned enterprises (POEs), and foreign-
owned enterprises (FOEs). SOEs are the firms with state participation in equity greater than 
50%. POEs are the firms with entirely private ownership or the ones with a mix of both private 
and state ownership where state ownership is less than or equal 50%. FOEs comprise both fully 
owned foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures established between foreign and local partners in 
Vietnam.24 Firms can shift from one category to another on a year-on-year basis.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, there has been a remarkable growth in the population of 
POEs in 2000s (Figure 2.2). Meanwhile, the number of FOEs has increased fourfold from 1096 
                                                 
21 Appendix A2.1 furnishes additional details about the procedure. 
22 As we use the entry- and exit-rate as regressors in the econometric model, the first (2000) and the last year 
(2012) of the panel are not usable. 
23 The reader is cross-referred to Appendix A2.2 for a comparison of our sample with the official figures of 
manufacturing firms reported annually by GSO. 
24 Our classification is in line with those employed by Asafei et al. (2008) and Huang and Yang (2016). See 
Appendix A2.3 for further details about the adopted classification. We also check if our findings are robust to an 
alternative way of defining ownership dummies (see section 2.5.2.2 and Appendix A2.13 and A2.14). 
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firms in 2001 to 4595 firms in 2011, while the number of SOEs halved from 1231 firms in 2001 
to 622 firms in 201125.  
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
2.4.2 Variables and descriptive analysis 
Productivity 
We employ firm TFP (in log) as the dependent variable in the econometric model, by 
measuring it with the IV-GMM modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimator (Levinsohn and Petrin, 
2003) developed by Wooldridge (2009)26. Output in the production function is proxied by real 
value-added, which is calculated using the addition method: specifically, it equals sum of total 
wage, depreciation,27 operating profit before tax, and indirect taxes. Capital input is proxied by 
the value of fixed assets in real terms while labor is measured by the number of total employees, 
both at the end of the year. Material input is calculated by subtracting value-added from output 
(deflated sales).28  
Ownership and market competition 
Two out of three mutually exclusive dummies for firm ownership (the baseline/omitted 
category is the dummy referring to POEs) are included in the empirical model to capture the 
differences in productivity levels across ownership types.  
We use two variables to measure the toughness of market competition in the 4-digit 
industry a firm belongs to. First, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is included, which 
equals the sum of squares of market shares (in terms of sales) of all firms in the 4-digit industry: 
                                                 
 25 A breakdown of firms by ownership type and industry is reported in Appendix A2.4.   
26 The estimation of firms’ TFP is discussed at length in Appendix A2.5. A table which presents production 
function input coefficients estimated for each 2-digit sector is also put in this appendix.  
27 As the VES does not have information about depreciation, by following Ha and Kiyota (2014), we 
approximate depreciation by the difference in accumulated depreciation between the end of year and the beginning of 
the year. 
28 We use different deflators to convert nominal values into real values (base year: 2010). Value-added is 
deflated by using the Producer Price Indexes (PPI) of each 2-digit industry (source: www.gso.gov.vn) while capital is 
deflated by using the gross fixed capital formation deflators (source: World Bank’s World Development Indicator). 
Finally, annual GDP deflators taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicator are used to deflate material 
inputs. Real values in Vietnam Dong (VND) are then converted into US dollars (USD) using the official annual 
exchange rate in 2010 at 18612.92 VND/USD.    
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the higher the HHI the more concentrated and therefore, the less competitive an industry is. 
Second, we use the annual entry rate at the 4-digit level, which captures the threat by potential 
entrants.  
In order to test for the effect of competition in reducing the gaps in productivity across 
firms with different ownership, we also include the interactions between ownership and 
competition by multiplying each dummy (SOEs and FOEs) with each proxy for market 
competition.  
Control variables 
In order to minimize the risk of getting biased coefficients referring to ownership and 
market competition due to omitted variables, we extend the empirical model and include a vector 
of controls at the firm, industry and province level. Table 2.1 shows the definitions of all 
variables employed. 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
Relying on the previous literature on the determinants of productivity at the firm-level, 
we include, as controls, measures of: firm age (see Jovanovic 1982; Ericson and Pakes 1995, 
among others), firm size (Garicano, et al. 2016) and firm export status29 (see Bernard and Jensen, 
1999; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Melitz, 2003, among others). Firm leverage ratio (debt over 
total assets) is also included as a first attempt to control for the fact that SOEs might have 
benefited from “softer budget constraints” than their private counterparts in the period 2001-
2011 (Kornai et al., 2003; Asaftei et al., 2008).  
Industry and province heterogeneity have been also controlled for. Specifically, we 
include the exit rate of the 4-digit industry the firm belongs to: indeed, together with the entry 
rate, this variable captures the overall dynamism characterizing the industry in which the firm is 
active (Geroski, 1995; Bartelsman et al. 2005). The import penetration ratio (as the ratio of 
imports to the sum of total domestic production and imports in the same 4-digit industry) is also 
                                                 
29 Firm export status is an indicator of whether a firm undertakes export activities in a specific year or not. 
For a few years that the VES does not survey this information, we impute the information using the procedure 
suggested by Newman et al. (2017) in their article investigating the export-productivity nexus of VES firms. 
Specifically, a firm is identified as an exporting firm if either (i) the firm pays export tax or (ii) if the firm exports in 
both the previous year and the subsequent year.    
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included to control for competition incoming from abroad.30 Moreover, the provincial annual 
GDP growth rate is inserted into our empirical model in order to control for demand shocks and 
phases of the economic cycle that may have affected Vietnamese provinces (in which the firms 
are located) in asymmetric ways. We have further included a vector industry and province 
dummies to account for unobserved and time-invariant factors affecting all firms belonging to 
the same industry and province in the same way. 
Finally, a vector of year dummies has been included to control for common shocks to 
productivity that may have affected all firms in each specific year.  
Descriptive analysis 
Table 2.2 shows the basic characteristics of firms in our sample by ownership type31. In 
general, SOEs are about four times older than both POEs and FOEs. SOEs and FOEs are more 
comparable in terms of employment and they are typically large firms, while POEs are more 
often small firms. 
From 2001 to 2011, the mean of capital-labor ratio (expressed in terms of thousands USD 
over 1 employee) of SOEs increased about 3 times (from 5.0 to 17.2); POEs has only marginally 
increased their capital-labor ratio, while FOEs have even decreased it. This evidence is in line 
with the process of capital accumulation undertaken by SOEs since 2005 (see Vu Thanh, 2014; 
p. 17), possibly boosted by the credit stimulus and easier access to capital granted by the 
government especially to this group of firms as a reaction to the 2008-2009 US mortgage’s loan 
crisis (Pincus, 2016; p. 387).  
Keeping in mind that from Table 2.2 we can only appreciate the unconditional (to other 
factors) differences in productivity across ownership types, some interesting preliminary results 
emerge.  During the period 2001-2011, the productivity level of SOEs is rather comparable to 
that of FOEs while, the productivity of POEs is far below the other two groups (in line with 
Nguyen and Le, 2005; Huang and Yang, 2016). Moreover, all three groups of firms have 
improved their productivity over the years, which is coherent with the growing path followed by 
the country in 2000s. However, firms have improved productivity at different paces, depending 
                                                 
30 Details about the calculation of the import penetration measure are provided in Appendix A2.6.   
31 We put a table of summary statistics and correlation matrix of variables in our sample in Appendix A2.7.  
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on ownership type: while SOEs increased (on average) their TFP by around 8%, POEs’ growth 
has been around 5% and the FOEs have grown their TFP by 4% on a year-on-year basis. These 
figures on TFP growth rates at the firm-level are comparable to those shown by Ha and Kyiota 
(2014; p. 208).   
Overall, this first descriptive evidence is in line with both (i) the dynamism of the 
economy found in other works and caused by the entry of many new private firms and (ii) a 
restructuring process of SOEs. In particular, the increase in the capital-labor ratio by SOEs seems 
to go hand in hand with a noticeable TFP growth, thus pointing out that some technological 
advancement and not simply capital deepening has characterized the evolution of state 
enterprises in the period 2001-2011. Given that firms with different ownership types may also be 
alike in other dimensions, we conduct a multivariate analysis in the next section, estimating 
regressions of firm TFP (in log) on ownership and market competition, controlling for a large 
vector of firm, industry and province characteristics. 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
2.5 Econometric analysis 
2.5.1 Baseline results 
We estimate variants of the following model, by OLS:  
𝑡𝑓𝑝௜௝௣௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ᇱ𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜௝௣௧ + 𝛾ᇱ𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௝௧ + 𝛿ᇱ൫𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜௝௣௧ ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௝௧൯ + 𝜑′𝑋௜௝௣௧
+ 𝜃′𝑉௝௧ + 𝜗′𝑍௣௧ + 𝜇௝ + 𝜌௣ + 𝜏௧ + 𝜀௜௝௣௧ ,                                                                 (1) 
where 𝑡𝑓𝑝௜௝௣௧ is the (log of the) TFP of the ith firm, belonging to the jth industry and 
located in the pth province in year t; 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜௝௣௧ stands for the types of ownership that 
characterizes the ith firm in year t (OWNERSHIP ={POE, SOE, FOE}); 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁௝௧ stands 
for the degree of market competition characterizing the jth (4-digit) industry in year t and proxied 
by both the the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the entry rate (COMPETITION ={HHI, Entry 
Rate}); coefficients 𝛿ᇱ capture the interaction effects.  We extend our baseline model by 
including a vector of firm-level (𝑋௜௝௣௧), industry-level (𝑉௝௧) and province-level (𝑍௣௧) time-variant 
characteristics and vectors of industry-, province- and year- fixed effects. Thus, the empirical 
model gives us information regarding the statistical relationships between the firm productivity 
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level and ownership (coefficients 𝛽ᇱ), the degree of competition of the industry (coefficients 𝛾ᇱ) 
and their interplay (coefficients 𝛿ᇱ), conditional on a large vector of firm-, industry- and 
province- characteristics.   
 Table 2.3 shows our first set of results. The specification in col. (1) includes only 
ownership dummies, year, industry and province fixed effects. We then extend the empirical 
model by including proxies for market competition (HHI and Entry Rate) and the vector of 
controls, respectively, in cols. (2) and (3). Results in col. (3) show that, on average, after 
controlling for a large set of firm, industry and province characteristics, both FOEs and SOEs 
exhibit significant higher productivity levels than POEs (the omitted category) during the period 
2001-2011 and that FOEs are the most productive firms. As for market competition, the 
coefficient of HHI is negative (-0.2) and significant while the coefficient of entry rate is negative 
(-0.05) and not statistically significant. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, while firms are more 
productive in less concentrated (more competitive) industries, no statistical relationship is found 
between productivity and the indicator capturing the threat of potential competitors. Overall, 
results in col. (3) support hypotheses 1b, 2 and 3, while hypothesis 1a is rejected.  
As for the control variables, results shown in col. (3) suggest that firms that are older, 
bigger, and undertaking export activities are more productive32. Meanwhile, a higher leverage 
ratio is associated with higher productivity. This could be explained by the fact that, in order to 
perform better, firms need to make productive investments that are financed through debt. 
Coefficients on exit rate and provincial GDP growth rate both show the expected positive sign 
even though they are not significant. Finally, in industries characterized by a higher import 
penetration, firms are - on average - less productive. Doan et al. (2016), in their recent study 
about import competition and productivity in Vietnam from 2001 to 2009, got a similar result.33 
                                                 
32 Surveys of firm productivity in developed countries tend to show a slightly different pattern, in which 
firms which are bigger but younger and undertaking export exhibit higher productivity performance (e.g., Baily et 
al., 1996; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Haltiwanger et al., 2017).  
33 This result is in line with both theoretical predictions in Aghion et al. (2005) and the empirical evidence in 
Ding et al. (2015) and Ben Yahmed and Dougherty (2017). In their seminal article, Aghion et al. (2005) propose that 
import competition only encourage innovations and improve productivity in sectors or firms which are close to the 
world technology frontier but even hurt productivity in sectors or firms which are lagging behind. It means that import 
penetration may discourage productivity growth in less advanced countries whose industries and firms are below the 
world frontier. 
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Given that the period from 2001 to 2011 has been characterized by institutional reforms 
aimed at improving the competitive environment of Vietnam, it is key to study the role of market 
competition in reducing gaps in productivity across firms with different ownership. Thus, in cols. 
(4) and (5), we separately add the interactions between ownership dummies and HHI and 
between ownership dummies and entry rate. Results support hypothesis 4, as the gap in TFP 
between POEs and SOEs and that between POEs and FOEs are smaller in industries 
characterized by a lower concentration (HHI) and a higher entry rate34.  
[Table 2.3 about here] 
In Section 2.2, we have sketched the main institutional and economic changes witnessed 
by Vietnam in 2000s. The first half of the decade has been characterized by the rapid private 
sector growth (2001-2006), thanks to relevant changes in the legal framework for businesses, 
while in the second half of 2000s both the accession to WTO and state-led development policies 
have taken place. Given that, it is relevant to check how those changes had been mapped into 
different performance by SOEs, POEs, and FOEs and we repeat our regression analysis for the 
two sub-periods, i.e. 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. The results -- shown in Table 2.4-- are in line 
with those shown in Table 2.3, but some differences between the two periods are worthy to point 
out. 
[Table 2.4 about here] 
                                                 
34 There is a concern that including four time-variant industry-level variables, viz. HHI, entry rate, exit rate, 
and import penetration together in one regression may cause a multicollinearity issue since these variables are likely 
to be highly correlated to each other. By simply looking at the correlations of these variables (Appendix A2.7), we 
can mitigate this concern. The highest correlation coefficients found are the one between import penetration and 
HHI (0.24) and the one between entry rate and exit rate (0.2). They are in expected scales and not so alarming. For a 
more robustness check, we also rerun the regressions in table 2.3 in an alternative way (we would like to thank 
Marco Sanfilippo to suggest this). We first run a regression with ownership dummies, firm-level controls, and 
adding industry-year and province-year fixed effects. For this practice, we get results reported in columns (1) and (2) 
of Appendix A2.8. We go on dropping industry-year fixed effects and replace them by industry fixed effects only 
and start to include one by one among the four industry-level variables above and then the interactions with 
ownership. Results reported in columns from (3) to (7) of Appendix A2.8 shows that the estimated coefficients of 
these four industry-level variables when we include them one by one are the same as those when we include them 
altogether. Hence, basically it does not matter whether we including them one by one or altogether in the same 
regression and the likely multicollinearity issue is not a real concern. The estimation results here in column (7) are 
also almost similar to the ones in column (3) of table 2.3. We do the same robustness check by running alternative 
regressions for those in table 2.4 and 2.5 for the two sub-periods, viz. 2001-2006 and 2007-2011 and put results in 
Appendix A2.9 and Appendix A2.10.    
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The advantage in productivity of SOEs with respect to POEs in the period 2007-2011 is 
much bigger (33% higher as in col. (4)) compared to one shown in the period 2001-2006 (only 
9% higher as in col. (1)). Furthermore, results also show that while FOEs still exhibit higher 
productivity levels than SOEs in the first sub-period, SOEs “closed the gap” with FOEs in the 
second sub-period. Interestingly, results in col. (4) even show that SOEs even outperform FOEs 
in the second sub-period by about 10%.  
These results, which are in line with some previous works (Ngoc and Ramstetter, 2004; 
Nguyen and Le, 2005; Huang and Yang, 2016), suggest a good productivity performance of the 
Vietnamese state-owned sector with respect to POEs, especially in the period 2007-2011 and 
deserve a more in-depth discussion. First, this may be the result of the state-led development 
policies undertaken by the Vietnamese government during the 2000s with the aim of 
consolidating several SOEs in to State Business Groups or State Economic Groups. The 
promotion of large groups of SOEs may have granted them the economies of scale to improve 
their productivity, which results even more relevant after the WTO accession in 2007 (Vu Thanh, 
2014; p. 12). Concurrently the transformation of governance in SOEs to limited liability 
companies or joint stock companies may have improved their internal incentive systems, with 
positive consequences on their productivity. Of course, there could be a “selection” issue: the 
government may have non-randomly kept in “its hands” the companies with better characteristics 
in terms of management practices, technology and human capital: if these characteristics are not 
independent from firm productivity, our results would be biased. We will explicitly deal with the 
“selection” issue in the Section 2.5.1.  
Second, the lagging behind of POEs may be explained by a lack in commercial 
experience and entrepreneurialism in Vietnam (Pincus, 2016; p. 382). We may put this in 
perspective with the evidence provided in Bloom and Van Reenen (2010; p. 211) regarding 
China (which has followed a similar path of development to Vietnam) and hypothesizing an 
issue of youth of Vietnamese POEs and the corresponding inferior managerial practices.  
Third, it is possible that our measure of productivity --which cannot be corrected to 
account for prices of output and input at the firm-level-- may (partially) reflect market power of 
the firm both in the product and the input markets (Van Beveren, 2012). The possibility that 
SOEs systematically charge higher prices in the product market should be rather low in this 
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work. Indeed, given the analysis restricted to manufacturing firms –that sell tradable goods--, it 
is not obvious that these may act as “natural monopolist” in their industries; moreover, if that 
would be the case, we should have not found a negative relationship between the degree of 
market concentration and firm “average” performance. Conversely, there is evidence (see the 
discussion in Nguyen and Le, 2005; pp. 306-309) that SOEs in Vietnam have had access to land 
and capital at more favorable conditions than private firms for a long period of time, for example 
via subsidies (Vu Thanh, 2014; p. 7). In particular, after the WTO accession in 2007 and, even 
more, the 2008 mortgage crisis in the US, the state provided additional loans to help SOEs 
through the state-owned banks (Pincus, 2016; p. 387). This third possibility may affect our main 
results in two ways. On the one hand, we may have simply over-estimated the TFP of SOEs due 
to price-bias. On the other hand, a preferential credit allocation to SOEs could imply a “true” 
higher productivity with respect to POEs, if the “cheaper” capital borrowed by SOEs is invested 
in more advanced technology (Nguyen and Le, 2005; p. 306).  
Obviously, the first possibility is the one we worry more about. Unfortunately, we cannot 
properly test if the results in terms of ranking in productivity by ownership type are robust to the 
price-bias correction. We can instead rely on an indirect test, by taking advantage of firm age 
variability in our sample. Similar to the idea put forward by Li (2008, p. 221) for the case of 
Chinese SOEs, the younger the SOE the lower should be the probability of having benefited 
from “soft budget constraints” for a long period of time. We thus re-run the regressions in the 
sub-sample of firms established by less than 10 years.35 Interestingly, as shown in Table 2.5, the 
good performance of SOEs is confirmed and even strengthened in the sub-sample of younger 
firms (especially for the period 2007-2011), thus being in favor of the idea that this is the result 
of the effective restructuring policies undertaken by the Vietnamese government rather than just 
a consequence of the price-bias.  
[Table 2.5 about here] 
Overall, the three explanations suggested above are not mutually exclusive and, at the 
same time, we cannot leave out the possibility that (part of) our results are affected by the price-
bias in the input markets. Thus, we submit the good performance in productivity by SOEs in 
                                                 
35 We have also performed the analysis in the sub-samples of, respectively, (i) firms younger than 15 years 
and (ii) firms younger than 5 years. Main results are confirmed and available to the authors upon request.  
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relative terms to be the result of state-led development policies plus a lack in experience and 
entrepreneurialism in POEs, “gross of” the price bias.  
2.5.2 Further results and robustness checks 
2.5.2.1 Controlling for the selection of SOEs   
Based on the literature on ownership in transition economies, (Estrin et al., 2009; pp. 9-
10) and the literature on the development of Vietnam (see Malesky and London, 2014; Pincus, 
2016; among others) it is reasonable to think that firms are not maintained as SOEs at random. 
Thus, the impressive productivity of SOEs observed in the period from 2007 to 2011 might 
reflect a selection of SOEs, rather than an outcome of a modernization process undertaken by the 
government during 2000s.  
The government may have retained the firms with better management, technology and 
human capital. Thus, our results so far might be biased and we need to properly control for the 
selection of SOEs. In order to do that, we conduct several checks. First, we compare the average 
tfp of privatized SOEs (i.e. those SOEs that became POEs or FOEs during the period under 
analysis) both before and after privatization with that of those remaining SOEs over the entire 
period. Table 2.6 shows that privatized firms have improved their average productivity level 
after privatization. However, the average productivity of privatized firms both before and after 
privatization (1.73 and 1.98) is still lower than that of those remaining SOEs (2.01). This first 
evidence is coherent with the idea that a selection of SOEs based on productivity may have been 
taken place.  
[Table 2.6 about here] 
Second, we compare the average tfp of those firms that remained SOEs over the period 
2001-2011 with that of privatized firms but before privatization and controlling for a vector of 
firm, industry, and province characteristics in a regression framework (Table 2.7).36 
Interestingly, the difference in tfp between firms always remaining SOEs and privatized SOEs 
(before privatization) disappears when industry fixed effects are included in the regression (col. 2 
of Table 2.7). This result suggests that the selection by the government, if at work, was more 
                                                 
36 In Table 2.7, neither FOEs nor privatized SOEs after privatization are included.  
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based on “strategic industries” rather than on strategic “SOEs”. Thus, this evidence partially 
reassures us about the higher productivity of SOEs over POEs (observed especially in the period 
from 2007 to 2011) not entirely due to “selection” but also to the restructuring policies of the 
government.  
[Table 2.7 about here] 
Third, as the probability of being maintained as SOEs is not a random event, we use a 
Heckman 2-stage procedure (Heckman, 1979) to correct for the selection of SOEs. The first 
stage is a probit model to predict the probability that a firm will be retained as SOEs in year t 
(Table 2.8)37. In the second stage, we include the inverse Mills’ ratio retrieved from the first 
stage in the main empirical model. Results are shown in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 and they are in line 
with those shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. After having taken selection into account, SOEs still 
exhibit a higher productivity than POEs (column (1) – table 2.9). Moreover, they also have 
statistically significant higher performance in terms of productivity than FOEs in the period from 
2007 onwards (see column (4) of table 2.10).   
[Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 about here] 
2.5.2.2 Further checks 
We run a battery of robustness checks and present the results in the Appendix. First, we 
extend the empirical model and include the first lag of firm tfp as a further control (Appendix 
A2.11). Indeed, we may have captured a spurious correlation if (i) a higher productivity level the 
previous year is the reason for either being retained by the government or being acquired by a 
foreign investor, and (ii) there is a persistence in firm TFP over time. Second, in order to reduce 
                                                 
37 The dependent variable of the probit model is a dummy being one if a firm is a SOE and zero otherwise. 
The explanatory variables include (1-year lagged) firm-, sector- and province-characteristics. Firm-level 
characteristics include a dummy for whether the firm is managed by central government, export status, tfp, number of 
employees, firm age, the leverage ratio and their squared terms. As suggested by Bai et al. (2009), we also include 
year, industry and province fixed effects plus employment shares of SOEs in each 3-digit industry sector and province, 
and the 1-year changes in these shares. As discussed in section 2.4.1, our main data sample covers the period from 
2001 to 2011. Meanwhile, in this Heckman 2-stage procedure, our data sample is only restricted to the period from 
2002 to 2011 since we lose the year 2001 (the first year in the main sample) when lagging explanatory variables one 
year in the first-stage selection model.           
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the simultaneity issue, we estimate the model with all independent variables included as 1-year 
lagged (Appendix A2.12). The main results are robust to both checks.  
Third, we check if our results are also robust to an alternative way of defining ownership 
dummies. In our definition so far, SOEs are the firms with state participation in equity greater 
than 50% and POEs could be firms with 100% private ownership or having a mix of both private 
and state ownerships where the state account for less than 50% of ownership. However, when 
dealing with state ownership, even a small share of state ownership may influence firm 
performance and productivity38. For example, Inoue et al. (2013) find that minority state 
shareholding facilitates firm performance and investments on building firm capabilities in Brazil. 
So, we divide the group of POEs as defined above into two groups: POEs - now defined as firms 
with 100% private ownership and MIXED enterprises – enterprises with a mix of both private 
and state ownership where state ownership ranges from greater than 0 to 50 percent. Meanwhile 
the definitions of FOEs and SOEs remain the same.  
Regression results with MIXED enterprises as additional ownership group are presented 
in Appendix A2.13. We use model specifications in column (1), (4), and (7) – the models 
without interaction terms - to explain the comparative performance of firms with different 
ownership categories. In whole research period from 2001 to 2011, POEs (now being entirely 
private owned) exhibit lower productivity than both FOEs and the enterprises with state 
ownership, viz. MIXED enterprises (state ownership varying from greater than 0 to 50 percent) 
and SOEs (the state ownership greater than 50%). Moreover, while FOEs are the best performer 
in terms of tfp, among enterprises with state ownership, MIXED enterprises perform better than 
SOEs (see column (1) in Appendix A2.13). It is also interesting to look into the performance 
rankings of these types of firm in the two sub-periods: 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. While POEs 
always perform the worst compared to enterprises in the other ownership types, the rankings in 
terms of productivity among SOEs, MIXED enterprises, and FOEs in the sub-period from 2007-
2011 have a reverse order compared to those in the sub-period from 2001-2006. In the sub-
period from 2001-2006, FOEs are in the top of the rankings, MIXED enterprises are in the 
second, SOEs are in the third (column (4) – Appendix A2.13). In the second sub-period, the 
                                                 
38 We thank Marco Sanfilippo for pointing this out. 
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rankings go with SOEs as the top and then MIXED enterprises and FOEs as the second and third, 
respectively (column (7) – Appendix A2.13).  
These results confirm again our general findings that FOEs and firms with state 
ownership (both greater or less than 50%) show, on average, higher TFP levels than POEs. 
Moreover, while in the sub-period 2001-2006 FOEs have the highest tfp level, in this second 
sub-period 2007-2011, firms with state ownership has close the gap in productivity with FOEs. 
Importantly, we observe that the productivity of SOEs is the highest and even more than both 
MIXED and FOEs in the second sub-period 2007-2011 (column (7) – Appendix A2.13). This is 
in line our finding of the remarkable improvement in terms of productivity of SOEs in the sub-
period when the state-led government policies have geared up. Our findings are also robust to the 
results of the 2nd stage in the Heckman 2-stage procedure to account for the selection of SOEs 
when adding the dummy for MIXED enterprises39. 
Finally, we go on to check if our findings are robust to a different measure of 
productivity by using labor productivity (log of value-added over an employee) as the dependent 
variable and adding the capital-labor ratio to the list of control variables. We run parallel 
analyses to the ones in tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 but now using labor productivity as the 
dependent variable. Results (reported in Appendixes from A2.15 to A2.18) are indeed consistent 
with the findings when we use tfp as the dependent variable. 
2.6 Discussion: the Vietnamese transition in a comparative 
perspective 
The results open the way to a reconsideration of the role of SOEs in the process of 
transition, both with respect to the Vietnamese case and to other countries’ historical 
experiences. 
As for the case of Vietnam, our results do not support the view that the maintenance by 
the state of a long-lasting control of part of the business sector impairs the effects of competition 
on firm productivity. Vu Thanh (2014) is critical about the policies undertaken to modernize 
                                                 
39 Results of the first stage is actually the results in table 2.9 (since we do not change the definition of SOEs 
here, the dependent variable of the first stage is unchanged). Results of the 2nd stage are presented in Appendix 
A2.14. 
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SOEs, as for example, the creation of State Economic Groups (SEG): the author puts forward the 
idea that big SEGs were used to disable WTO accession’s effects and to disguise national 
protection over wide sectors of the economy. This was done by ensuring to SOEs favorable 
access to both land and capital (Nguyen and Le, 2005) 40. Along the same lines, Baccini et al. 
(2017) claim that inefficient SOEs hindered resources’ re-allocation and reduced productivity 
gains that the opening to international trade (WTO accession) could have ensured to the country 
economy. In a counterfactual exercise, they find that the aggregate productivity growth had been 
roughly 50 percent higher, were SOEs be private in Vietnam. They also estimate a gap in 
productivity growth of SOEs’ dominated industries with respect to POEs’ dominated ones.  
Actually, our results on firm performance (both pre- and post-accession into WTO) do 
not support Vu Thanh’s criticism about the reforms of SOEs. Moreover, while the role of 
competition in fostering productivity is confirmed by our empirical analysis, lower productivity 
growth in SOEs’ dominated industries found by Baccini et al. (2017) is fully compatible with the 
fact that the productivity level of SOEs is higher that of POEs in those industries. 
Moreover, our results on the pre-2007 period, which show a productivity advantage of 
FOEs over SOEs and POEs, are in line with those obtained by Huang and Yang (2016). Even if 
their analysis covers a shorter period of time (2000-2008), they show that WTO accession is 
positively related to SOEs’ productivity in a stronger manner than to POEs’ and FOEs’ 
productivity. Consistently, our study highlights remarkable productivity levels of SOEs after 
2007 (Table 2.2). Given the simultaneity of WTO accession and the state-led development 
policies, we cannot disentangle which phenomenon has contributed the most to the observed 
effect. However, we provide some general empirical evidence in favor of the joint effect of 
                                                 
40 While policies of the Vietnamese government aimed at improving the state sector, there is also a concern 
that SOEs may have constrained the development of the private sector. For example, Thang and Freeman (2009) 
showed that, in the period 2000-2003, the greater the presence of SOEs in a province, the lower was the proportion 
of bank lending to POEs and the longer it took for these firms to have access to land. We check if SOEs are 
constraining the development of POEs by regressing the 1-year TFP growth rate of POEs on the employment share 
of SOEs that belong to the same 3-digit industry and are located in the same province (Appendix A2.19). We control 
for firm size, firm age, export status, tfp, the presence of FOEs in terms of employment share in the same 3-digit 
industry and province and we include the vectors of industry, province and year fixed effects. All independent 
variables are included as 1-year lagged in order to limit simultaneity bias. Overall, we find no evidence of SOEs to 
constrain the development of POEs. Conversely, results show that, ceteris paribus, the employment share of SOEs in 
the same industry exhibits a positive correlation with the productivity growth of POEs during the whole period 
(2001-2011) and even more in the sub-period from 2007 to 2011.    
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ownership and market competition in a period of increasing openness of the Vietnamese 
economy and governmental reforms undertaken to improve the governance of SOEs.  
As for the general debate on the role of SOEs during a transition from central planning to 
market economies, it is worth to note that, after 2000, a critical view on the early approaches to 
privatization has taken foot (e.g. Peng et al., 2016). First, a poor institutional environment and a 
weak market for corporate control, does not prevent appropriation in big firms enjoying 
monopolistic power. A comparison of ex-communist EU and CIS countries offers a clear 
evidence of the role that institutional environment has played in determining privatization 
outcomes (Estrin et al. 2009). Second, how privatization is carried out also matters: fast 
privatization without efficient financial infrastructures faces the risk to put big firms on hands of 
crooks and enables the creation of a kleptocracy that spoils big firms and adverse selects 
competent technicians and managers (Black et al., 2000). The impressive rent appropriation and 
tax evasion by new owners convinced Russian governments to launch a re-nationalization 
program (Chernykh, 2011). The major critique on state ownership is based on the relative 
advantage of private property rights in aligning managerial incentives with efficiency goals (e.g. 
Shleifer, 1998). However, this relative advantage depends on the functioning of a market for 
corporate governance and also, on the institutions that regulate the state control over business. 
The balance, in terms of cost and time, is not clear.41  
We put forward that the role of state ownership in transition countries is an open 
question: SOEs have once predicted to be extinct, but they evolved even in western countries to 
be hybrid and account for ten percent of global GDP in recent years (Peng et al. 2016). We 
submit that the high level of productivity shown by Vietnamese SOEs in the period 2007-2011 
may have been an outcome of the state-led development policies undertaken by the government. 
A gradual reform of SOEs buffers them from an abrupt exposition to market selection when 
institutions are still weak (Estrin et al., 2009). Not in contrast with that, we find that market 
competition has been a major driver for reducing productivity gaps across ownership types 
within industries and that privatization’s episodes have positively contributed to firm 
productivity in Vietnam during the period 2001-2011. 
                                                 
41 A similar tradeoff has been faced in western countries dealing with the problem of re-nationalization 
after the financial crisis (Clò et al. 2017) 
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As pointed out in Section 2.5.1, given the evidence on the more favorable conditions at 
which SOEs had access to land and capital for a long period of time (Nguyen and Le, 2005; pp. 
306-309) and the unavailability in the VES database of the information regarding prices at the 
firm-level, we interpret our results as “gross of” the price bias.   
2.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we empirically examine the role of ownership and market competition in 
Vietnamese firms’ TFP in the period 2001-2011. We get two main results. First, both FOEs and 
SOEs have performed better than POEs in terms of TFP levels. While FOEs exhibited the 
highest TFP level in the period 2001-2006, SOEs “closed the gap” with FOEs in the period 
2007-2011. We posit that the remarkable performance of SOEs from 2007 onwards is the result 
of the policies undertaken by the Vietnamese government to restructure them, “gross of” any 
potential omitted price bias in our measure of tfp. Second, competition improves firm average 
productivity across industries and reduces the gaps in productivity among firms of different 
ownership types. These findings are consistent to a series of robustness checks.  
The first result suggests that the state-led development policies have been effective in 
Vietnam. Inside each SOE, there are firm-specific valuable resources that cannot be easily re-
allocated via the market (e.g. Uhlenbruck et al., 2003; Peng et al., 2016). A gradual restructuring 
of SOEs buffers them from an abrupt exposure to market selection when institutions are still 
weak (Estrin et al., 2009). During transition towards a market economy, government intervention 
can work well in preserving firm-specific resources in SOEs. However, SOEs -- either privatized 
or not-- should be fully exposed to market competition when supporting institutions fully 
emerge. 
The second result points out that, in Vietnam during the period 2001-2011, market 
competition has been effective for improving firm “average” productivity and reducing the gaps 
in productivity between POEs and SOEs (or FOEs). Moreover, it has played a complementary 
role to both a restructuring of SOEs and “privatization” episodes. Consequently, we may expect 
further improvements in market competition and the business environment to boost the catching-
up of POEs in terms of productivity levels towards the performance of both FOEs and SOEs.  
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This study is not without limitations and future studies in these areas are called for. First, 
since we do not have information on prices of output and input at the firm level, our measure of 
TFP cannot take account of omitted price bias and may (partially) reflect market power of the 
firm (Van Beveren, 2012). We have conducted an indirect test to confirm the remarkable 
performance of SOEs is the result of the effective restructuring policies undertaken by the 
Vietnamese government rather than just a consequence of the price-bias. To advance the 
literature on Vietnam economic growth and development, future studies should consider a better 
measurement of tfp which corrects for omitted price bias whenever data on firm-level prices are 
available. Second, we point out (in section 2.3) but do not directly test some mechanisms that 
enable the remarkable productivity performance of SOEs such as the modernization of their 
governance and incentives or institutional effects. They are out of the scope of this study given 
the limitation of the data at hands. Studies in China (e.g., Xu, 2000) have confirmed that SOEs 
have improved performance following a series of changes in their internal incentives. Aivazian et 
al. (2005) even shows that even without the need to privatization when the state may still be the 
sole owner, corporatization of SOEs alone can bring significant improvement in SOE efficiency 
in China. Future research in this direction for Vietnam, hence, is warranted.     
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Tables and figures 
 
Figure 2.1 
Framework of analysis: institutional reforms and productivity (adapted from Park et al., 2006) 
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(ii) state-led development policies enhance SOEs’ 
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across industries and to reduce gaps in productivity 
across ownership types. 
 
Tougher market 
competition 
(enhanced by 
WTO accession 
in 2007) 
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Figure 2.2 Number of firms by ownership type; Vietnamese manufacturing; 2001-2011 
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Table 2.1 List and definition of variables 
Variables Definition 
Productivity 
tfp Log of firm’s TFP, estimated by using the IV-GMM modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimator (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) developed in Wooldridge (2009). See Appendix A2.5.  
Ownership and market competition  
SOE Dummy variable equal to 1 for state-owned firms (and 0 otherwise) 
FOE Dummy variable equal to 1 for foreign-owned firms (and 0 otherwise) 
HHI Sum of squares of market shares of all firms in the 4-digit industry the firm belongs to  
Entry Rate Entry rate of the 4-digit industry the firm belongs to 
SOE*HHI Interaction term 
FOE*HHI Interaction term 
SOE*Entry 
Rate Interaction term 
FOE*Entry 
Rate Interaction term 
Control variables 
Import 
penetration 
Ratio of imports to the sum of total domestic production and imports in the same 4-digit industry 
the firm belongs to. See Appendix A2.6. 
Exit Rate Exit rate of the 4-digit industry the firm belongs to 
Leverage 
Ratio Debt over total assets of the firm 
Firm size No. of employees at the end of the year (in log) 
Firm age No. of years since the firm establishment (in log, +1) 
Export 
status A dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports 
Province 
GDP 
growth  
1-year growth rate of the provincial GDP  
Year FE Year fixed effects 
Industry FE Industry fixed effects 
Province FE Province fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
46 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Firm-
characteristics 
2001 
SOEs POEs FOEs 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Firm age 21.4 13.4 6.5 8.4 5.0 3.7 
Value added 2156.1 8729.0 154.8 668.0 2597.6 10918.1 
No. of employees 510.9 807.2 79.1 282.8 367.3 1140.1 
Capital-labor ratio 5.0 9.0 5.2 73.3 34.0 134.3 
tfp 1.6 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.5 
 
2006 
SOEs POEs FOEs 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Firm age 23.9 15.4 5.7 7.6 5.7 4.4 
Value added 4249.0 15097.0 183.0 885.8 2311.1 9080.9 
No. of employees 630.8 956.5 72.4 262.3 493.4 1656.1 
Capital-labor ratio 9.0 21.4 4.8 23.3 14.6 29.5 
tfp 2.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.3 
 
2011 
SOEs POEs FOEs 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Firm age 23.5 17.0 6.2 7.1 7.1 5.1 
Value added 7089.9 35378.9 303.7 2657.0 3515.5 21823.2 
No. of employees 488.9 794.6 58.1 229.4 487.3 1843.2 
Capital-labor ratio 17.2 67.4 6.1 23.0 14.9 32.5 
tfp 2.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 2.2 1.2 
Notes  
Value-added in real terms is calculated as the sum of total wage, depreciation, operating profit before tax, and indirect 
taxes. Capital input is measured as real fixed assets while labor is measured as the number of firm employees, both at 
the end of the year. All monetary variables are expressed in the constant 2010 value in units of 1000 USD. 
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Table 2.3 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; 2001-2011 
      Dependent variable: tfp 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ownership            
SOE 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.30*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
FOE 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Market competition      
HHI  -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.43*** -0.20*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Entry Rate  -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Interactions      
SOE*HHI    0.76***  
    (0.10)  
SOE*Entry Rate     -0.31*** 
     (0.05) 
FOE*HHI    1.52***  
    (0.06)  
FOE*Entry Rate     -0.21*** 
     (0.04) 
Controls      
Exit Rate   0.02 0.04 0.01 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Import Penetration   -0.34*** -0.30*** -0.33*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Leverage Ratio   0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm size   0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm age   0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export status   0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Province GDP growth   0.06 0.05 0.06 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.81*** 0.89*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Observations 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  
Omitted ownership category: POE  
Standard errors in parentheses 
      
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 2.4 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; 2001-2006 and 2007-2011 
 Dependent variable: tfp Dependent variable: tfp 
 2001-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  
Ownership               
SOE 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.15***  0.33*** 0.27*** 0.56***  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  
FOE 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.50***  0.23*** 0.15*** 0.68***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Market competition         
HHI -0.33*** -0.61*** -0.33***  -0.03 -0.16*** -0.02  
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Entry Rate -0.02 -0.03 0.04  -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.07  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Interactions         
SOE*HHI  0.57***    0.94***   
  (0.14)    (0.15)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.19***    -1.16***  
   (0.06)    (0.21)  
FOE*HHI  1.52***    1.44***   
  (0.10)    (0.07)   
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.20***    -2.25***  
   (0.06)    (0.11)  
Controls         
Exit Rate 0.11* 0.13* 0.09  0.12 0.14 0.19*  
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Import Penetration -0.22*** -0.20** -0.21***  -0.19*** -0.11 -0.16**  
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Leverage Ratio 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.14** 0.14** 0.14**  0.01 -0.01 0.06  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  
Constant 0.02 0.09 0.00  0.61*** 0.60*** 0.51***  
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 95,774 95,774 95,774  186,990 186,990 186,990  
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.38  0.37 0.37 0.37  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes:               
Omitted ownership category: POE        
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 2.5 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; firms <= 10 y.o.; 2001-2011 and sub-
periods 
  Dependent variable: tfp Dependent variable: tfp Dependent variable: tfp 
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Ownership                   
SOE 0.43*** 0.34*** 0.61*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.47*** 0.92*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) 
FOE 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.65*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Market competition          
HHI -0.15*** -0.32*** -0.15*** -0.33*** -0.58*** -0.34*** 0.02 -0.06 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Entry Rate 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.13** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Interactions          
SOE*HHI  1.43***   1.51***   1.18***  
  (0.22)   (0.38)   (0.28)  
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.64***   -0.49***   -1.85*** 
   (0.10)   (0.12)   (0.40) 
FOE*HHI  1.28***   1.40***   1.09***  
  (0.07)   (0.11)   (0.09)  
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.16***   -0.15**   -2.27*** 
   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.12) 
Controls          
Exit Rate 0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.14 0.16 0.21* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Import Penetration -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.22** -0.19** -0.21** -0.22*** -0.16** -0.19** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Leverage Ratio 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm size 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm age 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export status 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Province GDP growth 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.01 -0.00 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant 0.10** 0.12*** 0.09** -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 229,390 229,390 229,390 74,986 74,986 74,986 154,404 154,404 154,404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.33 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
50 
 
Table 2.6 Average tfp of privatized SOEs versus always remaining SOEs 
Privatized SOEs Always remaining SOEs 
Before 
privatization After privatization  
1.73 1.98 2.01 
Note: We identify a firm as privatized SOEs when its ownership status changes 
from being an SOE to either a POE or an FOE.  
 
 
Table 2.7 Difference in tfp between always remaining SOEs and privatized SOEs (before 
privatization) 
Dependent variable: tfp 
 1 2 
Dummy (=1) for those firms always remaining SOEs 0.12*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage Ratio -0.36*** -0.31*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Export status 0.02 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
Firm size 0.27*** 0.38*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm age 0.02* -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.20*** 0.23*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Observations 10,867 10,867 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.49 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes 
Notes:   
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2.8 Heckman selection model: first stage (probit); the probability for firms to be 
maintained as SOEs; 2002-2011 
    Dependent variable: dummy =1 for SOEs 
    
Firm managed by central Gov. (t-1) 2.48*** 
 (0.05) 
tfp (t-1) 0.15*** 
 (0.02) 
(tfp)^2 (t-1) -0.01*** 
 (0.00) 
Firm size (t-1) 1.38*** 
 (0.04) 
(Firm size)^2 (t-1) -0.09*** 
 (0.00) 
Firm age (t-1) -0.43*** 
 (0.04) 
 (Firm age)^2 (t-1) 0.21*** 
 (0.01) 
Leverage Ratio (t-1) 0.42*** 
 (0.03) 
(Leverage Ratio)^2 (t-1) -0.04*** 
 (0.01) 
Export status (t-1) -0.18*** 
 (0.02) 
Employment share by industry (t-1) 1.42*** 
 (0.08) 
Employment share by province (t-1) 1.81*** 
 (0.12) 
∆Employment share by industry (t-1 to t) 1.10*** 
 (0.23) 
∆Employment share by province (t-1 to t) 1.08*** 
 (0.20) 
Constant -7.76*** 
 (0.15) 
Observations 194,503 
Year FE Yes 
Province FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: In this Heckman 2-stage procedure, our data sample is only 
restricted to the period from 2002 to 2011 since we lose the year 
2001 (the first year in the main sample) when lagging all 
explanatory variables one year in the first-stage selection model.        
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Table 2.9 Heckman selection model: second stage; ownership, competition and firm 
productivity; 2002-2011 
  Dependent variable: tfp 
 1 2 3  
Ownership        
SOE 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.59***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
FOE 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.45***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Market competition     
HHI -0.17*** -0.42*** -0.17***  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Entry Rate 0.11*** 0.10** 0.25***  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  
Interactions     
SOE*HHI  0.68***   
  (0.11)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.59***  
   (0.07)  
FOE*HHI  1.67***   
  (0.07)   
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.36***  
   (0.06)  
Inverse Mills’ ratio -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.19***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Controls     
Exit Rate -0.14** -0.12** -0.16***  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Import Penetration -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.23***  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Leverage Ratio 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm size 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.08 0.07 0.08  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Constant 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.15***  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 194,503 194,503 194,503  
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.41  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; In this Heckman 2-stage procedure, our 
data sample is only restricted to the period from 2002 to 2011 since we lose 
the year 2001 (the first year in the main sample) when lagging all 
explanatory variables one year in the first-stage selection model.           
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Table 2.10 Heckman selection model: second stage; ownership, competition and firm 
productivity; 2002-2006 and 2007-2011 
 Dependent variable: tfp 
  2002-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ownership             
SOE 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.66*** 0.59*** 0.89*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
FOE 0.52*** 0.40*** 0.61*** 0.29*** 0.21*** 0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Market competition       
HHI -0.00 -0.34** 0.00 -0.06 -0.21*** -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Entry Rate 0.11 0.08 0.24*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Interactions       
SOE*HHI  0.47***   0.91***  
  (0.15)   (0.16)  
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.31***   -1.21*** 
   (0.08)   (0.23) 
FOE*HHI  1.69***   1.58***  
  (0.12)   (0.08)  
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.31***   -2.05*** 
   (0.08)   (0.12) 
Inverse Mills’ ratio -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Controls       
Exit Rate 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Import Penetration -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.15* -0.07 -0.13 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Leverage Ratio 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm size 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm age 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export status 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Province GDP growth 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.19* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant 0.18** 0.27*** 0.13 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 60,471 60,471 60,471 134,032 134,032 134,032 
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; In this Heckman 2-
stage procedure, our data sample is only restricted to the period from 2002 to 2011 since we lose the year 2001 (the first year in 
the main sample) when lagging all explanatory variables one year in the first-stage selection model.           
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Appendixes  
A2.1 Procedure to convert the old Vietnamese Standard Industrial Classification system 
(VSIC 93) into the most recent one (VSIC 07) 
We develop a probabilistic routine to adjust the old industrial classification (VSIC 93), 
not used anymore after 2010, into the new industrial classification (VSIC 07). Any research that 
wants to combine VES’s data before and after 2010 need to overcome this issue to have a panel 
of firms classified with a consistent industrial classification. 
Each firm in the VES database (with a unique ID, derived from the firm’s tax code) is 
classified as belonging to an industry following the VSIC. There are two versions of the VSIC: 
VSIC 93 (ver. 1993) and VSIC 07 (ver. 2007), which were respectively built based on United 
Nation’s ISIC 3 and ISIC 4. The old version (VSIC 93) was applied to enterprises surveyed from 
2000 to 2005, while the new version (VSIC 07) has been applied since 2006 onwards. A 
conversion of the VSIC 93 into VSIC07 is thus needed for the cohorts prior to 2006. The 
procedure we follow for the conversion is based on two steps.  
First, we create a concordance table at 4-digit level between VSIC93 and VSIC07. We 
make use of the fact that, GSO still keeps assigning both the old VSIC 93 code and the new 
VSIC 07 code for each enterprise surveyed between 2006 to 2010. From this co-assignment, we 
build the concordance table which captures every possible correspondence between VSIC 93 and 
VSIC 07 codes. There are both one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences. In case of one-to-
many correspondence, an empirical probability distribution is built based on the frequencies at 
which each industry in the old system is associated with the corresponding industries in the new 
system. For example, if an industry X in VSIC 93 is associated with three industries Y1, Y2, Y3 
of VSIC 07, the empirical probability distribution will tell us the probabilities that X will be 
associated with Y1, Y2, and Y3.  
Second, if an enterprise belongs to an industry X in VSIC 93, which is associated with 
three industries Y1, Y2, Y3 in VSIC 07, it will be randomly assigned to either Y1, Y2, or Y3 by 
using the empirical probability distribution of X being associated with Y1, Y2, and Y3 described 
above. 
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There are cases (about than 0.5%) where a firm in the VES from 2000 to 2005 does not 
show the information about the VSIC03, giving us no clues to assign the corresponding  code in 
the VSIC07. We fill the missing information by using the same VSIC07 code that assigned those 
enterprises in the next available year from 2005 onwards. In particular, information in 2006 will 
be used to fill the missing information in 2005 and that for 2005 in turn will be used to fill the 
missing in 2004, and so on and so forth.  
By doing this, we assume enterprises not to change their industry over time. Indeed, a 
time-invariant (modal) industry code is assigned to each firm. As a robustness check, we also 
calculate TFP and repeat the analysis for the case in which firms are allowed to switch industry 
over time. The main results are confirmed.   
The STATA code for this procedure is available from the authors upon request. 
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A2.2 Comparison of our sample with total population 
 
 
Year Our sample Total population Coverage ratio 
2001 10114 12353 81.9% 
2002 12614 14794 85.3% 
2003 14584 16916 86.2% 
2004 16719 20531 81.4% 
2005 18854 24017 78.5% 
2006 22889 25086 91.2% 
2007 26320 29182 90.2% 
2008 34328 36459 94.2% 
2009 38602 42894 90.0% 
2010 46318 45472 101.9% 
2011 41422 52587 78.8% 
Total 282764 320291 88.3% 
Note: Information about total population of manufacturing are 
taken from the official number reported by GSO in their 
website (www.gso.gov.vn) 
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A2.3 Ownership classification 
There are 14 ownership types defined by the GSO and we re-classify them into 3 mutually 
exclusive groups. SOEs are the firms with state participation of at least 50% ownership. POEs are 
the firms with entirely private ownership and the ones where state ownership is less than or equal 
50%. Cooperatives enter into the POEs category because they are essentially private business in 
Vietnam. These should be distinguished from collectives/cooperatives in China, which are 
enterprises collectively owned by employees and local governments (e.g. Xu et al., 2014). FOEs 
comprise both fully owned foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures established between foreign and 
local partners in Vietnam.   
 
  
 
Notes:  
a Our classification scheme is very close to the one adopted by Huang and Yang (2016). 
 
 
  
Code Ownership types as defined by GSO Our classificationa  
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
Central SOEs (supervised by central government) 
Local SOEs (supervised by province-level government) 
Central state-owned limited liability companies 
Central state-owned limited liability companies 
Joint stock companies with state ownership of more than 50% 
SOEs 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
Cooperatives 
Private enterprises (sole proprietorship) 
Partnership companies 
Private limited companies 
Joint stock companies without state ownership 
Joint stock companies with state ownership of less than or equal 50% 
POEs 
12 
13 
14 
Wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries 
Joint ventures (between SOE and foreign partners) 
Joint ventures (between non-state company and foreign partners) 
FOEs 
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A2.4 Breakdown of firms by ownership and industry in 2001 and 2011 
Each cell has three rows. First row shows the frequency, the second is “row” percentage 
while the third one shows “column” percentage. 
VSIC 07 (2-digit industry) 
2001 2011 
SOEs POEs FOEs Total SOEs POEs FOEs Total 
10 Food 176 2,137 110 2,423 60 4,204 308 4,572 
 7.26 88.2 4.54 100 1.31 91.95 6.74 100 
  14.3 27.44 10.04 23.96 9.65 11.61 6.7 11.04 
11 Beverages 75 452 21 548 27 1,408 35 1,470 
  13.69 82.48 3.83 100 1.84 95.78 2.38 100 
  6.09 5.8 1.92 5.42 4.34 3.89 0.76 3.55 
12 Tobacco 18 5 1 24 16 3 2 21 
  75 20.83 4.17 100 76.19 14.29 9.52 100 
  1.46 0.06 0.09 0.24 2.57 0.01 0.04 0.05 
13 Textiles 55 257 69 381 27 1,370 289 1,686 
  14.44 67.45 18.11 100 1.6 81.26 17.14 100 
  4.47 3.3 6.3 3.77 4.34 3.78 6.29 4.07 
14 Wearing 88 382 118 588 35 2,789 605 3,429 
 apparel 14.97 64.97 20.07 100 1.02 81.34 17.64 100 
  7.15 4.91 10.77 5.81 5.63 7.7 13.17 8.28 
15 Leather  35 151 65 251 15 695 244 954 
 processing 13.94 60.16 25.9 100 1.57 72.85 25.58 100 
  2.84 1.94 5.93 2.48 2.41 1.92 5.31 2.3 
16 Wood  48 633 34 715 17 3,120 117 3,254 
 Processing 6.71 88.53 4.76 100 0.52 95.88 3.6 100 
  3.9 8.13 3.1 7.07 2.73 8.62 2.55 7.86 
17 Paper 41 372 25 438 17 1,487 126 1,630 
 product 9.36 84.93 5.71 100 1.04 91.23 7.73 100 
  3.33 4.78 2.28 4.33 2.73 4.11 2.74 3.94 
18 Printing 119 190 6 315 65 2,526 66 2,657 
  37.78 60.32 1.9 100 2.45 95.07 2.48 100 
  9.67 2.44 0.55 3.11 10.45 6.98 1.44 6.41 
19 Refined 2 9 2 13 2 57 5 64 
 Petroleum 15.38 69.23 15.38 100 3.13 89.06 7.81 100 
  0.16 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.32 0.16 0.11 0.15 
20 Chemicals 47 206 82 335 37 1,212 280 1,529 
  14.03 61.49 24.48 100 2.42 79.27 18.31 100 
  3.82 2.65 7.48 3.31 5.95 3.35 6.09 3.69 
21 Pharmaceu- 31 68 12 111 12 253 32 297 
 tical 27.93 61.26 10.81 100 4.04 85.19 10.77 100 
  2.52 0.87 1.09 1.1 1.93 0.7 0.7 0.72 
22 Rubber and 30 408 86 524 23 2,350 473 2,846 
 plastics 5.73 77.86 16.41 100 0.81 82.57 16.62 100 
  2.44 5.24 7.85 5.18 3.7 6.49 10.29 6.87 
23 Non-metallic 182 840 50 1,072 81 2,912 132 3,125 
 mineral 16.98 78.36 4.66 100 2.59 93.18 4.22 100 
  14.78 10.79 4.56 10.6 13.02 8.04 2.87 7.54 
24 Basic metals 19 105 20 144 20 768 85 873 
  13.19 72.92 13.89 100 2.29 87.97 9.74 100 
  1.54 1.35 1.82 1.42 3.22 2.12 1.85 2.11 
25 Fabricated  74 618 101 793 45 5,640 524 6,209 
 metal products 9.33 77.93 12.74 100 0.72 90.84 8.44 100 
  6.01 7.94 9.22 7.84 7.23 15.58 11.4 14.99 
26 Computer  15 45 42 102 13 300 226 539 
 and electronics 14.71 44.12 41.18 100 2.41 55.66 41.93 100 
  1.22 0.58 3.83 1.01 2.09 0.83 4.92 1.3 
27 Electrical 27 110 52 189 17 611 187 815 
 equipment 14.29 58.2 27.51 100 2.09 74.97 22.94 100 
  2.19 1.41 4.74 1.87 2.73 1.69 4.07 1.97 
28 Other  44 136 19 199 14 765 113 892 
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VSIC 07 (2-digit industry) 
2001 2011 
SOEs POEs FOEs Total SOEs POEs FOEs Total 
 machinery 22.11 68.34 9.55 100 1.57 85.76 12.67 100 
  3.57 1.75 1.73 1.97 2.25 2.11 2.46 2.15 
29 Motor  14 41 31 86 14 159 135 308 
 vehicles 16.28 47.67 36.05 100 4.55 51.62 43.83 100 
  1.14 0.53 2.83 0.85 2.25 0.44 2.94 0.74 
30 Other trans- 58 139 38 235 44 395 122 561 
 port equipment 24.68 59.15 16.17 100 7.84 70.41 21.75 100 
  4.71 1.79 3.47 2.32 7.07 1.09 2.66 1.35 
31 Furniture 18 350 45 413 5 2,106 225 2,336 
  4.36 84.75 10.9 100 0.21 90.15 9.63 100 
  1.46 4.49 4.11 4.08 0.8 5.82 4.9 5.64 
32 Other 4 89 62 155 4 535 236 775 
 manufacturing 2.58 57.42 40 100 0.52 69.03 30.45 100 
  0.32 1.14 5.66 1.53 0.64 1.48 5.14 1.87 
33 Repair of 11 44 5 60 12 540 28 580 
 machinery 18.33 73.33 8.33 100 2.07 93.1 4.83 100 
  0.89 0.57 0.46 0.59 1.93 1.49 0.61 1.4 
Total 1231 7,787 1096 10,114 622 36,205 4595 41,422 
  12.17 76.99 10.84 100 1.5 87.41 11.09 100 
  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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A2.5 The modified Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator developed by Wooldridge (2009)  
We start with a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
      yit = β0 + β1kit + β2lit + β3m it + ωit + eit         (1) 
where lower-case letters refer to natural logarithms of yit (deflated-sales), kit (capital), lit 
(labor), and mit (material). Among the inputs for production function, kit (capital) is the quasi-fixed 
state variable accumulated from past investments while lit or mit (log of labor or material) are free-
adjustment inputs which can be correlated with ωit (i.e. the firm know its implicit productivity 
when taking decisions on labor and material). While Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that mit 
is the only free-adjustment input, we follow Ackerberg, Caves, Frazier (2006) by assuming that 
both lit or m it are free-adjustment inputs. It means that firms also determine lit based on ki, ωit or 
lit=l(ki, ωit).  
It is assumed that eit is independent of all current and past inputs, kit, lit, mit (t=1,2, …,T): 
E(eit| kit, lit, m it, kit-1, lit-1, m it-1, …) = 0 with t=1,2, …,T. We also assume that productivity (ωit) is 
(i) a monotonic function of mit, kit:  ωit=g(m it, kit) and (ii) follow an autoregressive process of order 
1 (AR(1)): ωit =E(ωit|ωit-1) + ait. The innovation in productivity AR(1) process, ait, is not only 
independent of ωit-1=g(kit-1,m it-1) but also independent of kit as kit is quasi-fixed and being 
determined from past periods.  
Hence, we can write: ωit =E(ωit|ωit-1) + ait= f[g(kit-1,m it-1)] + ait = h(kit-1,m it-1) + ait where 
h()=f[g()] is assumed to be monotonic function of kit-1 and mit-1. Then (1) becomes: 
yit = β0 + β1kit + h(kit-1,m it-1) + β2lit + β3m it + εit       (2) 
where εit= ait + eit   is independent of kit, kit-1, mit-1 but can be correlated with lit and mit (i.e. 
lit and mit are endogenous). 
If we approximate h() by sum of polynomials order 2 of kit-1 and mit-1, we can estimate (2) 
using GMM method in STATA: 
ivreg2   yit   kit   kit-1   m it-1   kit-1*m it-1  k2it-1   m2it-1   (lit  m it = lit-1  m it-2), gmm2s cluster(firm_id) 
We can approximate h() by polynomials of kit-1 and m it-1 up to order 3 (Wooldridge, 2009).   
The function h() is represented by kit-1   m it-1   kit-1*m it-1  k2it-1  m2it-1   in the command line. 
lit and   mit are endogenous (i.e. can be correlated with εit) and being instrumented by their own 
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lags lit-1 and mit-2: while the other variables are exogenous and being instrumented by themselves. 
Then the vector of instrument is zit = [1  kit   kit-1  m it-1   kit-1*m it-1  k2it-1  m2it-1   lit-1  m it-2]. The 
moment equations used to identify parameters in (2) in the Stata’s command line are E(z’it* εit) = 
0 
In this study, we specially use the production function with value-added on the left-hand 
side. The equivalence of (2) when value-added is on the left-hand side is: 
vit = β0 + β1kit + h(kit-1,m it-1) + β2lit + εit       (2’) 
In this case, we only have one endogenous variable lit which will be instrumented by its 
own lag lit-1. The vector of instrument z’it = [1  kit   kit-1  m it-1   kit-1*m it-1  k2it-1  m2it-1   lit-1] then is 
used to identify parameters in (2’) from the following moment equations E(z’it* εit) = 0. The 
command line in STATA is: 
ivreg2   vit   kit   kit-1   m it-1   kit-1*m it-1  k2it-1   m2it-1   (lit = lit-1), gmm2s cluster(firm_id) 
We estimate the coefficient 𝛽ଵ,෢ 𝛽ଶ෢ separately for each 2-digit manufacturing sectors, and 
the firm’s TFP (in log) is calculated as 𝜔ෝ௜௧ = 𝑣௜௧ − 𝛽መଵ𝑘௜௧ − 𝛽መଶ𝑙௜௧. It should be noted that we also 
include dummies for year in the ivreg2 command to control for the difference in technologies 
across years. The estimated 𝛽ଵ ෢  and 𝛽ଶ෢ are reported in the table below.  
Input coefficients estimated for each 2-digit manufacturing sector 
Sector code (VSIC07) Sector name  𝜷𝟏 ෢  𝜷𝟐෢  
10 Food 0.25 0.45 
11 Beverages 0.16 0.74 
12 Tobacco 0.31 0.74 
13 Textiles 0.20 0.61 
14 Wearing Apparel 0.08 0.81 
15 Leather products 0.09 0.77 
16 Wood and product of woods 0.14 0.68 
17 Paper 0.15 0.63 
18 Printing 0.16 0.73 
19 Refine petroleum products 0.26 0.84 
20 Chemicals 0.22 0.51 
21 Pharmaceuticals 0.20 0.48 
22 Rubber and Plastics 0.18 0.62 
23 Non-metalic mineral 0.16 0.70 
24 Basic metals 0.25 0.50 
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Sector code (VSIC07) Sector name  𝜷𝟏 ෢  𝜷𝟐෢  
25 Fabricated metal  0.17 0.68 
26 Electronics, computer, And optical equipment 0.12 0.62 
27 Electrical equipment 0.20 0.50 
28 Machinery and equipment 0.13 0.67 
29 Motor vehicles 0.25 0.42 
30 Other transport equipment 0.18 0.62 
31 Furniture 0.12 0.72 
32 Other manufacturing 0.15 0.67 
33 Repair and installation of machinery 0.12 0.68 
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A2.6 The measure of import penetration 
Import penetration is the ratio of imports to the sum of sales and imports by 4-digit VSIC 
07 industry. Data on imports have been extracted from UN Comtrade database and classified by 
the HS classification system of traded products (HS1 to HS 4). We use the following procedure to 
convert import data at HS’s 6-digit product level into 4-digit VSIC 07’s industrial sectors. 
First, we obtain the concordance tables from HS systems to ISIC Rev.3 from World 
Integrated Trade Solution’s website (http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html). 
Vietnam reports trade data in different versions of HS (HS1 to HS4) from years to years. As World 
Integrated Trade Solution only provides the concordance from HS 1, HS2, and HS3 to ISIC Rev.3, 
we will convert import values by HS4 to HS3 using the conversion table between HS4 and HS3 
provided by World Customs Organization 
(http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-and-
tools/hs_nomenclature_2012/correlations-tables.aspx). When a HS4 category is associated with 
more than one HS3 categories, we split the import value by the HS4 category equally between all 
associated HS3 categories.  Moreover, as VSIC 93 is developed on the basis of ISIC Rev.3; 
specifically, it is a mirror of ISIC Rev.3 with only minor difference. Therefore, we have got 
concordance tables from HS systems (1 to 3) to VSIC 93, in fact.  
Second, we map import data classified by HS products to VSIC 07’s 4-digit sectors, using 
the HS to VSIC 93 concordance above and the concordance from VSIC 93 to VSIC 07 provided 
by GSO. We manually input the associated VSIC 07 codes for 5 specific VSIC 93 codes, viz. 1911, 
2330, 2412, 3313, 3720, which are missing in the concordance from GSO. When a VSIC 93 
categories maps into two or more VSIC 07 categories, we split the import value equally between 
all VSIC 07 categories linked to the VSIC 93 category.  
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A2.7 Summary statistics and correlation matrix of variables in the dataset 
                
  Variables  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 tfp (in log) 1.19 1.06 1.00            
2 SOE 0.03 0.18 0.13 1.00           
3 FOE 0.11 0.31 0.25 -0.06 1.00          
4 HHI 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 1.00         
5 Import penetration 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.24 1.00        
6 Entry Rate 0.23 0.11 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.05 1.00       
7 Exit Rate 0.10 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.20 1.00      
8 Leverage ratio 0.45 0.39 0.21 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.00 1.00     
9 Firm size  3.23 1.55 0.36 0.29 0.38 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.23 1.00    
10 Firm age 1.55 0.93 0.25 0.27 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 0.11 0.35 1.00   
11 Export status 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.39 0.13 1.00  
12 Province GDP growth 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 1.00 
N=282,764 obs. 
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A2.8 Robustness check: running regressions in table 2.3 in an alternative way  
In this robustness check, we rerun the regressions in table 2.3 in an alternative way. This alternative strategy is to mitigate the concern 
that including four time-variant industry-level variables, viz. HHI, entry rate, exit rate, and import penetration together in one 
regression may cause a multicollinearity issue since these variables are likely to be highly correlated to each other. We first run a 
regression with ownership dummies, firm-level controls, and adding industry-year and province-year fixed effects. For this practice, 
we get results reported in column 1 and 2 of the table below. We go on dropping industry-year fixed effects and replace them by 
industry fixed effects only and start to include one by one among the four industry-level variables above and their interactions with 
ownership. Results in columns from 2 to 7 shows that the estimated coefficients of these four industry-level variables when we include 
them one by one are the same as those when we include them altogether. Hence, basically it does not matter whether we include them 
one by one or altogether in the same regression and the likely multicollinearity issue is not a real concern. The estimation results we 
obtain here in column (7) are also almost similar to the ones in column (3) of table 2.3. We do the same robustness check for 
regressions in table 2.4 and 2.5 for the two sub-periods, viz. 2001-2006 and 2007-2011 and put results in Appendix A2.9 and 
Appendix A2.10.    
  Dependent variable: tfp; period 2001-2011 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 Ownership                    
SOE 1.00*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.29***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
FOE 0.78*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.36***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Industry-level 
determinants           
HHI   -0.15***    -0.21*** -0.45*** -0.21***  
   (0.04)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  
Entry Rate    -0.07*   -0.02 -0.02 0.04  
    (0.04)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  
Exit Rate     -0.09*  -0.10** -0.09* -0.12**  
     (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Import Penetration      -0.26*** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.30***  
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  
Interactions           
SOE*HHI        0.81***   
        (0.10)   
FOE*HHI        1.53***   
        (0.06)   
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SOE*Entry Rate         -0.29***  
         (0.05)  
FOE*Entry Rate         -0.23***  
         (0.05)  
Firm-level controls           
Leverage Ratio  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm size  0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status  0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Constant 0.87*** 0.02 -0.07* -0.08* -0.12*** -0.04 0.07 0.09* 0.05  
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764 282,764  
Adjusted R^2 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38  
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No No No No  
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.9 Robustness check: running regressions in table 2.4 in an alternative way  
 
  Dependent variable: tfp; period 2001-2006 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
  Ownership                    
SOE 0.96*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.14***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  
FOE 0.84*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.48***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Industry-level 
determinants           
HHI   -0.28***    -0.35*** -0.64*** -0.35***  
   (0.10)    (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Entry Rate    -0.10*   -0.10 -0.10* -0.05  
    (0.05)   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Exit Rate     0.01  0.05 0.07 0.04  
     (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Import Penetration      -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.25***  
      (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Interactions 
           
SOE*HHI        0.58***   
        (0.14)   
FOE*HHI        1.53***   
        (0.10)   
SOE*Entry Rate         -0.16**  
         (0.06)  
FOE*Entry Rate         -0.16***  
         (0.06)  
Firm-level controls           
Leverage Ratio  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Export status  0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Constant 0.88*** -0.06 -0.08 -0.12* -0.18*** -0.15*** 0.04 0.11 0.02  
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Observations 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774 95,774  
Adjusted R^2 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38  
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No No No No  
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
69 
 
A2.10 Robustness check: running regressions in table 2.5 in an alternative way  
 
 
  Dependent variable: tfp; period 2007-2011 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
 Ownership                    
SOE 1.08*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.55***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  
FOE 0.74*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.68***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Industry-level 
determinants           
HHI   -0.04    -0.07 -0.22*** -0.06  
   (0.05)    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Entry Rate    -0.27***   -0.27*** -0.26*** 0.03  
    (0.07)   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Exit Rate     -0.10  -0.13 -0.11 -0.07  
     (0.11)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Import Penetration      -0.12* -0.15* -0.07 -0.12*  
      (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)  
Interactions           
SOE*HHI        0.96***   
        (0.15)   
FOE*HHI        1.45***   
        (0.07)   
SOE*Entry Rate         -1.16***  
         (0.21)  
FOE*Entry Rate         -2.31***  
         (0.11)  
Firm-level controls           
Leverage Ratio  0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11***  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Export status  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21***  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Constant 1.02*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.24***  
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990 186,990  
Adjusted R^2 0.26 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38  
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes No No No No No No No  
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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A2.11 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; adding the first lag of tfp in the vector of controls 
 Dependent variable: tfp 
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
Ownership             
SOE 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.18***  0.14*** 0.11*** 0.17***  0.18*** 0.14*** 0.31***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)  
FOE 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.26***  0.28*** 0.22*** 0.32***  0.17*** 0.12*** 0.40***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Market competition             
HHI -0.04 -0.19*** -0.04  0.10 -0.10 0.10  -0.00 -0.09 0.00  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Entry Rate 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.23***  0.17*** 0.16*** 0.23***  -0.05 -0.06 0.14*  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI  0.51***    0.48***    0.62***   
  (0.09)    (0.13)    (0.14)   
FOE*HHI  0.91***    0.89***    0.93***   
  (0.06)    (0.10)    (0.08)   
SOE*EntryRate   -0.26***    -0.11    -0.68***  
   (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.20)  
FOE*EntryRate   -0.25***    -0.14**    -1.20***  
   (0.05)    (0.07)    (0.11)  
Lagged productivity             
tfpt-1 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46***  0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***  0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Controls             
Exit Rate -0.09* -0.08 -0.10*  -0.04 -0.03 -0.06  0.16 0.16 0.20*  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Import Penetration -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.18***  -0.05 -0.03 -0.04  -0.20*** -0.16** -0.19**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Leverage Ratio 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm size 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13***  0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***  -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.02 0.01 0.02  0.06 0.06 0.06  -0.09 -0.10 -0.06  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  
Constant 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.13***  0.22*** 0.27*** 0.20***  0.41*** 0.41*** 0.35***  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Observations 194,503 194,503 194,503  60,471 60,471 60,471  134,032 134,032 134,032  
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54  0.58 0.58 0.58  0.52 0.52 0.52  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: omitted ownership category: POE; standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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A2.12 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; regressors as 1-year lagged variables 
 Dependent variable: tfp 
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
Ownership             
SOE(t-1) 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.28***  0.13*** 0.08*** 0.16***  0.32*** 0.24*** 0.60***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  
FOE(t-1) 0.34*** 0.24*** 0.32***  0.49*** 0.37*** 0.47***  0.26*** 0.18*** 0.73***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  
Market competition             
HHI(t-1) -0.14*** -0.39*** -0.14***  0.00 -0.32*** 0.00  -0.05 -0.20*** -0.04  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Entry Rate(t-1) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***  0.09* 0.09* 0.09*  -0.10 -0.08 0.24***  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI(t-1)  0.82***    0.70***    1.11***   
  (0.10)    (0.13)    (0.16)   
FOE*HHI(t-1)  1.57***    1.49***    1.54***   
  (0.06)    (0.10)    (0.08)   
SOE*EntryRate(t-1)   -0.23***    -0.07*    -1.41***  
   (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.22)  
FOE*EntryRate(t-1)   0.08**    0.04    -2.27***  
   (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.12)  
Controls             
Exit Rate(t-1) -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.20***  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.34***  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  
Import Penetration (t-1) -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.27***  0.04 0.03 0.03  0.11 0.16* 0.13  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Leverage ratio(t-1) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size (t-1) 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***  0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27***  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age (t-1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02***  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status(t-1) 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***  0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05***  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.23***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth (t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.05 0.04 0.05  0.06 0.05 0.11  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  
Constant 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24***  0.11 0.18** 0.11  0.46*** 0.47*** 0.35***  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Observations 209,614 209,614 209,614  66,598 66,598 66,598  143,016 143,016 143,016  
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39  0.41 0.41 0.41  0.38 0.38 0.38  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes:              
Omitted ownership category: POE 
Standard errors in parentheses            
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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A2.13 Ownership, competition and firm productivity; adding Mixed ownership group (enterprises in which the state possesses 
more than 0 but less than or equal 50% of ownership) 
 Dependent variable: tfp 
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
Ownership             
SOE 0.25*** 0.20*** 0.34***  0.12*** 0.08*** 0.19***  0.36*** 0.30*** 0.62***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  
FOE 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.39***  0.45*** 0.34*** 0.52***  0.25*** 0.17*** 0.71***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
MIXED 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.43***  0.30*** 0.26*** 0.36***  0.31*** 0.27*** 0.78***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  
Market competition             
HHI -0.20*** -0.45*** -0.20***  -0.33*** -0.63*** -0.33***  -0.02 -0.18*** -0.01  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
entryRate -0.05 -0.05 0.03  -0.03 -0.03 0.05  -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.02  
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI  0.80***    0.59***    0.98***   
  (0.10)    (0.14)    (0.15)   
FOE*HHI  1.56***    1.56***    1.49***   
  (0.06)    (0.10)    (0.07)   
MIXED*HHI  0.71***    0.59***    0.77***   
  (0.13)    (0.22)    (0.16)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.34***    -0.21***    -1.28***  
   (0.05)    (0.06)    (0.21)  
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.23***    -0.22***    -2.32***  
   (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.11)  
MIXED*Entry Rate   -0.46***    -0.20    -2.38***  
   (0.10)    (0.13)    (0.24)  
Controls             
Exit Rate 0.03 0.04 0.01  0.11* 0.12* 0.09  0.12 0.13 0.19*  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Import Penetration -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.33***  -0.22*** -0.20** -0.21***  -0.18** -0.09 -0.16**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Leverage Ratio 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15***  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***  0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.07 0.06 0.07  0.14** 0.14** 0.14**  0.00 -0.01 0.05  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  
Constant 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16***  0.04 0.11 0.02  0.62*** 0.60*** 0.50***  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 282,764 282,764 282,764  95,774 95,774 95,774  186,990 186,990 186,990  
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.38  0.38 0.38 0.38  0.37 0.37 0.37  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POEs (now being firms with 100% private ownership); Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.14 Heckman selection model: second stage; ownership (adding MIXED OWNERSHIP), competition and firm productivity; 
2002-2011, 2002-2006, and 2007-2011 
 
 Dependent variable: tfp 
  2002-2011 2002-2006 2007-2011 
VARIABLES 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
Ownership                      
SOE 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.60***  0.45*** 0.41*** 0.55***  0.64*** 0.56*** 0.91***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  
FOE 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.48***  0.54*** 0.42*** 0.64***  0.31*** 0.23*** 0.73***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  
MIXED 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.55***  0.36*** 0.32*** 0.48***  0.31*** 0.27*** 0.75***  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)  
Market competition             
HHI -0.18*** -0.46*** -0.17***  -0.02 -0.40*** -0.01  -0.06 -0.23*** -0.05  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)  
entryRate 0.11*** 0.10** 0.28***  0.11 0.09 0.27***  -0.33*** -0.34*** 0.06  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI  0.77***    0.53***    1.03***   
  (0.11)    (0.15)    (0.16)   
FOE*HHI  1.73***    1.75***    1.65***   
  (0.07)    (0.12)    (0.08)   
MIXED*HHI  0.71***    0.67***    0.81***   
  (0.13)    (0.25)    (0.16)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.62***    -0.33***    -1.33***  
   (0.07)    (0.08)    (0.22)  
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.40***    -0.34***    -2.13***  
   (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.12)  
MIXED*Entry Rate   -0.99***    -0.49**    -2.29***  
   (0.15)    (0.19)    (0.25)  
Inverse Mills’ ratio -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16***  -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.23***  -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.19***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Controls             
Exit Rate -0.14** -0.12** -0.16***  0.05 0.07 0.01  -0.00 -0.00 0.08  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  
Import Penetration -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.24***  -0.15 -0.12 -0.13  -0.14* -0.04 -0.12  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  
Leverage Ratio 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05***  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Firm size 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***  0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Export 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***  0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.09* 0.08 0.09*  0.09 0.08 0.09  0.14 0.12 0.18*  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Constant 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.16***  0.21** 0.30*** 0.15*  0.52*** 0.51*** 0.40***  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Observations 194,503 194,503 194,503  60,471 60,471 60,471  134,032 134,032 134,032  
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.41  0.43 0.44 0.44  0.40 0.40 0.40  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POEs (now being firms with 100% private ownership); Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.15 Robustness to labor productivity - Ownership, competition and firm labor productivity (ln(VA/employee))  
 
  Dependent variable: labor productivity  
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
VARIABLES 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
 Ownership                       
SOE 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.23***  0.05*** 0.04** 0.08***  0.29*** 0.24*** 0.45***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)  
FOE 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.33***  0.37*** 0.28*** 0.44***  0.21*** 0.16*** 0.55***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Market competition             
HHI -0.25*** -0.40*** -0.25***  -0.35*** -0.56*** -0.35***  -0.04 -0.13** -0.03  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)  
Entry Rate -0.07** -0.07** -0.01  -0.04 -0.04 0.02  -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.15**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI  0.43***    0.21    0.76***   
  (0.10)    (0.14)    (0.15)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.21***    -0.10*    -0.79***  
   (0.05)    (0.06)    (0.21)  
FOE*HHI  1.05***    1.19***    0.89***   
  (0.06)    (0.10)    (0.07)   
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.23***    -0.24***    -1.75***  
   (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.11)  
Firm-level controls             
Ln (K/L) 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23***  0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Exit Rate 0.03 0.04 0.02  0.12* 0.13** 0.10  0.11 0.12 0.16  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Import Penetration -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.24***  -0.19** -0.18** -0.18**  -0.19** -0.14* -0.16**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  
Leverage Ratio 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***  0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm size 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.08* 0.07 0.08*  0.15** 0.14** 0.15**  0.07 0.06 0.11  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  
Constant -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.15***  -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.31***  0.17*** 0.16*** 0.09*  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  
Observations 282,764 282,764 282,764  95,774 95,774 95,774  186,990 186,990 186,990  
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35  0.34 0.34 0.34  0.33 0.33 0.33  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.16 Robustness to labor productivity - Difference in labor productivity (ln(VA/employee)) 
between always remaining SOEs and privatized SOEs (before privatization) 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable: labor productivity  
 1 2 
      
Dummy(=1) for those firms who always remaining SOEs 0.13*** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(K/L) 0.36*** 0.29*** 
 0.01 0.01 
Leverage Ratio -0.48*** -0.34*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Export status -0.07*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm size 0.11*** 0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm age 0.02 -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.08 -0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Observations 10,867 10,867 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.50 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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A2.17 Robustness to labor productivity - Heckman selection model: first stage (probit); the 
probability for firms to be maintained as SOEs; 2002-2011 
 
 
Dependen variable: dummy=1 for SOEs 
    
Firm managed by central Gov. (t-1) 2.47*** 
 (0.05) 
Labor productivity (t-1) 0.16*** 
 (0.01) 
Labor productivity ^2 (t-1) -0.02*** 
 (0.00) 
Firm size (t-1) 1.41*** 
 (0.04) 
(Firm size)^2 (t-1) -0.09*** 
 (0.00) 
Firm age (t-1) -0.45*** 
 (0.04) 
(Firm age)^2 (t-1) 0.21*** 
 (0.01) 
Leverage Ratio (t-1) 0.41*** 
 (0.03) 
(Leverage Ratio)^2 (t-1) -0.04*** 
 (0.01) 
Export status (t-1) -0.19*** 
 (0.02) 
Employment share by industry (t-1) 1.42*** 
 (0.08) 
Employment share by province (t-1) 1.84*** 
 (0.12) 
∆Employment share by industry (t-1 to t) 1.09*** 
 (0.23) 
∆Employment share by province (t-1 to t) 1.08*** 
 (0.20) 
Constant -7.72*** 
 (0.15) 
Observations 194,503 
Year FE Yes 
Province FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.18 Robustness to labor productivity - Heckman selection model: second stage; ownership, competition and firm labor 
productivity; 2002-2011, 2002-2006, and 2007-2011 
 
 Dependent variable: labor productivity (ln(VA/Employee)) 
  2002-2011 2002-2006 2007-2011 
VARIABLES 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  
 Ownership                      
SOE 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.50***  0.40*** 0.39*** 0.46***  0.61*** 0.55*** 0.77***  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  
FOE 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.41***  0.44*** 0.35*** 0.53***  0.27*** 0.21*** 0.58***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  
Market competition             
HHI -0.20*** -0.37*** -0.20***  0.01 -0.24* 0.01  -0.09 -0.18*** -0.08  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Entry Rate 0.09** 0.08* 0.21***  0.08 0.06 0.19***  -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.10  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Interactions             
SOE*HHI  0.36***    0.14    0.72***   
  (0.11)    (0.15)    (0.16)   
SOE*Entry Rate   -0.47***    -0.21***    -0.85***  
   (0.07)    (0.08)    (0.22)  
FOE*HHI  1.18***    1.34***    1.05***   
  (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.08)   
FOE*Entry Rate   -0.34***    -0.31***    -1.57***  
   (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.12)  
Inverse Mills’ Ratio -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.18***  -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26***  -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  
Controls             
ln_kol 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23***  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Exit Rate -0.13** -0.12* -0.15**  0.07 0.09 0.04  -0.03 -0.02 0.03  
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  
Import Penetration -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.18***  -0.13 -0.12 -0.13  -0.17** -0.11 -0.15*  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  
Leverage Ratio 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
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Firm size 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Firm age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.01** 0.01** 0.01**  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Export status 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11***  0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06***  0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Province GDP growth 0.09* 0.09* 0.10*  0.08 0.08 0.08  0.22** 0.21** 0.26**  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
Constant -0.13*** -0.11** -0.16***  -0.14* -0.07 -0.18**  0.20*** 0.19*** 0.12*  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  
Observations 194,503 194,503 194,503  60,471 60,471 60,471  134,032 134,032 134,032  
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37  0.39 0.39 0.39  0.35 0.35 0.35  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Province FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Notes: Omitted ownership category: POE; Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A2.19 Are SOEs constraining the productivity growth of POEs? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable: 1-year TFP growth rate of POEs 
 2001-2011 2001-2006 2007-2011 
    
Presence of SOEs    
Emp. share by SOEs  0.11*** 0.02 0.20*** 
same 3-digit ind. (t-1)    (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
Emp. share by SOEs  0.03 0.09 0.23*** 
same province (t-1)    (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
    
Controls    
Emp. share by FOEs  0.46*** 0.17* 0.47*** 
same 3-digit ind. (t-1)    (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) 
Emp. share by FOEs  0.10*** -0.22** 0.34*** 
same province (t-1)    (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) 
Firm size  t-1 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm age  t-1 -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Export status t-1 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
tfp t-1 -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.53*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.04 0.21*** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Observations 196,429 61,442 134,987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.32 0.28 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:   
Only POEs are considered in these regressions 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Chapter 3 Tax-avoidance profit shifting by 
multinational firms: evidence from Vietnam  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We are witnessing a raise in awareness about tax-dodging profit shifting activities by 
multinational corporations (MNCs) from high-tax to low-tax countries (Economist, 2013; 
Dharmapala, 2014). Specifically, these MNCs try to minimize their global income tax burden by 
internally relocating profits generated by subsidiaries located in high-tax countries to the ones 
located in low-tax states. In 2013, the OECD initiated a project (the OECD/G20 BEPS, still 
ongoing) characterized by an action plan of fifteen items to prevent cross-border profit shifting 
by MNCs. According to the OECD’s conservative estimate, between $100 and $240 billion of 
global corporate income tax has been lost annually due to profit shifting by MNCs from 2013 to 
2015 (OECD, 2015).  
Given the importance of the issue, there has been a growing number of empirical studies 
investigating the evidence and magnitude of multinational profit shifting42. The prevailing results 
stemming from this literature have outlined at least two powerful facts. First, MNCs do, in 
indeed, shift profits from high taxes countries to low taxes ones (e.g. Heckemeyer and Overesch, 
2013; Dharmapala, 2014). Second, they tend to use two means to this end (e.g. Chang, 2013, p. 
134; Dharmapala, 2014, p. 14). The first is through internal transfer pricing in which an MNC 
channels profits generated in high-tax countries to low-tax jurisdictions by manipulating prices 
of imports and exports in intra-group transactions between group-affiliated subsidiaries. 
Specifically, imports undertaken by the MNC’s focal subsidiary located in a high-tax country 
                                                 
42 Throughout this chapter, we use the words “profit shifting” to refer to the activities of an MNC to 
internally relocate profits among its affiliates across national borders, specifically from high to low tax countries, to 
minimize its global income tax responsibility.  
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will be overpriced while its exports are underpriced. The second mechanism is through strategic 
inter-subsidiary debts in which the multinational firm issues debts to subsidiaries in high-tax 
countries because the interest paid back to the parent company is exempted from income tax in 
the host countries.  
Despite these significant findings, the extant literature has two main limitations. First, 
these studies mostly focus on profit shifting in OECD countries while evidence from developing 
countries is still under-explored (Fuest and Riedel, 2010; Johannesen et al., 2016). Second, in 
terms of methodology, there are some serious endogeneity issues in the estimation approach used 
in most studies (Dharmapala, 2014).     
This chapter is a study that tackles those issues by investigating the profit-shifting 
behavior of multinationals operating in Vietnam, a late development country, during the period 
from 2006 to 2012. Vietnam serves as a good laboratory context since there is a lot of suspicion 
and indirect evidence raised in the media about MNCs’ abuse of transfer pricing to siphon profits 
out of the country (e.g. Nguyen, 2011; Tuoi Tre News, 2015). We also use a new identification 
strategy initiated by Chang and colleagues (Chang, 2013) to investigate the profit-shifting 
activities of multinational firms out of Vietnam. Specifically, it examines how corporate income 
tax-rate differential between the home country and Vietnam determines a foreign wholly-owned 
subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit obtained from an exogenous income shock in Vietnam. 
This identification approach then addresses the endogeneity issues raised about the traditional 
estimation approach developed by Hines and Rice (1994).   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces a simple 
formal model about cross-border profit shifting activities by MNCs. It is followed by a 
description of corporate income tax legislation and evidence in the media news about tax-
avoidance multinational profit shifting in Vietnam. We then introduce our data source, sample, 
and methodology. In the last sections, we present econometric results, discuss them, and 
conclude the chapter.    
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3.2 A simple formal model of tax-avoidance profit shifting by 
MNCs 
In this section, we first introduce a simple version of formal models43 that have been used 
so far to explain the logic behind tax-motivated profit shifting activities of MNCs. Consider a 
representative MNC coming from a home country H and having a subsidiary in a specific host 
country D (e.g. Vietnam). This subsidiary makes an amount of “true” pre-tax profit, which is 
normalized to 1. The corporate income tax rate in home country H is tH while its counterpart in 
host country D is tD. We assume that host country D has a higher tax rate than that of the home 
country (tD>tH). Hence, the MNC will get a benefit of tD-tH from tax saving for any 1 dollar of 
profits being shifted from D to H44. We call the amount of shifted profits is s (since “true” profit 
is normalized to 1, s is essentially the fraction of “true” profits being shifted: s varies from 
greater than 0 to less than 1). Basically, the MNC has relocated an amount of profits s generated 
in D to its home H and pay income tax for the shifted profits (s) now appearing in the MNC’s 
balance sheet and income statement in H. The MNC also incurs costs when shifting profits, for 
example consulting services for tax planning, potential costs for legal services, reputation hurt 
when news about its profit shifting are disseminated (Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). Following 
custom in the literature (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), we assume that the total cost of 
shifting (c) is a positive, increasing and convex function of s, specifically, 𝑐 =  ଵ
ଶ
𝛾𝑠ଶ. Here, γ is a 
cost coefficient which implies that the marginal cost of shifting c’ is proportional to s: c’= γs.    
                                                 
43 These formal models of profit shifting by MNCs are essentially similar to each other and have appeared, 
for example, in Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009), Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013), or Sugathan and George (2015). The model that we present here is based on Sugathan and George’s (2015) 
which explains profit shifting of MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries out of a specific host country. 
44 We need to make a clear distinction between “profit shifting” and “profit repatriation”. “Profit shifting” 
is the activity of multinational firms to siphon profits from high-tax to low-tax countries without paying any taxes 
for the shifted profit at the country where it is generated. Meanwhile, “profit repatriation” is the legal withdrawal of 
profits by multinational firms back to their home country (the location of the parent firm), after paying corporate 
income taxes to the host country (the location of the subsidiary). 
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Then, to the MNC coming from H, the value (Vsub) of its subsidiary in D is composed of 
three components: (i) after-tax profits in D: (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝑡஽), (ii) shifted profits from D into H 
net of the tax paying in H: 𝑠(1 − 𝑡ு), and (iii) profit shifting costs: −
ଵ
ଶ
𝛾𝑠ଶ . Or, we have: 
𝑉௦௨௕ = (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝑡஽) + 𝑠(1 − 𝑡ு) −
ଵ
ଶ
𝛾𝑠ଶ       (1) 
The MNC determines the optimal amount of shifted profits out of a subsidiary in D to 
maximize Vsub. Using equation (1), the first order condition with respect to s is  
డ௏ೞೠ್
డ௦
= 𝑡஽ − 𝑡ு − 𝛾𝑠 = 0     (2) 
Solving (2), we get the optimal amount of shifted profits is 𝑠∗ =  ௧ವି௧ಹ
ఊ
 . It equals the 
benefit the MNC gets from shifting 1 dollar of profits (tD-tH) divided by the cost coefficient of 
profit shifting (γ). We normalize the subsidiary’s profits at 1. If we call the unnormalized real 
profits is π, the optimal amount of shifted profits will be πs* = π(tD-tH)/ γ. Remember that so 
far, we have assumed that tD>tH. If, conversely, tD is less than tH, we will have s*<0. In this case, 
profits will be shifted from H into D instead and the amount shifted also equals s* in a similar 
logic45.  
Taking the derivative of the shifted profits with respect to tax-rate difference between the 
host country and the home country, we have డ௦
∗
డ(௧ವି௧ಹ)
= ଵ
ఊ
> 0. It could be stated verbally that the 
optimal amount of shifted profits s* is strictly increasing with respect to tax rate differentials 
between host and home countries (tD-tH). Intuitively, the larger the tax-rate difference, the bigger 
the marginal benefit from shifting one dollar of profits, which encourages the MNC to engage 
more in profit shifting and report less profits in the host country (D). Therefore, a proposition 
derived from this simple model and also being supported so far by empirical studies in the 
literature is: 
                                                 
45 The assumption here is that the costs of shifting are similar in both countries. 
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Proposition: Given a specific host country, for example Vietnam, an MNC will engage 
less (more) in profit shifting and reporting more (less) profits in Vietnam, the higher (smaller) 
the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of Vietnam.  
3.3 Corporate income tax law and some evidence raised by the 
media about tax-avoidance profit shifting by MNCs in Vietnam 
Vietnam is a late development economy. Only since 1986, when Vietnam Communist 
Party launched Doi moi reform (somehow equivalent to perestroika in Russia), Vietnamese 
economy has opened to foreign investors and local private entrepreneurs. As the economy is in a 
transition phase toward being operated by a market-based mechanism, its new pro-market legal 
institutions are under construction and gradually being improved overtime. 
Before 2004, to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the country kept maintaining a 
dual corporate income tax system applied separately for local and foreign-invested firms. The 
foreign-invested firms were treated more favorably than local firms in terms of corporate income 
tax. The statutory income tax rate for foreign-invested firms was 25% while it was 32% for local 
companies. Moreover, foreign-invested firms could even enjoy further tax reductions or tax 
holidays if they invested in strategic locations like special industrial zones or in specific 
industries.   
On its schedule to join WTO, to create a fair competition environment for all enterprises, 
the Vietnamese government enforced a new Corporate Income Tax Law in 2003, which took 
effect in 2004. According to the new law, the discrimination between private and state-owned 
sectors or between domestic and foreign-invested firms was abandoned. The statutory income 
tax rate was 28% and applied equally to all enterprises. Since then, statutory income tax rates of 
Vietnam kept declining from 28% (in the period 2004-2008) to 25% (from 2009 to 2012 – the 
end of our sample data).  
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Meanwhile, Vietnam has still a very limited legislation on multinational profit shifting 
(World Bank, 2014)46. Specifically, there was no regulation on anti-tax avoidance from profit 
shifting or transfer pricing until 2010 when the Ministry of Finance introduced a Circular (a kind 
of sub-law document) regarding the requirement of documentation of transactions between 
related parties and how to evaluate these transactions based on arm’s length criteria. These 
regulations were only officially legislated two years later in the amendment of the Law on Tax 
Management approved by the parliament in July 2013. However, the Law is still incomplete and 
ineffective to prevent tax-avoidance profit shifting as it has still no regulation on thin 
capitalization47 and specific penalties related to transfer pricing. Even though Vietnam charges 
the interest paid out of the country a tax of 5 percent, foreign-invested firms still get a tax 
deduction of 20 percent given the top statutory tax rate of 25 percent in the period from 2009 to 
2013. 
Given such tax regime, there is a lot of suspicion and indirect evidence raised by the 
country’s media about tax-avoidance profit shifting by foreign multinational firms. A typical 
example is the story of Metro Cash and Carry Vietnam. More than doubling its scale from 8 to 
19 wholesale centers and seeing its revenues increases 25 times, the giant German wholesaler 
has had only a single year of positive profit and incurred continuous losses over its first 12 years 
of operation in the country. Since its entry in 2001, “Metro has never paid a single penny of 
corporate tax” (Tuoi Tre News, 2015). The People Daily - the largest daily newspaper in sales 
volume in Vietnam - reports that while continuing to expand their operations, about 50% of FDI 
enterprises report losses continuously in the period from 2000 to 2010 and, hence, do not pay 
income tax. However, no case came to trial because of lacking explicit evidence (Nguyen, 2011).  
In an attempt to empirically verify these stylized facts, we run a series of OLS regressions 
comparing performance of foreign firms versus local firms in Vietnam from 2006-2012 
                                                 
46 Interested readers are invited to cross-refer to the report by World Bank (2014) for more detailed 
discussion about issues concerning corporate income tax in Vietnam.   
47 The issue that the share of equity in total assets is too thin as firms borrow a large amount of debt and 
enjoy interest deductibility from tax 
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controlling for firm size, age, 2-digit industry, region, and year fixed effects48. Results reported 
in Appendix A3.1 confirm the main storyline above that foreign-invested firms are much more 
efficient in terms of asset utilization but have much lower profitability compared to domestic 
firms. Specifically, results in regression models 1-3 using ROA (i.e. operating profits on total 
assets) as the dependent variable show that wholly-owned subsidiaries have the lowest 
profitability among all the ownership-based types of firms in Vietnam, worse not only than state-
owned firms but also than foreign joint ventures (i.e. joint ventures between foreign and local 
parties) and private-owned firms. This raises a suspect that wholly-owned subsidiaries, 100% 
controlled by foreigners with better known brands and superior technology, are hiding profits 
and shifting them out of the country. We also decompose ROA into ROS (i.e. operating profit on 
net sales) and AT (asset turnover)49 and, in turn, replace ROA with either ROS or AT as the 
dependent variable in the regression models 4-9. Results reveal further that wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are really efficient at asset utilization (only behind state join ventures) but have the 
worst profit margins or ROS, which further implies our profit-hiding anecdotal story.     
3.4 Data and methodology 
3.4.1 Data 
Our main source of data is the database of the Vietnamese Enterprise Surveys (VESs) 
from 2006 to 2012 compiled by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO)50. Besides state-
                                                 
 48 These regressions employ all firms in the database of the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (VESs) compiled 
by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam. As our main source of data, this database will be described in more 
details right later in data and methodology section.  
 49 ROA = ROS×AT (DuPont Identity). ROS is defined as operating profits on net sales while AT equals net 
sales over total assets. 
 50 GSO has conducted these annual surveys since 2000. We start our investigation period by 2006 for two 
main technical reasons. First, data on financial expenses and revenues to detect profit shifting through debt 
instruments are only available since 2006. Second, more importantly, GSO started applying a new industrial 
classification (VSIC 07) for the VES survey in 2006. The old industrial classification version (VSIC 93) was applied 
for the VES surveys from 2000 to 2005. Because we use industry level profitability at 4-digit sectors as the source of 
exogenous income shock to identify profit shifting, it is necessary that we have a consistent industrial classification 
system through years. In another research project, we have overcome this obstacle by developing a probabilistic 
routine to convert the industrial classification before 2006 (VSIC 93) into the new industrial classification (VSIC 
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owned and domestic private-owned firms, these annual surveys also cover all foreign-invested 
firms in Vietnam, our target group51. According to the Vietnamese law, foreign-invested firms 
are comprised of wholly-owned subsidiaries (100% foreign ownership) and joint ventures 
between foreign investors and local partners (from either state or private sectors). Following 
Chang (2013, p. 216), we choose to investigate profit shifting only in wholly-owned subsidiaries 
because the controlling parent firms encounter no management obstacles to involve in profit 
shifting in these subsidiaries. In contrast, in joint ventures, they might be constrained from 
shifting profits by other local equity owners.  
Hence, a population of all wholly-owned subsidiaries operating in Vietnam from 2006 to 
2012 is extracted from the database of the VESs. It includes 39,123 firm-year observations. We 
use the nationality of the foreign owners to define the home country of a focal wholly-owned 
subsidiary. If there are more than one foreign owners, the home country of origin of the focal 
subsidiary will be the nationality of the foreign owner with the highest equity stake. To deal with 
outliers, we drop observations with return on assets (ROA) in the upper and lower 0.01% of the 
distribution. We also have to delete observations missing one or more key variables. Our final 
sample then is an un-balanced panel with 36,209 observations (92.34% of the population) of 
8,732 wholly-owned subsidiaries coming from 79 countries (each subsidiary has an average of 
4.1 observations). A table of distribution of home countries of these subsidiaries is presented in 
table 3.1.  
[Table 3.1 about here] 
We obtain most of the key variables for our analysis using information on firm age, 
industry sector, and financial information from VESs database. We append information on 
                                                 
07). However, as this is a probability-based conversion, we choose to be conservative in this study to start our 
research period by 2006 onwards to have a consistent industrial classification based on VSIC 07.        
 51 These annual surveys essentially cover all enterprises of all ownership types (i.e. state-owned, foreign-
owned, and private-owned) and employment scales and operating in all industries. Because the population of 
enterprises has grown, since 2003, GSO has only surveyed a selected sample of the micro enterprise group (i.e. 
private enterprises with less than 10 employees or 20 employees from 2008 onwards) while still keeping track of all 
state-owned and foreign invested enterprises. However, for all micro enterprises which are not surveyed, GSO also 
documents a list of their names and basic demographic information, which can be used to generalize survey 
information for this group. A general description of the surveys in English is available from the author upon request.  
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country statutory corporate income tax rates from the world corporate tax database of the Tax 
Foundation, a US-based independent tax policy research organization. The tax database covers 
244 countries and data reach back to 1983 when available (Source: 
https://github.com/TaxFoundation/data/tree/master/world-corporate-tax-rates-and-gdp).  
3.4.2 Econometric strategy and variables 
The relocation of profits generating in one country to another country involves a 
deliberate manipulation of reported accounting profits. The traditional econometric approach (or 
the “Hines and Rices” approach52) identifies profit shifting by estimating the percentage change 
in a focal subsidiary’s reported profits due to one percentage point change in tax-rate difference 
between the parent and the focal subsidiary. It assumes that tax-rate changes are exogenous and 
use exogenous variations in tax-rate difference between the home and host countries as the 
source of identification (Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014).  
However, the extant literature has shown some endogeneity issues in the “Hines and 
Rices” approach. First, tax-rate changes may influence firm profitability through other 
mechanisms besides profit shifting. For example, an increase in the host country’s tax rate may 
discourage efforts of firm managers and, hence, lead to a reduction in firm profitability (e.g. 
Feldstein, 1999; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Johannesen et al., 2016). Moreover, tax-rate 
changes are infrequent and tend to happen at the same time as social, economic, and political 
changes in the macro-level environment of the home and host countries (Dharmapala and Riedel, 
2013). Hence, it is difficult to tell whether changes in a subsidiary’s reported profit following 
changes in tax rates in either home or host countries are due to tax-motivated profit shifting or 
the impacts of macro-level changes in socio-economic environment or even due to reduction in 
managerial efforts.      
                                                 
 52 The term “Hines and Rice” was named by Dharmapala (2014). It represents an empirical strategy to 
identify profit shifting developed in the pioneer works of Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994). See 
appendix A.3.2 for our results using the “Hines and Rice” approach.  
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 In this study, we use a new identification approach developed by Chang and colleagues 
(Chang, 2013, p. 215-222)53. This approach has been originally used to trace profit tunneling of 
Indian business groups in Bertrand et al. (2002). Bertrand et al. (2002) find that Indian business 
groups tend to manipulate non-operating profits of member firms and tunnel profits from affiliate 
firms which the group owner(s) has low cash flow rights to affiliate firms which the owner(s) has 
high cash flow rights. Other authors, specifically Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) and Sugathan 
and George (2015), also apply this approach to identify profit shifting by foreign multinationals 
in Europe and India, respectively.  
This approach can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that an exogenous industry-level 
shock raises the earnings of an MNC’s subsidiary in Vietnam by $1. Given the propensity and 
channels of profit shifting that are already in place, the multinational firm will shift part of the $1 
additional income out of the Vietnamese subsidiary. We then examine how corporate income 
tax-rate differential between the home country and Vietnam determines a foreign wholly-owned 
subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit obtained from the exogenous income shock and 
consider this as indirect evidence of profit shifting. 
The following is the econometric model of this approach used in our study:  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ + 𝛿 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒௜௧) +
 𝜃 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧ + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦௜ +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ + ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧    () 
In this model, the dependent variable, profitit is reported pre-tax profit of a subsidiary i in 
period t54. We use two types of profits: operating profit and financial profit to detect different 
                                                 
 53 This approach is developed by Chang, Chung, and Moon (2012) in the working paper “Do multinational 
firms shift profits out of China?” We do not have a copy of this working paper and our entire reference relies on the 
description of its methodology and excerpt of its results being put in Appendix 10 (p. 215-222) of the book by 
Chang (2013), the leading author.     
 54  Previous studies such as Huizinga and Laeven (2008) or Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) have 
restricted their sample to only subsidiaries having positive pre-tax profits. This is because their sample is comprised 
of subsidiaries operating in different host countries and if a host country’s jurisdiction does not allow firms to carry 
losses forward, only subsidiaries having positive profits have incentives to shift profits. As Vietnamese Accounting 
Standards allow loss offsetting into subsequent years, we included in our sample subsidiaries with both positive and 
negative profits.    
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mechanisms use by multinational firms to shift profits out of Vietnam. Operating profit is 
defined as profits before taxes and financial expenses. Financial profit is calculated by 
subtracting financial expenses from financial income.    
Predicted profit is the profit that the subsidiary is predicted to obtain from an industry-
level income shock. Asset-weighted average return on assets of all firms in the same industry 
(industry-level ROA) is identified as the source of earnings shocks to a subsidiary’s income. This 
shock influences every individual firm in the industry. Moreover, it is considered as exogenous 
since it is out of control of any single individual firm’s intervention or decision (Bertrand et al., 
2002). Industries are classified at 4-digit level according to the 2007 version of Vietnamese 
Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC 2007). As advised by Bertrand et al. (2002), to reduce 
potential mechanical correlation, the subsidiary i itself is excluded when calculating industry-
level ROA for sector s which it belongs: 𝑅𝑂𝐴തതതതതത௦௜ =  ∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐴௝
஺௦௦௘௧ೕ
∑ ஺௦௦௘௧ೕೕಯ೔∈ೞ௝ஷ௜∈௦
. In this formula, the 
subscript j represents all the other firms in the same sector s except i and Assetj is total assets of 
firm j55. Multiplying industry-level ROA with the subsidiary i’s total assets: 𝑅𝑂𝐴തതതതതത௦௜ × 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡௜, we 
obtain predicted profit as the “earnings shocks” experienced by the focal subsidiary i in the 
absence of profit shifting.  
Tax difference is the corporate income tax-rate difference between the home country and 
Vietnam (i.e. the tax rate of the home country minus the tax rate of Vietnam).  
Controlling variables include 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧ (log of total assets), 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦௜ 
(subsidiary fixed effects), 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ (year fixed effects), and, ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௜௧ (home country-
year fixed effects).  
Here, we use the same empirical model in Chang (2013) with a minor modification. The 
only modification is that we add home country-year fixed effects. With the subsidiary fixed 
effects, this model is a firm-level panel fixed effects model (FE model). Yearly fixed effects (i.e. 
                                                 
 55 ROA is defined here as operating profit over total assets. All firms in each 4-digit industry sector in the 
database are employed to calculate industry-lever ROA, including not only foreign subsidiaries but also domestic 
firms. 
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year dummies) control for any common effect on all foreign subsidiaries in Vietnam due to the 
macro-level changes in Vietnam in a given year. Meanwhile, home country-year fixed effects 
account for any common effect on all subsidiaries coming from the same home country due to 
the macro-level changes in both the home country and Vietnam in a given year. 
Therefore, in this model, a specific subsidiary’s average performance is represented by 
𝜃 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧ + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦௜ +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ + ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௜௧. The coefficient β 
attached to predicted profit will tell us the expected money a focal subsidiary will obtain from a 
one-dollar “earnings shock” from industry level, given the subsidiary’s average performance. 
The coefficient δ of the interaction term, 𝛿 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒௜௧), then 
shows the variation in response of subsidiaries’ reported profits to the industry-level “earnings 
shock” depends on different levels of tax difference between home countries and Vietnam, out of  
average subsidiary performance. This provides us indirect evidence of profit shifting.  
We test this model for all wholly-owned subsidiaries in Vietnam. From the proposition in 
section 3.2, we would expect that δ>0. It means that a foreign subsidiary will report more profits 
in response to an industry-level earnings shock, the higher the corporate income tax rate of the 
home country compared to that of Vietnam.  
Table 3.2 provide summary statistics of the key variables. The mean of tax rate difference 
is 0.821% while the highest and lowest levels observed is 15.69% and -28%. A graph of 
corporate income tax rates and tax-rate differences between home country and Vietnam of the 
top 21 investing countries in Vietnam is presented in figure 3.1. We present the correlation 
matrix of the key variables in table 3.3.      
[Table 3.2 and 3.3 about here] 
[Figure 3.1 about here] 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1. Baseline results 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
Table 3.4 shows estimation results of our main identification model investigating the 
influence of an industry-level exogenous earnings shock on wholly-owned subsidiaries’ reported 
operating profit. Model 1 is the base line model, while in model 2, we add the interaction 
between earnings shock (predicted profit) and tax-rate difference to track how tax-rate difference 
induces foreign firms to report more or less profits from the earnings shock. Model 1 shows that 
a one-dollar ($1) earnings shock in the local market in average brings additional 96.3 cents in 
operating profit for a typical wholly-owned subsidiary. In model 2, we have an estimation of δ 
less than 0 (δ=-0.0608). It means that for each 1 percentage point corporate income tax rate of 
the home country higher than that of Vietnam, wholly-owned subsidiaries under-report 6.08 
cents more from a $1 earnings shock in the local market. Using estimated coefficients in model 
2, we plot estimated reported operating profits in response to a $1 income shock of foreign 
subsidiaries at varying levels of corporate income tax rate difference in figure 3.2. Other thing 
being equal, a foreign subsidiary from Singapore with a corporate income tax rate of 20% in 
2006 (i.e. tax rate difference equals -8%) will report about $1.27 increase in operating profit 
given a $1 income shock. Meanwhile, a foreign subsidiary from Canada with a corporate income 
tax rate of 36.1% in 2006 (i.e. tax rate difference equals 8.1%) will report just about $0.29 
increase in operating profit when being faced with the same $1 income shock.  
[Table 3.4 about here] 
[Figure 3.2 about here] 
 Our results, hence, suggest that a foreign subsidiary will report less profits in Vietnam 
the higher the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of Vietnam. This 
contradicts the proposed hypothesis and previous results from the literature since the literature 
would suggest that a subsidiary will report more profits in response to the industry earnings 
shock, the higher the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of 
Vietnam. We also run the traditional Hines and Rice’s approach to see if results from this 
approach are different from the ones we just obtained from our new identification approach. 
Estimation results from the Hines and Rices’s approach (Appendix A3.2) are indeed similar in 
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terms of sign even though smaller in terms of magnitude to those from our identification 
models56.    
3.5.2. Do home countries’ institutions matter? Emerging countries vs. developed countries  
One possible explanation for the negative association between tax-rate difference and 
reported operating profit responding to the income shock (see figure 3.2) is that there is a 
structural difference in shifting behaviors between two main types of MNCs investing in 
Vietnam. Vietnam has two typical types of foreign MNCs: the MNCs from neighboring, 
emerging countries in Asia (emerging-market MNCs) and the MNCs from developed OECD 
economies (developed-market MNCs). The emerging-market MNCs share one common 
property: they come from countries with relatively weaker institutions (e.g. Rottig, 2016). Tax 
evasion hence is pervasive in those countries due to weak governance and a large informal sector 
(Cai and Liu, 2009; Johannesen et al., 2016; Gokalp et al., 2017). While developed-market 
MNCs need to pay taxes for any amount of profits “shifted” home and appeared in their home 
balance sheets and income statements, the emerging-market MNCs could even evade/dodge 
taxes in their home countries. Therefore, the negative association between tax-rate difference and 
reported operating profit may be mainly driven by emerging-market MNCs’ profit-shifting 
behavior. These emerging-market MNCs may rely on their ability to cope with these institutions 
at home and will shift profits home and report less profits in the host country even when tax rates 
of their home countries are higher than that of the host country (i.e. Vietnam). 
We test this explanation by running our identification model for two subsamples of 
subsidiaries of developed-market MNCs (the ones from OECD countries) and subsidiaries of 
emerging-market MNCs (the ones from Asia excluding Japan and Korea as they are OECD 
                                                 
 56 One reason that the Hines and Rice’s approach yields a smaller magnitude in terms of profit shifting 
could be because it only considers subsidiaries reporting positive profit. This practice relies on the assumption that 
profit-shifting incentives are only relevant in subsidiaries with positive profit. However, recent evidence both 
anecdotal and empirical shows that MNCs are very aggressively involving in tax-avoidance profit-shifting in 
developing countries where those firms report zero and negative profits consistently through years (see our section 
3.3, Chang (2013, p.132), and Johannesen et al. (2016)).        
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members) in Vietnam57. Results are presented in model 1 and 3 (table 3.5) respectively. We find 
that δAsia equals -0.0222, which suggests a foreign subsidiary coming from Asian countries will 
report less profits in response to an industry-level earnings shock, the higher the corporate 
income tax rate of the home country compared to that of Vietnam. Meanwhile, a foreign 
subsidiary coming from OECD countries will behave as the norms by reporting more profits in 
response to an industry-level earnings shock, the higher the corporate income tax rate of the 
home country compared to that of Vietnam (δOECD=0.0137). These results seem to be supportive 
of our explanation about the structural difference in shifting behaviors between Asian emerging-
market MNCs and OECD developed-market MNCs.  
[Table 3.5 about here] 
As there is no clear cut between emerging countries and developed countries, we follow 
here an often-used approach in the literature by defining the OECD countries as developed 
countries while considering the ones who do not belong to the OECD group as emerging (Rottig, 
2016). However, some of the countries are categorized as emerging countries in this way are 
pretty developed themselves compared to the rest of the group. We, therefore, check if the results 
above are robust to an alternative way of dividing between emerging and developed countries 
when we further exclude Hong Kong and Singapore (here after HS), two high-income and fairly 
advanced countries, from the group of Asian emerging countries and put them in group of 
developed countries alongside with other OECD countries. Results in model 2 and 4 of table 3.5 
suggest that δAsia estimated turns from negative to positive when we exclude firms from HS 
while δOECD, turns, in contrast, from positive to negative when we include HS into the group of 
developed countries. While our explanation about the structural difference in profit-shifting 
behaviors between emerging-market MNCs and developed-market MNCs does fail this 
robustness test58, it also suggests another fact that the negative association between tax rate 
                                                 
 57 Wholly-owned subsidiaries from OECD and Asia accounts for about 99% of all wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in Vietnam. 
 58 We would like to thank Marco Sanfilippo for pointing out the weakness in the way we operationalize 
emerging countries and developed countries, which leads to this robustness check.  
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difference and reported operating profit seems to be strongly driven by the presence of firms 
from HS.   
3.5.3. The role of tax havens 
 We have seen in the robustness check above that the estimated coefficient δ always turn 
negative with the presence of firms from HS. This leads us to another explanation that the overall 
negative relationship between reported operating profit and tax-rate difference is driven by the 
behavior of the firms from tax havens, of whom HS are among. These foreign firms from tax 
havens, where corporate tax rates are usually very low or even zero, report more profits in 
response to the income shock in Vietnam than the remaining firms coming from other non-tax-
haven countries where corporate tax raters are higher. Hence, we get a negative δ in our 
regression model, which suggests that a foreign subsidiary will report less profits in Vietnam the 
higher the corporate income tax rate of the home country compared to that of Vietnam 
 To compare the response to the earnings shock by foreign subsidiaries from tax havens to 
that by the ones from non-tax havens, we run the following model specification in which we add 
the interaction between predicted profit and a dummy for foreign subsidiaries from tax havens59:  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ + 𝛾 (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧ ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛௜௧) +
 𝜃 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧ + 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦௜ +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௧ + ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧     
Results are shown in table 3.7 from which we have the estimated coefficient γ equals 1.235. It 
means that, given a one-dollar industry-level income shock, firms from tax haven report $1.235 
(roughly about 3.93 times)60 more than those from non-tax havens. We also list the distribution 
of wholly-owned subsidiaries from tax havens by year in table 3.6. As majority of tax-haven 
firms are the ones coming from Singapore, Hong Kong, and Switzerland, we compare how these 
Hong Kong, Singaporean, and Swiss firms react to the income shock in comparison to the rest by 
adding the interaction between predicted profit and a dummy for firms from HS (or HS and 
                                                 
 59 The list of tax havens is from Dharmapala and Hines (2009) 
 60 3.93=1.235/0.314 
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Switzerland). Results reported in model 3 and 4 (table 3.7) suggest that overall negative 
relationship between reported operating profit and tax-rate difference is mostly driven by the 
behavior of the firms from HS (and Switzerland) alone.    
[Table 3.6 and 3.7 about here] 
 Let us further illustrate this fact by plotting estimated reported operating profits by firms 
from tax havens in response to a $1 income shock in figure 3.3 using estimated coefficients in 
model 2 of table 3.4. It is even clearer if we look at figure 3.4 where we plot estimated reported 
operating profits at varying levels of tax rate difference by foreign subsidiaries from top 21 
investing countries in Vietnam. Here, the size of the bubble is proportional to the share of firms 
from a specific country in total population of wholly-owned subsidiaries in a year. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Switzerland, the three tax havens among the top investors, locate at the far left in 
the variation spectrum of tax-rate difference. It is the fact that these firms from HS (and 
Switzerland) who reporting more profits than the rest determines the negative association 
between reported operating profit and tax rate difference.  
[Figure 3.3 and 3.4 about here] 
3.5.4. Profit shifting through debt instrument 
Because tax-motivated changes in reported operating profit only capture the evidence of 
profit shifting through transfer pricing, we next run our identification model using financial 
profit as dependent variable to identify profit shifting through the channel of inter-subsidiary 
debts (table 3.8). Estimated δ (model 2) is negative and equals -0.016. For each 1 percentage 
point corporate income tax rate of the home country higher than that of Vietnam, a wholly-
owned subsidiary hence under-reports additionally 1.6 cents in financial profit. This negative 
association between reported financial profit and tax-rate difference is driven by the behavior of 
the firms from tax havens too. We observe that given a $1 industry-level income shock, firms 
from tax haven report 43.6 cents more in terms of financial profit than those from non-tax 
havens. We also plot estimated reported financial profits in Vietnam at varying levels of tax rate 
difference by foreign subsidiaries from tax havens and the top 21 investing countries in figure 
3.5 and 3.6.  
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 [Table 3.8 about here] 
[Figure 3.5 and 3.6 about here] 
3.5.5. Comparison of tax-avoidance profit shifting in Vietnam to other contexts 
Using the estimate of δ in model 2 of table 3.4 we can calculate the “semi-elasticity” of 
operating income to tax rate difference. This “semi-elasticity” is usually being used to compare 
the magnitude of profit shifting in different contexts. It tells us the extent of profit shifting by the 
percentage change in the focal subsidiary’s reported operating profits due to 1 percentage point 
change in tax-rate difference between the parent and the focal subsidiary. As discussed above, 
given a $1 earnings shock in the local market, wholly-owned subsidiaries under-report 6.08 cents 
cents more for each 1 percentage point corporate income tax rate of the home country higher 
than that of Vietnam. This corresponds to a semi-elasticity of -6.08 (%)61. A summary of 
estimates of semi-elasticity for different geographical contexts and Vietnam is presented in table 
3.9. Estimate of semi-elasticity for Vietnam is much larger to those of China (1.7), the US (2.25), 
and EU countries (ranging from 0.28 to 2.92), which suggests a more aggressive tax-avoidance 
profit shifting behavior by MNCs in Vietnam compared to that in the other context.    
 [Table 3.9 about here] 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
So far, we have examined how corporate income tax-rate differentials between the home 
country and Vietnam determine a wholly-owned subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit 
obtained from an exogenous income shock. We find that how much profit (both operating and 
financial ones) that a foreign subsidiary would report is significantly sensitive to these tax 
incentives, which gives us indirect evidence of multinational profit shifting activities. However, 
departing from the proposition by formal theories and evidence from most other empirical 
studies on multinational profit shifting, we find a negative association between subsidiaries’ 
reported profit and tax rate difference. It means that the higher the corporate income tax rates of 
the home country, the less profits a wholly-owned subsidiary will report in Vietnam given a $1 
                                                 
 61 The assumption is that a foreign firm will shift the same amount from every additional dollar it makes.  
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income shock. Further analyses then reveal that this negative relationship between reported profit 
and tax-rate difference is driven by the behavior of the firms from tax havens, mostly the ones 
from HS. These firms coming from home countries where corporate tax rates are very low report 
more profits in response to the income shock in Vietnam than the remaining firms coming from 
other countries where corporate tax rates are higher. 
Why do foreign firms from HS, the two tax havens and also neighboring countries, report 
more profits in Vietnam than the ones from the other countries? It is perhaps too soon to give any 
speculative explanation. We hope, through the study of this chapter, to contribute to the literature 
some puzzling evidence of multinational profit shifting in Vietnam. Through the phenomenon of 
HS firms putting money in Vietnam, it suggests that cross-border multinational profit shifting is 
more complicated than what has been known given the role of tax havens and the weak 
institutions of Vietnam. Future research digging deeper this phenomenon is warranted and 
similar studies in other developing countries like Vietnam are needed to corroborate our findings. 
Moreover, more clinical studies on the phenomenon of multinational profit shifting are called for 
as our study and most other empirical research in the literature only provide indirect evidence of 
multinational profit shifting. Such case-based studies with in-depth and direct evidence will be 
supplemental to empirical studies to fully portrait how multinationals involving in tax-avoidance 
profit shifting across borders.    
This study is not without limitations. First, we examine multinational profit shifting from 
a single country perspective (i.e. Vietnam) by observing how tax incentives induce a Vietnam-
based wholly owned subsidiary’s under-reporting of the profit obtained from an exogenous 
income shock. However, this identification strategy cannot tell us where the profit is actually 
shifted to. It would be better if we employ a multi-country perspective and have data on 
operation and profitability of all affiliates in the same multinational group in different host 
countries. The core idea is that if a multinational group is shifting an amount of profit out of a 
subsidiary in a specific host country, parts of this profit must be re-appeared somewhere in the 
balance sheets and income statements of other affiliates/subsidiaries of the same group in other 
countries. If there is suddenly “an exogenous earnings shock” to a group affiliated firm, we can 
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empirically trace the propagation of the earnings shock across other group affiliated firms given 
the shifting channels are readily available, like the propagation of fluid in communicating 
vessels. Second, the income shock that a subsidiary absorbs from industry-level average 
performance may have characteristics of "the perils of peer effects" (Angrist, 2014)62. When we 
regress an individual firm's reported performance on industry (group) average performance, the 
peer effects identified here by group average are confounded with intragroup correlation. We 
have no way to disentangle peer effects from purely mechanic intragroup correlation in group 
average performance. However, as our reference groups are composed of firms from different 
provinces and different ownership types (state-owned, domestic private-owned firms, as well as 
foreign-invested firms), we believe that our reference groups are heterogeneous enough that the 
issue of intragroup correlation is mitigated. 
     
     
                                                 
 62 We would like to thank Antonio Accetturo for pointing this out.  
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 3.1 Distribution of countries of origin of wholly-owned subsidiaries in Vietnama  
 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Taiwan 1,092 1,242 1,350 1,446 1,481 1,560 1,552 9,723 
Korea, Rep. 610 796 925 1,155 1,251 1,494 1,546 7,777 
Japan 449 569 638 770 805 977 1,059 5,267 
China 134 200 263 336 370 497 474 2,274 
Singapore 172 187 232 267 324 424 431 2,037 
USA 136 176 183 217 252 310 281 1,555 
Hong Kong 109 109 124 133 171 184 216 1,046 
Malaysia 84 103 122 150 151 180 179 969 
France 82 91 108 127 130 157 150 845 
UK 63 67 75 100 109 132 135 681 
Thailand 62 73 81 98 104 119 117 654 
Australia 58 73 82 95 89 104 100 601 
Germany 36 42 50 67 75 80 91 441 
Switzeland 26 22 25 31 30 36 32 202 
Canada 11 19 22 32 39 42 33 198 
Belgium 15 20 21 23 28 23 24 154 
Philppines 7 15 17 29 29 23 22 142 
Denmark 8 10 12 23 23 32 33 141 
India 5 10 11 20 18 25 22 111 
Russia 12 14 15 15 12 16 16 100 
Indonesia 4 9 11 12 18 23 22 99 
Other countries 81 97 129 175 204 250 256 1,192 
Total 3,256 3,944 4,496 5,321 5,713 6,688 6,791 36,209 
a There are in total 79 countries having wholly-owned subsidiaries in Vietnam from 2006-2012. We 
order the countries by the number of wholly-owned subsidiaries and group 58 countries with a small 
number of foreign investment in Vietnam into a category of other countries.   
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of key variables  
           
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Operating profit  541.1243 6632.485 -124908 757679 
Financial profit -65.7162 2059.802 -54245.5 262988 
Earnings shock (Predicted profit) 547.1276 3226.965 -105724 330955 
Log of Assets 7.313626 1.955638 -3.11663 14.957 
Tax rate difference (%) .8218655 7.577718 -28 15.69 
Note: N=36,209; All monetary variables are expressed in the constant 2010 value in units of 
1000 USD. We convert the VND nominal values into VND real values in the base year of 2010 
using Vietnamese GDP deflators (The World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database). 
VND real values are then converted into USD using the official annual exchange rate in 2010 at 
18612.92 VND/USD.   
 
 
Table 3.3 Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Operating profit 1     
2 Financial profit 0.114 1    
3 Earnings shock (Predicted profit) 0.636 -0.155 1   
4 Log(Asset) 0.175 -0.037 0.314 1  
5 Tax rate difference 0.008 0.002 0.024 -0.018 1 
      N=36,209 and All correlation coefficients greater than 0.02 are significant at 1% level 
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Table 3.4 Response from wholly-owned subsidiaries with different home country corporate 
income tax rates to earnings shock: Operating profits 
 
Dependent variable: Reported operating profit  
Model: 1 2 
Independent variables:     
Earnings shock (Predicted profit) 0.963*** 0.786*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0105) 
Earnings shock ×  -0.0608*** 
tax rate difference  (0.00124) 
Log of Assets -70.12 -11.44 
 (49.12) (47.07) 
Observations 36,209 36,209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.666 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Year*Home-Country FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 3.5 Do home countries’ institutions matter? Response in operating profit by MNCs from 
Asian Emerging countries vs. MNCs from OECD countries  
 
Dependent variable: Reported operating profit 
 Model: 1 2 3 4 
 
Asia firmsa Asia firmsa without 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
OCED 
firms 
OECD firms  
with Hong Kong  
and Singapore 
 Independent variables:         
Earnings shock (Predicted profit) 1.321*** 0.786*** -0.188*** 0.778***  
(0.0262) (0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0131) 
Earnings shock × -0.0222*** 0.0443*** 0.0137*** -0.0795*** 
tax rate difference (0.00334) (0.00236) (0.00165) (0.00153) 
Log of Assets -331.3*** 9.493 165.0*** 60.14  
(86.95) (57.90) (40.90) (65.49) 
Observations 17,245 14,162 18,806 21,889 
Adjusted R-squared 0.713 0.513 0.687 0.702 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Home-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and Standard errors in parentheses  
a Excluding Japan and Korea 
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Table 3.6 Distribution of wholly-owned subsidiaries by tax havens in Vietnam 
 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Bermuda 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Cayman Islands 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 6 
Cyprus 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
Gibraltar 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Hong Kong 109 109 124 133 171 184 216 1,046 
Ireland 1 1 2 3 5 10 10 32 
Jordan 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 6 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Luxembourg 4 4 5 6 6 4 4 33 
Macao 2 1 1 0 0 1 2 7 
Malta 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Mauritius 0 0 1 1 3 3 5 13 
Panama 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Singapore 172 187 232 267 324 424 431 2,037 
Switzerland 26 22 25 31 30 36 32 202 
Total 318 325 394 445 546 670 709 3,407 
Note: The list of tax havens is from Dharmapala and Hines (2009). 
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Table 3.7 Response in operating profit to earnings shock by firms from tax havens vs. non-tax 
havens 
 
 Dependent variable: Reported operating profit   
Model: 1 2 3 4 
 Independent variables:       
Earnings shock (Predicted profit) 0.963*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0132) 
Earnings shock × dummy  1.235***   
for tax havens  (0.0175)   
Earnings shock × dummy   1.240***  
for Hong Kong and Singapore   (0.0175)  
Earnings shock × dummy for    1.236*** 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland    (0.0175) 
Log of Assets -70.12 107.4** 113.3** 108.3** 
 (49.12) (45.23) (45.20) (45.23) 
Observations 36,209 36,209 36,209 36,209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.692 0.693 0.692 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Home-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 3.8 Response from wholly-owned subsidiaries with different home country corporate 
income tax rates to earnings shock: Financial profits 
 
Financial profit 
 Dependent variable: Reported financial profit   
Model: 1 2 3 5 6 
 Independent variables:        
Earnings shock (Predicted profit) -0.185*** -0.231*** -0.414*** -0.413*** -0.414*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00336) (0.00408) (0.00408) (0.00408) 
Earnings shock ×  -0.0160***    
tax rate difference  (0.000397)    
Earnings shock × dummy   0.436***   
for tax havens   (0.00543)   
Earnings shock × dummy    0.436***  
for Hong Kong and Singapore    (0.00543)  
Earnings shock × dummy for     0.437*** 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Switzerland     (0.00543) 
Log of Assets 28.12* 43.57*** 90.82*** 92.65*** 91.17*** 
 (15.56) (15.12) (14.01) (14.01) (14.00) 
Observations 36,209 36,209 36,209 36,209 36,209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.621 0.642 0.694 0.694 0.694 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*Home-Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3.9 Comparison of magnitude of profit shifting activity in Vietnam and other contextsa 
 
 
Study Context Period Semi-Elasticity 
Interpretation: a 1% 
point corporate income 
tax rate of the home 
country higher than that 
of the host country is 
associated with a change 
in reported income from 
$100,000 to 
Hines and Rice 
(1994) US 1982 2.25 $102,500 
Huizinga and 
Laeven (2008) EU 1999 From 0.28 to 2.92 $103,000 
Dischinger (2010) EU 1995-2005 0.7 $100,700 
Chang (2013) China 2001-2007 1.7 $101,700 
Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2013) Meta-analysis Various 0.8 $10,800 
Lohse and Riedel 
(2013) EU 1999-2009 0.4 $100,400 
Sugathan and 
George (2015) India 2001-2010 0.53 $100,530 
Our research Vietnam 2006-2012 -6.08 $93,920 
a This table is based on the summary table of Dharmapala (2014), We only append results from recent 
research by Chang (2013), Sugathan and George (2015).  
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Figure 3.1 Corporate income tax rates and tax-rate differentials between home country and 
Vietnam of 21 leading countries having wholly-owned subsidiaries in Vietnam (2006-2012)  
 
 
.2
.3
.4
.2
.3
.4
.2
.3
.4
.2
.3
.4
.2
.3
.4
2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012
2006 2008 2010 2012
Australia Belgium Canada China Denmark
France Germany Hong Kong India Indonesia
Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia Philippines Russian Federation
Singapore Switzerland Taiwan, Province of China Thailand United Kingdom
United States of America
Corporate tax rates by home country
-1
0
0
10
20
-1
0
0
10
20
-1
0
0
10
20
-1
0
0
10
20
-1
0
0
10
20
2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012
2006 2008 2010 2012
Australia Belgium Canada China Denmark
France Germany Hong Kong India Indonesia
Japan Korea, Republic of Malaysia Philippines Russian Federation
Singapore Switzerland Taiwan, Province of China Thailand United Kingdom
United States of America
%
Tax-rate differentials between home country and Vietnam
 
 
 
117 
 
Figure 3.2 Estimated response to a $1 earnings shock: Operating Profit 
 
 
Note: Estimated reported operating profit in response to a $1 income shock is 
calculated from estimated coefficients in model 2 table 3.4: reported operating profit 
= 0.786 – 0.0608×tax rate difference, given that income shock equals $1.  
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Figure 3.3 Estimated response to a $1 earnings shock: Operating Profit 
(by WOSs from tax havens) 
 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) is the mark for tax havens. Country names are in ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 three-letter 
country codes. The list of tax havens having WOSs in Vietnam includes Bahrain (BHR), Bermuda (BMU), 
Cayman Islands (CYM), Cyprus (CYP), Gibraltar (GIB), Hong Kong (HKG), Ireland (IRL), Jordan 
(JOR), Lebanon (LBN), Liechtenstein (LIE), Luxembourg (LUX), Macao (MAC), Malta (MLT), 
Mauritius (MUS), Panama (PAN), Singapore (SGP), Switzerland (CHE). 
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Figure 3.4 Estimated response to a $1 earnings shock: Operating Profit 
(by WOSs from top 21 investing home countries) 
 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) is the mark for tax havens. The size of the bubble is proportional to the share of firms 
from a specific country in total population of WOSs in a year (2006 and 2012). Top 21 investing home 
countries include Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), China (CHN), Denmark (DNK), 
France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Hong Kong (HKG), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Japan (JPN), Korea, 
Republic of (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Philippines (PHL), Russian Federation (RUS), Singapore (SGP), 
Switzerland (CHE), Taiwan, Province of China (TWN), Thailand (THA), United Kingdom (GBR), 
United States of America (USA). 
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Figure 3.5 Estimated response to a $1 earnings shock: Financial Profit 
(by WOSs from tax havens) 
 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) is the mark for tax havens. Country names are in ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 three-letter 
country codes. The list of tax havens having WOSs in Vietnam includes Bahrain (BHR), Bermuda (BMU), 
Cayman Islands (CYM), Cyprus (CYP), Gibraltar (GIB), Hong Kong (HKG), Ireland (IRL), Jordan 
(JOR), Lebanon (LBN), Liechtenstein (LIE), Luxembourg (LUX), Macao (MAC), Malta (MLT), 
Mauritius (MUS), Panama (PAN), Singapore (SGP), Switzerland (CHE). 
 
  
CYP*
MAC*IRL*
HKG*
SGP*
CHE*
LUX*PAN*
GIB*MLT*
-.4
-.2
0
.2
re
po
rte
d 
pr
of
it 
($
)
-30 -20 -10 0 10
tax rate difference (%)
2006
BHR*CYM
CYP*
MAC*IRL*LIE
JOR*
MUS*
HKG*SGP*
CHE*
LUX*
MLT*
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
re
po
rte
d 
pr
of
it 
($
)
-30 -20 -10 0 10
tax rate difference (%)
2012
 
 
 
121 
 
Figure 3.6 Estimated response to a $1 earnings shock: Financial Profit 
(by WOSs from top 21 investing home countries) 
 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) is the mark for tax havens. The size of the bubble is proportional to the share of firms 
from a specific country in total population of WOSs in a year (2006 and 2012). Top 21 investing home 
countries include Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), China (CHN), Denmark (DNK), 
France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Hong Kong (HKG), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Japan (JPN), Korea, 
Republic of (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Philippines (PHL), Russian Federation (RUS), Singapore (SGP), 
Switzerland (CHE), Taiwan, Province of China (TWN), Thailand (THA), United Kingdom (GBR), 
United States of America (USA). 
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Appendix     
A3.1 Ownership and profitability of Vietnamese firms (2006-2012) 
 
 DEPENDENT ROA (Return on Assets)a ROS (Return on Sales)a AT (Asset Turnover)a 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                    
Log of Assets 0.0154*** 0.0175*** 0.0175*** 0.0470*** 0.0621*** 0.0617*** -0.428*** -0.455*** -0.456*** 
 (0.000119) (0.000124) (0.000124) (0.00153) (0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00980) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Age 0.00154*** 0.00167*** 0.00164*** 0.0101*** 0.0104*** 0.0102*** 0.0847*** 0.0837*** 0.0837*** 
 (3.10e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (0.000400) (0.000413) (0.000414) (0.00256) (0.00264) (0.00264) 
Private-owned firms  0.0377*** 0.0368***  0.159*** 0.155***  -0.363*** -0.365*** 
  (0.00151) (0.00151)  (0.0196) (0.0196)  (0.125) (0.125) 
Foreign invested firmsb  -0.0223***   -0.332***   0.499***  
  (0.00177)   (0.0229)   (0.147)  
Wholly-owned    -0.0321***   -0.362***   0.494*** 
subsidariesb   (0.00184)   (0.0238)   (0.152) 
State Joint venturesb   0.0525***   0.0302   0.706** 
   (0.00405)   (0.0524)   (0.335) 
Other Joint venturesb   -0.00128   -0.356***   0.395 
   (0.00329)   (0.0426)   (0.272) 
Constant -0.0388 -0.0851* -0.0841* -0.297 -0.517 -0.511 4.207 4.682 4.686 
 (0.0471) (0.0470) (0.0470) (0.609) (0.609) (0.609) (3.888) (3.890) (3.890) 
          
Observations 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 1,489,871 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
a ROA and ROS are cut off at 0.1% and 99.9% percentile to remove outliers. ROA is defined as operating profit (i.e. profits before taxes and financial 
expenses) over total assets while ROS equals operating profit over net sales. AT (asset turnover ratio) is net sales over total assets. We have: ROA = ROS×AT 
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(Dupont Identity). All monetary variables are expressed in the constant 2010 value in units of 1000 USD. We convert the VND nominal values into VND real 
values in the base year of 2010 using Vietnamese GDP deflators (The World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database). VND real values are then 
converted into USD using the official annual exchange rate in 2010 at 18612.92 VN. 
b Foreign-invested firms include three disjoint groups: wholly-owned subsidiaries, state joint ventures (i.e. the joint ventures with state-owned firms), and 
other joint ventures (i.e. the joint venture with local private partner(s)).
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A3.2 Results from the Hines and Rice’s approach 
 Dependent variable: Ln(reported operating profit) 
 
All foreign 
subsidiariesb 
WOSsa 
only 
Independent variables:     
Tax rate difference (τ) -0.00450* -0.00623** 
 (0.00257) (0.00298) 
WOSa=1 -0.0625  
 (0.0773)  
Ln(K) 0.125*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0167) 
Ln(L) 0.434*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0274) 
Constant 3.838*** 3.534*** 
 (0.809) (0.826) 
Observations 23,991 19,189 
Adjusted R-squared 0.782 0.759 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry-year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
a WOSs is short for wholly-owned subsidiaries  
b Model 1 includes all foreign subsidiaries (both joint 
ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries) while mode 2 
includes wholly-owned subsidiaries only.  
The above table shows the results when we run the econometric model of the Hines and 
Rice approach:  
ln(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡௜௧) = 𝛽ଵ𝜏௜௧ +  𝛽ଶ ln 𝐾௜௧ + 𝛽ଷ ln 𝐿௜௧ + 𝛾௝௧ + 𝜇௜ + 𝛿௧ + 𝜖௜௧          (1) 
in which, operating profitit is the reported pretax operating profit of a focal subsidiary i of a 
multinational group in year t in Vietnam. Kit and Lit represent the subsidiary’s tangible fixed 
assets and labor (in terms of total employment), while 𝛾௝௧, 𝜇௜, 𝛿௧ are industry(j)-year(t), firm(i), 
and year(t) fixed effects, respectively. The regressor of interest, τit, is the corporate income tax-
rate difference between the home country and Vietnam (i.e. the tax rate of the home country 
minus the tax rate of Vietnam). Given a level of input employment (Kit, Lit), the coefficient 𝛽ଵ, 
then tells us the extent of profit shifting by the percentage change in the focal subsidiary’s 
reported profits due to 1 percentage point change in the tax-rate difference between the parent 
and the focal subsidiary.   
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 We run the data from 2006 to 2012 for all foreign subsidiaries (i.e. both joint ventures 
and WOSs) and for WOSs only. It should be noted that the number of observations in the Hines 
and Rice’s model is different from that of our main identification model because the Hines and 
Rice’s model only considers foreign subsidiaries with positive pretax profit. For a comparison 
with the results in our main identification model, let us consider the estimate of 𝛽ଵ in the model 
including WOSs only. It equals -0.00623, which suggests that an 1-percentage point increase in 
the tax-rate difference (for example, because the tax rate of the foreign subsidiary’s home 
country increases 1 percent while the tax rate of Vietnam remains unchanged) would be 
associated with a 0.623-cent reduction in the reported operating profit of a subsidiary i from $1 
to 99.377 cents (=100 cents - 0.623 cents). Meanwhile, a comparable result in our main 
identification model (model 2, table 3.4) suggests that an 1-percentage point increase in the tax-
rate difference would be associated with a 6.08-cent reduction in the reported operating profit of 
a subsidiary i from $1 to 93.92 cents (=100 cents – 6.08 cents). Our result reveals much more 
aggressive profit-shifting behaviors by MNCs in Vietnam.   
 One reason that the Hines and Rice’s approach yields a smaller magnitude in terms of 
profit shifting could be because it only considers subsidiaries reporting positive profit. This 
practice relies on the assumption that profit-shifting incentives are only relevant in subsidiaries 
with positive profit. However, recent evidence both from media news and empirical studies 
shows that MNCs are very aggressively involving in tax-avoidance profit-shifting in developing 
countries where those firms report zero and negative profits consistently through years (see our 
section 3.3, Chang (2013, p.132), and Johannesen et al. (2016)).        
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Chapter 4 Roads to Damascus: Entry modes 
and ownership changes in Multinational 
Enterprises  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) performance after entry into a foreign country is an 
important but under-studied question in international business (e.g. Chang et al., 2013; Chung 
and Beamish, 2010). Prior studies have focused on either MNEs’ entry mode choice or 
termination of subsidiaries while little is known about strategic changes and adaption/evolution 
of MNEs’ subsidiaries in the middle stages (Chung and Beamish, 2010). The literature on post-
entry relative performance of entry modes tries to find out which mode of entry, as wholly-
owned subsidiaries (WOSs) or as joint ventures (JVs), implies better subsequent performance. 
The tenet in this literature is that entry misfit (i.e. any mode chosen which is deviating from the 
one theoretically predicted) will lead to poor post-entry performance (Brouthers, 2002). This 
thesis, however, does not pay attention to any post-entry strategic change by MNEs to adapt and 
correct for earlier entry choice misfit; for example, JVs might convert to WOSs and vice versa 
(Puck et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2013).  
Methodologically, research in this literature also encounters the endogeneity of entry 
mode choice. Specifically, firms depending on their own characteristics are self-driven to choose 
a specific entry mode (i.e. either WOSs or JVs) (Shaver, 1998; Brouthers, 2002). Addressing this 
“self-selection of entry mode” is an obstacle for researchers who want to compare post-entry 
performance of WOSs vs. JVs (e.g. Shaver, 1998; Martin, 2013). A recent study by Chang et al. 
(2013) overcomes the endogeneity issue when comparing performance of WOSs and JVs by 
using Difference in Differences (DiD) combined with propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique. The authors take advantage of the fact that some JVs in China gradually convert into 
WOSs after this country started allowing for the presence of WOSs following its admission into 
WTO in 2001. They compare the performance change before and after conversion of the 
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converted WOSs (JVs converting to WOSs is defined as the Treatment) with that of their 
matched continuing JVs (that constitutes the Control group). The treatment and control firms are 
comparable in most observable characteristics, which allows the authors to attribute to the 
treatment the causal effect observed on performance change (in this case the treatment is WOS 
operating mode). Chang et al. (2013) find that, after conversion, the converted WOSs perform 
better than comparable firms continuing as JVs.  
In this chapter, we first replicate the investigation of Chang et al. (2013) in Vietnam to 
see if their findings are context-free. In contrast to China, Vietnam FDI laws do not require the 
formation of a JV as the only allowed foreign entry mode. Nonetheless, even if MNEs are “free” 
(not bound by laws) to choose their preferred mode of entry, many companies decide to enter by 
establishing a JV and later convert to a WOS. In a sense, then, Vietnam serves as an ideal 
laboratory to test if Chang and colleagues’ findings are generalizable.  
We then extend Chang et al.’s study by exploring the conversion of JVs in the other 
direction to fully domestic firms (i.e. a firm with 100% of domestic ownership when JVs are 
fully acquired by local owner(s)). Specifically, we look at the drivers of the local owner’s 
acquisition of a JV and what are performance and strategic changes in the JV after being 
converted to a fully domestic firm (or a DOM – here after). By this line of analysis, we also 
contribute to the literature on joint venture evolution. The evolution and transformation of JVs 
towards either WOSs or DOMs when the MNEs or the local owners may buy out the firm is an 
interesting phenomenon. This is, strangely enough, a rather under-explored phenomenon. 
  The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we provide a review of two related 
streams of literature, the first dealing with relative performance of entry mode choices by MNEs, 
the second exploring the evolution of Joint Ventures. The next section (section 4.3) introduces 
the methodology of this study and our data source – the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (VES) 
database. We present our results in section 4.4. Section 4.5 discusses and concludes this chapter.  
4.2 Literature review  
Choosing an entry mode (i.e. WOSs vs. JVs) is a critical decision that an MNE has to 
face when making a foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g. Brouthers, 2002; Hennart and 
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Brouthers, 2007)63. Specifically, the MNE needs to decide whether it should find a local partner 
to set up a joint venture or establish a wholly-owned subsidiary. Compared to a JV, a WOS 
requires more resource commitment but brings more control to the MNE (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986). Therefore, entry mode choice yields long-term implications on subsequence 
performance of the FDI in the host country (e.g. Brouthers, 2002; Gaur and Lu, 2007). 
The dominant theory that explains an MNE’s entry mode choice between WOSs and JVs 
is transaction cost economics (TCE). Specifically, a WOS is preferable to a JV as it brings full 
control to the MNE when it is essential to protect the firm’s specific assets (e.g. brands, 
technologies, management practices) from opportunistic behaviors of the potential local partner 
in the host country (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). In contrast, a JV is preferable to a WOS 
when the MNE needs access to complementary assets of the local partner which are not easily 
transactable in the market (Hennart, 1991a; Hennart, 1991b). Various empirical studies have 
employed the TCE framework and confirmed its proposition that asset specificity from the MNE 
side and local complementary assets are two key determinants of entry mode choice (e.g. Zhao et 
al., 2004; Hennart and Brouthers, 200764)   
The literature on post-entry relative performance of entry mode choices naturally follows 
the literature of entry mode choice. It tries to find out which operating mode (i.e. WOSs vs. JVs), 
chosen by a foreign MNE when entering a host market, implies better subsequent performance. 
Earlier works simply compare post-entry performance of different modes and yield inconsistent 
results (e.g. Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Chang et al., 2013). Specifically, some find that 
WOSs perform better than JVs (e.g. Makino and Beamish, 1998; Pan and Chi, 1999; Kim and 
Gray, 2008) while others find the opposite (e.g. Woodcock et al., 1994; Gaur and Lu, 2007). All 
these results, however, are biased because of the self-selection issue65. Specifically, firms 
                                                 
63 Besides making FDI or equity-based entry modes (WOSs and JVs), an MNE can choose other 
contractual-based modes (e.g. exporting, licensing, franchising, or distribution contracts, etc.). See Hennart and 
Brouthers (2007) for a full list of 16 entry modes identified in the literature. However, in this study we focus mainly 
on equity-based entry modes, viz. WOSs and JVs, given that the MNE has decided to make equity investment.      
64 See Zhao et al. (2004) for a meta-analysis of transaction cost determinants of entry modes. 
65 Interested readers may want to look at Brouthers and Hennart (2007, p. 412-413) or Otto (2010, p.18-23) 
for a detailed review. The literature on post-entry relative performance of entry modes is also criticized for using 
mostly cross-sectional research designs which fail to capture an MNE subsidiary’s evolution (Benito, Petersen, & 
Welch, 2009) and for using measures of post-entry performance in terms of either subjective evaluation of MNE 
managers or subsidiary termination (exit) (e.g. Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Gaur and Lu, 2007).   
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depending on their own characteristics are self-driven to choose a specific entry mode (i.e. either 
WOSs or JVs) (Shaver, 1998; Brouthers, 2002). This self-selection of entry modes makes the job 
of comparing performance of WOSs vs. JVs like that of comparing apples with oranges.   
Taking into account the endogeneity of entry mode choice in his seminal article, 
Brouthers (2002) develops the concept of entry “fit” and “misfit”. Accordingly, an entry misfit 
happens when the entry mode chosen by an MNE deviates from the theoretically predicted mode 
and such entry misfit will lead to poor subsequent performance. In his seminal article, Brouthers 
(2002) estimates a logistic model which explains the choice between WOSs and JVs using 
TCE’s variables such as general transaction costs and asset specificity among others. He then 
codes a dummy for entry fit (1) and misfit (0) for the two groups of firms whose actual entry 
modes are (or are not) predicted by the logistic model. Using the fit dummy to explain managers’ 
subjective evaluation of the subsidiary performance, Brouthers (2002) finds support for his thesis 
that entry fit (or misfit) positively (or negatively) influences subsequent entry mode 
performance. In the case of entry misfit, the established subsidiary (either WOSs or JVs) is 
performing poorly after its formation because the MNE has chosen a “wrong” entry mode but 
not the mode prescribed by theories such as TCE.  
This thesis by Brouthers, however, seems to apply a static view and assume away any 
potential post-entry strategic move to adapt or correct for earlier entry choice misfits. For 
example, as illustrated in figure 4.1, JVs might convert to WOSs later and vice versa (Puck et al., 
2009; Chang et al., 2013). Moreover, in some cases, a foreign firm simply choose a mode of 
entry that gives it flexibility to change later and, compared to WOSs, JVs are considered as more 
flexible (e.g. Song, 2014). Hence, instead of being considered as a strategic error, the entry mode 
which was misaligned with predictions might be simply just a cautious choice when making an 
important investment. In a similar vein, according to the real option theory, JVs can be seen as 
real options that provide the MNE parents both the put option (divest) or call option (acquire) 
later (Kogut, 1991). Facing uncertainty in a new country market, cautious MNEs might choose to 
enter by establishing JVs. MNEs will act behaviorally and trigger the option later by either 
divesting or acquiring fully JVs after gaining experience and getting feedback about their 
decision in terms of JV performance.  
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
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Methodologically, in a recent article, Chang and colleagues (2013) overcome the 
endogeneity issue when comparing performance of WOSs and JVs by employing a new 
econometric technique. The authors take advantage of the fact that some joint ventures (JVs) in 
China gradually convert into WOSs after 2001 when China accesses into WTO. They compare 
ex-post performance of the converted WOSs (Treatment) with their matched continuing JVs 
(Control) using Difference in Differences (DiD) combined with propensity score matching 
(PSM)66. Matched firms are comparable in most observable characteristics, which allows the 
authors to attribute to the treatment the causal effect observed on performance (in this case the 
treatment is WOS operating mode). Chang et al. (2013) found that, after conversion, the 
converted WOSs perform better than comparable firms continuing as JVs controlling for the 
initial performance differences between the two groups before conversion67.  
One main limitation of Chang et al. (2013) is that this research can be context-specific 
(i.e. it only holds true in China). Most of MNEs entered China before 2001 are strictly required 
to establish joint ventures with local Chinese firms. Only after 2001 when China joined WTO, 
this requirement was relaxed and there has been a wave of conversion of JVs into WOSs in 
China (Chang et al., 2013, p. 322). This phenomenon is taken advantaged of in the research 
design of Chang et al. (2013), which makes it prone to context-specific. Vietnam, however, does 
not have any restriction on entry mode choice or any joint venture requirement in its laws on 
FDI68. Majority of FDI projects starting from 2000, the starting year of our dataset, are indeed in 
the form of WOSs. We therefore first initiate our study as an attempt to replicate Chang et al. 
                                                 
66 This is a fairly new econometric technique that has been only recently applied in strategic management 
and international business (Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012; Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2014). 
See section 4.3.1 for a discussion on this methodology.  
67 It should be noted that, in her unpublished thesis, Petkova (2009), who also applied difference-in-
differences analysis combined with propensity score matching, has found that the conversion of JVs to WOSs has no 
effect on firm performance in China. However, Petkova’s research is limited by its smaller sample size (1246 
observations, in which there are 86 treated cases, when assessing changes in ROA) and specific location (only firms 
from Wuxi Economic Development Zone of Jiangsu province). Chang et al. (2013) instead uses the sample of joint 
ventures from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics firm-level data which arguably contains the population of 
all foreign invested firms in China.  
68 While there is never a formal written requirement that foreign investors must set up joint ventures with 
Vietnamese business partners in FDI laws, joint ventures (i.e. shared ownership between foreign and Vietnamese 
business parties) are the main form of FDI before 1996 (Truong and Gates, 1996). After the Law on FDI 1996, by 
laws and in practice, foreign investors are free to choose the investment forms (i.e. contracts, joint ventures (JVs), or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs)) they like (Nguyen, 2014, p. 36). Our research period starts in 2001 five years 
after the 1996 FDI law.  
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(2013) to investigate the performance implications of JVs converting to WOSs in the country 
context of Vietnam where FDIs by laws are free to enter in both forms of JVs and WOSs. This 
will help us to test whether Chang et al.’s findings on performance superiority of WOSs 
compared to JVs are generalizable.  
At the same time, our study also contributes to the literature on joint venture evolution. 
Since post-entry subsidiary-level data are still pretty difficult to obtain (e.g. Chang et al., 2013), 
most studies still focus on JV’s termination events while neglecting the interesting post-entry 
strategic changes of JVs (Chung and Beamish, 2010). Specifically, the evolution of JVs and their 
transformation towards either WOSs or DOMs when the MNE or the local owners may buy out 
the firm is an interesting phenomenon. This is, strangely enough, a rather under-explored 
phenomenon. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge only two studies investigate the conditions 
that lead to such post-formation ownership transformation in JVs (Steensma et al., 2008; Iriyama 
and Madhavan, 2014). However, these studies do not explore the performance and strategic 
effects after ownership changes, especially when ownership of the JV is handed over to the local 
owner. This is why we believe that our study, examining the drivers of JVs conversion to either 
WOSs and DOMs, and performance and strategic implications of such conversion, is a valuable 
contribution.  
4.3 Econometric strategy and Data  
4.3.1 Econometric strategy: Difference-in-differences (DiD) combined with matching 
approach 
 The analysis of performance and strategic implications of joint ventures (JVs) converting 
to either wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOSs) or domestic firms (DOMs) has to take into account 
that very likely firms are selected not randomly in the two groups. Such condition lets arise a 
selection bias problem. To address it we should ensure that ex ante the MNEs in the groups we 
would compare are similar. In order to do so, we propose to use a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) combined with matching approach (e.g. Arnold & Javorcik, 2009; Chari et al., 2012; 
Chang et al., 2013; or Wang and Wang, 2015) by first match the converted JVs (treatment) with 
a group of comparable continuing JVs (control). Then in the next step, a DiD will be performed 
by taking the difference between the treatment and control groups in terms of within-firm 
performance difference before and after conversion. We apply this DiD combining with 
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matching approach for the two cases that (i) JVs turns to be WOSs and (ii) JVs turns to be 
DOMs separately. In both cases the reference category (the potential control group) is 
represented by continuing JVs.  
 Different matching methods, each with its own pros and cons, have been proposed to be 
employed under this common DiD combined with matching framework. The pioneer paper in the 
literature by Arnold & Javorcik, (2009) 69 stresses that the treatment should be matched with the 
control from the same industry sector and year. The first class of matching methods, hence, is 
exact matching by industry sector and year, which could be done based on propensity score 
(Arnold & Javorcik, 2009; Chang et al. 2013), Mahalanobis (or Euclidean) distance metric, or by 
applying the coarsened exact matching (CEM – Iacus et al. (2011))70. However, in practice, 
except Arnold & Javorcik (2009) or a later paper by Chang et al. (2013) that apply this approach 
using propensity score, almost no following papers choose to do exact matching by sector and 
year. The reason may simply lie in the fact that this class of matching methods requires a dataset 
with a very rich pool of potential controls71, otherwise, many treated cases will be left 
unmatched. Hence, while theoretically sound, it is hard to apply in many micro (firm or 
individual level) datasets of smaller sample size (e.g. Chari et al., 2012) 72. Besides, according to 
Abadie and Imbens (2008), the naïve bootstrapped standard errors in the exact matching by 
                                                 
69 Arnold & Javorcik (2009) investigate whether there is superior premium relating to foreign ownership by 
comparing productivity of foreign acquired manufacturing plants with that of comparable domestic plants in 
Indonesia.  
70 To do exact matching using propensity score, ones can use propensity score as a balancing score 
complementary to an exact matching on sector and year. This is done by first estimating a propensity score model 
predicting treatment based on a vector of pre-treatment characteristics X and then using the estimated propensity 
score to match between treatments and controls in the same sector and year (this approach has been applied by 
Arnold & Javocik (2009) and Chang et al. (2013)). Similar procedure applies to exact matching on Mahalanobis (or 
Euclidean) distance by simply replacing the Mahalanobis distance to propensity score as the balancing score to do 
an exact matching on sector and year. CEM instead do an exact matching not only on sector and year but also on 
user-defined coarsened values of all other pre-treatment characteristics X.     
71 We need to have many potential controls in each cell of a combination of year and sector which 
possesses a treated. Arnold & Javocik (2009), for example, have about 100,000 potential control observations to 
match with only 297 treated cases or Chang et al. (2013) have about 18,000 control observations in compared to 
about 799 cases.  
72 In CEM, one need to subjectively coarsen (in other words, tolerate) a lot on each covariate in the vector 
of pre-treatment characteristics X, except sector and year, to fully match all the treated cases in smaller datasets. A 
simple trial of CEM with automatic coarsening using my dataset to match JVs switching to be WOSs and 
comparable continuing JVs on a selected set of pre-treatment covariates X including 2-digit sector and year lead to 
only 4 out of 67 treated cases being matched.   
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sector and year using propensity score as in Arnold & Javorcik (2009) are inconsistent (Wang 
and Wang, 2015).    
 Recent applications tend to use propensity score matching (PSM) and simply control for 
sector and year fixed effects in the model predicting treatment (Chari et al., 201273; Wang and 
Wang, 2015). Based on the same estimated propensity scores, Wang and Wang (2015) choose to 
use the single nearest neighbor matching estimator while Chari et al. (2012) choose to apply the 
propensity score reweighting estimator. By controlling for sector and year fixed effects in the 
model predicting treatment and derive these estimators of the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) in a DiD framework, any remaining temporally invariant differences between 
treatment and control groups can be tolerable (Smith and Todd, 2005). Both the single nearest 
neighbor matching (or pair matching) estimator (Wang and Wang, 2015) or propensity score 
reweighting estimator (Chari et al., 2012) have the same root of the same propensity score 
function. In choosing each of the two, one encounters a trade-off in terms of bias and variance 
(i.e. pair matching has lowest bias but more variable).  
 In this chapter, we choose to use a Conditional Difference in Differences Estimator 
(CDiD) method that combines the PSM with the difference-in-differences method (DiD) as 
proposed by Smith & Todd (2005). Specifically, we use DiD combining with PSM one-to-one 
matching following the practice in Wang and Wang (2015): 
 (i) First step: we run a Probit regression to predict the treatment (a conversion of JV). 
This enable us to calculate the propensity score which is the predicted probability of treatment 
according to the probit model. Then we perform a PSM one-to-one match with replacement and 
with common support restriction. An observation of converted JVs in treatment group will be 
matched with an observation of continuing JVs in control group with the closest propensity 
score. By matching with replacement, one control can be used as a match to multiple treated 
firms as long as it is closest in terms of propensity score to these treated. We impose common 
support restriction which requires that the treated observations are matched only if they have 
propensity scores lying inside the region of minimum and maximum propensity scores of the 
control observations.    
                                                 
73 We would like to thank Marco Sanfilippo for suggesting this paper.  
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 (ii) Second step: for each MNE in both the treatment and control groups, we calculate 
changes in the outcome variable for firm i=1,…,I as: Yi=Yi,t+k- Yi,t-1.  We compare the level of 
the outcome k years (k=0, 1, 2) after the switch (Yi,t+k) with its level one year prior to switch (Yi,t-
1). Finally, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) under the DiD framework is 
calculated as followed:  
𝐴𝑇𝑇௞ =
ଵ
௡
∑ ൣ൫𝑌௜,௧ା௞ଵ − 𝑌௜,௧ିଵ଴ ൯ − ∑ ൫𝑌௝,௧ା௞଴ − 𝑌௝,௧ିଵ଴ ൯ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗)௝∈஼௢௡௧௥௢௟ ൧௜∈்௥௘௔௧௘ௗ  (1) 
where:  k refers to the length of years lag at which we would evaluate the effect; n is the 
total number of switching MNEs; Y is the outcome variable considered and the superscripts 1 
and 0 indicate, respectively, the switching event of JV or the fact that JV continues in the period 
under analysis; w(.) is a weight of the controls to compared to each treated MNE and depends on 
the matching estimator chosen (e.g. PSM pair matching or propensity score reweighting 
estimators). For PSM pair matching if we call m(i) as the index of the matched control to a 
specific treated firm i, our specific ATTk will be 
𝐴𝑇𝑇௞ =
ଵ
௡
∑ ൫𝑌௜,௧ା௞௧௥௘௔௧௘ௗ − 𝑌௜,௧ିଵ௧௥௘௔௧௘ௗ൯௜∈்௥௘௔௧௘ௗ −
ଵ
௡
∑ ൫𝑌௠(௜),௧ା௞
௖௢௡௧௥௢௟ − 𝑌௠(௜),௧ିଵ
௖௢௡௧௥௢௟ ൯௠(௜)∈௖௢௡௧௥௢௟   (2) 
For testing the significance of ATT in PSM pair matching, for long researchers use a 
bootstrapped standard error (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). However, Abadie and Imbens 
(2008) has proved that this standard bootstrapped standard error is inconsistent for pair matching 
estimators. In this chapter, we follow the current practice in the literature to report Abadie and 
Imbens’ robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2016) for our estimated ATTk. 
4.3.2 Data and identification of joint venture switching 
Our raw source of data is the annual Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2000 to 
2012 compiled by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). Besides state-owned and 
private owned firms, VES includes all foreign-invested firms operating in Vietnam.  
Every firm in the VES has a registration type which indicates its main ownership. We 
then regroup these registration types into 3 disjoint categories: domestic firms (DOMs), joint 
ventures (JVs) and wholly-owned enterprises (WOSs). DOMs are firms with 100% domestic 
ownership, which includes both domestic state-owned and private owned firms. WOSs are firms 
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with 100% foreign ownership, meanwhile JVs are firms with shared ownership between foreign 
investors and local partners from either state or private sectors.  
This recoded registration system is used to identify JVs’ conversion. We identify the 
conversion of a JV when its registration type changes from JVs to either WOSs or DOMs74. As 
the dataset also includes information on ownership shares of Vietnamese and foreign parties in a 
joint venture. We use the foreign share of ownership (i.e. the percentage share of ownership by 
the foreign parents) to cross check on the conversion of a JV. We do not consider the cases in 
which foreign ownership share in a JV changes from any level of above 90% to 100% as a JV-to-
WOS switch. In these cases, the JV with foreign ownership share of more than 90% could also 
be considered as a WOS in a loose sense75.   
4.3.3 Propensity score estimation and matching 
 In this section, we explain the detail of propensity score estimation and matching in our 
econometric strategy. A very crucial assumption in PSM is the unconfoundedness assumption. It 
requires that treatment assignment (i.e. a conversion of JV) is independent of potential outcomes 
(e.g. firm performance) given the set X of observable covariates included in the probit model. 
Here, we first introduce the covariates in our probit model and give justification for our choice of 
these covariates. We next introduce the outcomes being assessed and details on the 
implementation of the matching.  
Choice of covariates in propensity score estimation 
The dataset includes demographic and financial information of each firm from which we 
build the variables in our propensity score models. All monetary terms are converted to real 
values at the constant price of 2010. It is important that we choose a set X of observable 
covariates that influence both the decision to convert of JVs and their performance. We use the 
following variables to predict the conversion of JVs in the Probit models: firm size, age, ROA, 
leverage ratio, export status, fixed assets ratio, foreign ownership, state joint venture, and year, 
2-digit industry, region fixed effects. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the 
                                                 
74 Wang and Wang (2015) have used the same approach to distinguish between foreign acquired firms 
versus domestic acquired firms in China. 
75 A customary definition in international business literature uses 95% of ownership held by foreign parents 
as the cut-off point to define a WOS (Gomes-Casseres, 1990).  
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number of years since a firm’s establishment. ROA is defined as pretax profits divided by total 
assets while leverage ratio equals total debt divided by total assets. Export status is coded 1 if 
the firm undertakes export activities and 0 otherwise76. Fixed assets ratio is defined as fixed 
assets divided by total assets. Foreign ownership is ownership share of the foreign parents. State 
joint venture is a dummy to indicate joint ventures whose local parents are Vietnamese state-
owned enterprises. Common shocks to all firms in the same year, same industry, and same region 
are controlled by year, 2-digit industry, region fixed effects. 
These above variables include almost all the covariates suggested by Chang et al. (2013). 
Different theories and literatures on foreign entry mode choice and joint venture performance 
such as transaction cost economics, learning, real option theory of joint venture, and the 
literature on joint venture instability have guided their chosen (Chang et al., 2013). We 
summarize in figure 4.2 a theoretical framework on the observable confounding factors that 
influence both switching decision of JVs and their performance.  
[Figure 4.2 about here] 
Specifically, transaction cost economics suggest that a high level of asset specificity from 
the MNE and the need to protect those specific assets from the local partner’s potential 
opportunistic behaviors in a joint venture will enable the MNE to buy out the local partner’s 
stake and convert the JV to a WOS (Puck et al., 2009). Fixed assets ratio then serves as an 
indicator of asset specificity, that is specific investments in terms of “sophisticated machinery”, 
reflecting in the JV’s amount of fixed assets- Chang et al. (2013). Firm age is related to the time 
length of learning from each other by both the MNE and the local partner (Hennart, 1991). 
Steensma et al. (2008) find that “the acquisition of knowledge” from the MNE partner increases 
the likelihood that the local partner takes over the whole JV from its MNE partner at a later 
stage. Joint ventures could also be seen as real options that provide the parents both the put 
option (divest) or call option (acquire) later (Kogut, 1991). ROA, leverage ratio, and “export 
platform”, therefore, act as a proxy for the values of these “real options” in later periods when 
                                                 
76 For a few years that the VES does not survey on firm export, we impute the information using whether 
the firm pays export tax as suggested by Newman, Rand, Tarp, and Nguyen (2017) in their article investigating the 
export-productivity nexus of VES firms. As export firms being recovered from using the information on export tax 
are still underrepresented in our sample of foreign JVs, we further impute export status by identifying an export firm 
if the firm exports in either the previous year or the subsequent year.   
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uncertainty resolves (Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Chang, 1996; Chang et al., 2013). Facing 
uncertainties from a new country market, an MNE might simply choose a mode of entry that 
gives it flexibility to change later (JVs are more flexible than WOSs - Song, 2014). MNEs will 
act behaviorally and trigger the option after gaining experience and getting feedback about its 
decision in terms of JV performance. The same line of logic applies equally to the local partners. 
Firm size is included to account for size-related factors of conversion (Chang et al., 2013). The 
other two covariates, foreign ownership and state joint venture reflect the effects of bargaining 
power and control due to (uneven) ownership share and local parent type on JV stability (e.g. 
Ren et al., 2009). 
Outcomes  
We assess the implications of conversion of international joint ventures in Vietnam 
through the main outcome: financial performance represented by ROA. Besides, we also explore 
changes in strategic indicators including leverage ratio, sales, fixed assets, employment, average 
wage per employee (except leverage ratio, all the others in the log form).  
Implementation of the propensity score matching  
We perform two separate matching practices between JVs switching to WOSs and 
comparable continuing JVs and between JVs switching to DOMs and comparable continuing 
JVs. Hence, we will run two separate probit models to predict JVs switching to WOSs and JVs 
switching to DOMs separately. The control group in both matching practices is continuing JVs 
defined as the ones who are joint ventures at the time they first appear in our dataset and 
continue to be a joint venture at time t when we perform matching. We use two slightly variant 
data cleaning procedures for the two matching samples. The details of these procedures are 
described in Appendix A4.1 and a description of switching cases is put in Appendix A4.2.  
 To estimate propensity scores, we run probit models predicting the conversion of JV at 
time t based on its characteristics in the prior period. There is a concern that we do not capture an 
Ashenfelter’s dip by lagging just one period all covariates in the set X described above to predict 
the treatment at a time t. An Ashenfelter’s dip happens if the treated experience a temporary 
negative shock in performance the recent periods before treatment77. We screen all the covariates 
                                                 
77 We would like to thank Marco Sanfilippo to point this out.   
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and find the evidence of an Ashenfelter’s dip in terms of financial performance (ROA) for both 
the cases when JVs turning to WOSs and JVs turning to DOMs. Figure 4.3 presents this evidence 
by plotting the means of ROA of all treated cases in periods before and after switching. Hence, 
we use a three-year average of lags of ROA from t-1 to t-3 to control for this Ashenfelter’s dip in 
financial profitability when running the probit model explaining the conversion of JVs to WOSs 
at a time t, meanwhile all the other covariates are lagged one year as it is customary. For the case 
when we predict JVs switching to DOMs, we just lag all covariates, including ROA, one period. 
Even though there is evidence of the Ashenfelter’s dip in firm profitability, taking the three-year 
average of lags of ROA before conversion will leave us the number of treated cases being 
matched too small (only 30 cases). Our matching analysis for the case when JVs turning to 
WOSs, hence, applies to the period from 2003 to 2010 since we require three years of lag time in 
the probit model and study changes in performance two years after conversion. For the case of 
JVs turning to DOMs, our matching covers the period from 2001 to 2010.  
[Figure 4.3 about here] 
 The most tiresome and important step in PSM, given the plausibility of the 
confoundedness condition, is to derive a good specification of the probit model which enable us 
to balance the treatment and control groups after matching in terms of all covariates in the set X. 
I use Dehejia and Wahba’s (2002) algorithm to derive the specific specifications for the probit 
models predicting treatment. This simple procedure requires us to add interactions or high-
ordered terms of covariates and rerun/reevaluate the models until we get a satisfying 
configuration.  
 I follow the guidance by Garrido et al. (2014) to perform PSM one-to-one match with 
replacement and with common support restriction in Stata 14 MP. The common support is the 
area bound by the minimum and maximum propensity scores of the control groups. Up to date, 
even though Stata has provided its own command, teffects psmatch, for PSM, the best commands 
for one-to-one PSM and balancing analysis are still the user-written psmatch2 and its companion 
pstest (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003 – the most updated versions at 30 of Jan 2016). However, as 
Leuven & Sianesi (2003) do not include the Abadie and Imbens’ robust standard errors (AI’s 
S.E.) in their commands, practitioners need to overcome this limitation by first using psmatch2 
and pstest to perform PSM and balancing check, and then using teffects psmatch to get the AI’s 
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S.E. (Garrido et al., 2014)78. To get precisely equivalent results in ATTs between psmatch2 and 
teffects psmatch, we need to make sure that the two commands run on the same sample. We get 
through this inconvenience procedure fairly well when we perform matching for the case of JVs 
turning to WOSs (we have better overlap). For the case of matching for JVs turning to DOMs 
(when the outcomes being assessed are ROA, leverage ratio, employment, and average wage per 
employee), we encounter one treated case being off-support. As teffects psmatch does not allow 
us to impose common support and hence there is no way to make results from teffects psmatch 
and psmatch2 equivalent if we insist on imposing common support restriction, we choose to use 
the results from using psmatch2 for PSM one-to-one match with common support restriction. In 
this case, we accept that psmatch2’s default standard errors do not take into account that 
propensity scores are estimated. For a comparison, we also report results from running teffects 
psmatch when we drop the treated being off-support from analysis to prevent teffects from 
performing a bad match (see Appendix 4.8).     
4.4 Results 
4.4.1. JVs switching to WOSs 
Propensity score estimates and matching 
Results of the Probit model in the first step of PSM to predict the conversion of JVs to 
WOSs are presented in table 4.179. We observe that a poor average ROA in three previous years 
significantly increases the likelihood of a JV’s conversion to a WOS. A poor financial 
performance of the JV may trigger the parent MNE to fully internalize it to centralize 
management and better coordinate parent-subsidiary relations (e.g. Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; 
O’Donnell, 2000). We also find that the coefficient of fixed asset ratio is positive and significant. 
In the presence of asset specificity proxied by fixed asset ratio, JVs are more likely to convert to 
                                                 
78 In an email correspondent, Barbara Sianesi, the author of psmatch2, also suggests that it is the practice 
that she would advise to her students and herself would do. We would like to thank Barbara for her prompt response 
and advice.  
79 We have tried various configurations when we add higher ordered terms or interaction of covariates. The 
configuration with all covariates in linear terms that we presented in table 4.1 seems to be better than the others in 
balancing the matched pairs.  
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WOSs (Chang et al., 2013). Meanwhile, foreign ownership share has a positive and significant 
relationship with the likelihood of JVs switching to be WOSs. 
[Table 4.1 about here] 
It would be better if we were able to include intangible assets ratio in the probit model 
explaining the conversion of JVs to WOSs to take account of specific assets such as technology 
or brands which are intangible and being licensed/transferred to the joint ventures by the MNE 
parents. However, the VES database only includes information on intangible assets since 2006, 
which leaves us with too few treated cases if we choose to include intangible assets ratio among 
the other pre-treatment characteristics to perform matching. For a robust check, we attempt to 
run Probit models adding intangible assets ratio among the other covariates to predict the 
conversion of JVs to WOSs from 2007 to 2012 (when we have information on firm intangible 
assets). Nevertheless, we do not find its coefficient to be significant in both scenarios when we 
also include or drop fixed assets ratio among the other covariates (results are put in Appendix 
A4.3).  
Results of balancing tests are put in table 4.2. The means of treatment and control in 
columns three and four tells us about the characteristics of the sample before (unmatched) and 
after matching (matched). Before matching, the treatments are essentially different from the 
control group in age, average ROA, leverage ratio, fixed assets ratio, state joint venture dummy, 
and foreign ownership share. Specifically, the treatment group tend to be younger, perform 
financially poorer (low/negative ROA and highly leveraged), have higher fixed assets ratio and 
foreign ownership share. They also contain a smaller percentage of state joint ventures (the ones 
who local parents are state-owned domestic firms). After matching, the treated and matched 
controls are not different from each other in all of these characteristics. The standardized 
differences (or standardized biases) on each covariate between treatment and control groups after 
matching are all bellow 20 (the mean (median) standardized difference is 7.5 (4.7)). We put the 
distributions of continuous covariates for treated and control groups after matching in Appendix 
A4.4 for a further careful diagnosis of after-matching balance between treated and control groups 
(we also put a distribution of treated cases being matched by region and sector in Appendix 
A4.5). The distributions of propensity scores for treated and control groups are plotted in figure 
4.4. We can see that these distributions of propensity scores for treated and control groups are 
almost overlapped after matching (the mean distance in propensity scores of matched pairs is 
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.000691480). All of these observations give us a well assurance about the quality of our 
propensity score matching.  
[Table 4.2 and Figure 4.4 about here] 
DiD combined with PSM estimators for changes in financial performance and other strategic 
indicators after conversion 
 Our main outcome of interest is firm financial performance measured by ROA. As can be 
seen in part A of table 4.3, mean ROA of the treated group drops from t-1 to t and then improves 
in the next two period t+1 and t+2 after JVs switching to WOSs. The average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) in terms of ROA at year t+1 is 0.045 and it is statistically significant. It means 
that one year after conversion, ROA of the converted WOSs is 4.5 percentage points greater than 
that of the continuing JVs net of the initial difference in ROA between the two groups before 
conversion. However, the improvement in ROA seems to be just an “one-shot” rather than a 
persistent effect. By extending our analysis one year further up to t+3 in part B of table 4.3, we 
observe that mean ROA of treated cases reaches its peak at t+1 then drops again in t+2 and t+3. 
The ATT at t+3 is even negative (-0.08) and statistically significant (see figure 4.5 for a 
comparison of the means of ROA of matched treated and control groups from t-1 to t+3)81.     
[Table 4.3 about here] 
 Theoretically, if WOSs were superior to JVs we would expect to observe a persistent 
improvement in ROA of the converted JV-to-WOSs compared to the controlled continuing JVs, 
like what is observed in Chang et al. (2013). It reflects the difference in long-term performance 
trend between the two organization modes emerging over time (i.e. WOSs would persistently 
perform better than JVs in long term). Here, after carefully controlling for the Ashenfelter’s dip 
in financial performance before conversion, we do not find any persistent improvement in terms 
of financial performance of the converted JV-to-WOSs in Vietnam, hence also any superiority of 
WOSs as an organization mode in compared to JVs. The converted WOSs seems to temporarily 
                                                 
80 Propensity scores are theoretically bound between 0 and 1.  
81 To estimate propensity scores and perform matching in the sample with non-missing observations up to 
t+3, we use the following configuration: size, age, average ROA, leverage ratio, leverage ratio2, leverage 
ratio*average ROA, export status, fixed assets ratio, state joint venture dummy, foreign ownership share, and year, 
sectors, region fixed effects. The standardized differences of each covariates after matching are all bellow 20 (the 
mean (median) standardized difference is 12.5 (12.2)). The mean distance in propensity scores of matched pairs is 
.0015338.  
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experience negative financial performance before conversion and then recover back to its normal 
trend which is not so different from that of the comparable continuing JVs (see figure 4.5).  
[Figure 4.5 about here] 
 We continue to check the changes in other strategic indicators of the converted WOSs 
after conversion (table 4.4. and 4.5). There is some evidence of restructuring/adjustment in the 
converted WOSs in the first few years after conversion which has accompanied the improvement 
in ROA, albeit not persistent, that we observed. First, after switching the converted WOSs have 
reduced its amount of debt in relative to its total assets. The ATT in terms of leverage ratio is 
statistically significant at t+1 and equals -0,141, which suggests that in one year after conversion 
the level of leverage in the converted WOSs is 14.1 percent less than that of continuing JVs net 
of the initial difference in leverage ratios between the two groups before conversion. There are 
also increases in sales of the converted WOSs after switching but the ATTs are not significant. 
When evaluating changes in fixed assets, it should be noted that in general we should observe 
that the value of a firm’s fixed assets reduces over time. This reflects asset depreciation and the 
well-known fact that new capital investments are lumpy (i.e. firms make new investments in 
fixed assets in an intermittent manner). We observe decreases in fixed assets in both treatment 
and control groups. The ATT in terms of fixed assets is marginally significant at t+2 and equal 
0.215, which suggests a slight improvement in fixed assets in converted WOSs after their 
conversion. The converted WOSs also slightly increase their employment scale and reduce the 
average wage bill per employee at time t: ATT in terms of employment equals 0.058 and 
statistically significant while that of average wage equals -0.127 and also significant. 
Employment scale has grown by 5.8 percent faster in the converted WOSs at the time of 
conversion. At the same time, their average wage bill per employee has reduced by 12.7 percent 
relatively when compared to the comparable JVs.       
[Table 4.4 and 4.5 about here] 
4.4.2. JVs switching to DOMs 
Propensity score estimates and matching 
 We put the results of the Probit model predicting the conversion of JVs to DOMs in table 
4.6. We find that firm size has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the likelihood of 
conversion. It suggests that size might be a factor that constraints local owners from buying out 
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the JV. After an “optimal point” in size, the likelihood of JVs switching to DOMs decreases. 
Credit constraints and limited financial resources might be the reason that explain why the local 
owner cannot buy out fully equity in big JVs. By contrast, foreign MNEs do not feel this 
constraint in their decision to acquire the local partner’s stake, even in very big JVs. Among 
other results, foreign ownership share has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of 
JVs switching to be DOMs. The larger the share of foreign ownership in a JV, the less likely that 
the JV will turn to be a DOM. Note that we found above an opposite positive effect of foreign 
ownership share on the likelihood that JVs switching to WOSs. 
[Table 4.6 about here] 
 Results of the associated balancing tests are put in table 4.7. Before matching, the 
treatments are essentially different from the control group in size, foreign ownership share, and 
state joint venture dummy. Specifically, the treatment group (JV-to-DOMs) tend to be smaller in 
terms of size and have lower levels of foreign ownership share. They also contain a smaller 
percentage of state joint ventures. After matching, the treated and matched controls are not 
different from each other in all of these characteristics. The standardized differences (or 
standardized biases) between treatment and control groups on each covariate after matching are 
all bellow 20 (the mean (median) standardized difference is 7.3 (6.7))82. We put the distributions 
of continuous covariates for treated and control groups after matching in Appendix A4.6 for a 
further careful diagnosis of after-matching balance between treated and control groups (we also 
put a distribution of JV-turning-to-DOMs being matched by region and sector in Appendix 
A4.7). In figure 4.6, we can see that the distributions of propensity scores of treated and control 
groups are almost overlapped after matching (the mean distance in propensity scores of matched 
pairs is .0001354). Hence, all of these observations give us a well assurance about the quality of 
our propensity score matching for the cases when JVs turning to DOMs. 
[Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 about here] 
DiD combined with PSM estimators for changes in financial performance and other strategic 
indicators after conversion 
                                                 
82 We have tried various configurations when we add higher ordered terms or interaction of covariates. The 
configuration with all covariates in linear terms that we presented in table 4.6 seems to be better than the others in 
balancing the matched pairs. 
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 As mentioned above, since there is one treated case being off-support in our matching83 
(when the outcomes being assessed are ROA, leverage ratio, employment, and average wage per 
employee), we choose to use the results from using psmatch2 for PSM one-to-one match with 
replacement and with common support restriction. In these cases, we accept that the default 
standard errors in psmatch2 do not take into account that propensity scores are estimated and we 
simply perform t-tests to test whether the difference in accumulated changes in an outcome 
between the treatment and control groups (i.e. the ATT) is significant84. Since the naïve 
bootstrapped standard errors are no longer used, Chang et al. (2013) also rely on the same 
practice when comparing performance of converted WOSs and comparable continuing JVs in 
China. For a comparison, we also report in Appendix A4.8 the ATTs and their associated AI’s 
S.Es. obtained when we drop the treated being off-support from the sample and run teffects 
psmatch (as there is no common support restriction in teffects, this command will still perform a 
bad match for the treated being off-support if we do not drop it85).   
 As can be seen in table 4.8, mean ROA of the treated group increases from t-1 to t+1 then 
slightly drops at t+2 after JVs switching to DOMs. However, compared to the matched 
continuing JVs, there is no significant improvement in profitability of the converted JV-to-
DOMs after conversion since the control group also experiences the same trend in ROA (see 
figure 4.7). Hence, none of ATTs in terms of ROA are statistically significant. Similarly, we also 
observe no significant changes in leverage ratio, sales, employment, average wage (table 4.9 and 
4.10) in the converted JV-to-DOMs after conversion compared to the matched continuing JVs. 
However, there is some evidence that the converted JVs has invested more on fixed assets after 
conversion. The mean of ln(fixed assets) in these JVs-turning-DOMs has changed from 6.365 at 
year t-1 to 6.607 at year t (which equivalent to 28 percent increase in the value of firm fixed 
assets). The ATT in terms of ln(fixed assets) is strongly significant at t+2 and equals 0.494, 
which suggests that fixed assets have grown by 49.4 percent faster in JVs switching to DOMs 
                                                 
83 This treated case has a propensity score much higher than the maximum propensity score of the controls.  
84 The default standard errors in psmatch2 are basically the sample standard errors and these t-tests are 
simply the t-test of equal mean of two independent samples using sample standard errors.  
85 It should be noted that the results in teffects psmatch will, therefore, be slightly different from those of 
psmatch2. It is due to the fact that teffects runs the first-step probit model predicting treatment on a sample without 
the treated case being off-support (we simply drop it before running teffects) while psmatch2 runs the first-step 
probit model on the full sample.  
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relative to continuing JVs by two year after conversion (t+2). In general, it is suggested that the 
local owner has invested more on fixed assets after buying out a JV. However, the conversion of 
a JV to a DOM simply brings no effect in terms of financial profitability for the firm.  
[Figure 4.7 about here] 
[Table 4.8, 4.9, and 4.0 about here] 
4.5 Conclusion 
 This study uses a difference-in-differences (DiD) combined with propensity score 
matching to explore performance and strategic implications of the conversion of JVs to either 
WOSs or DOMs in Vietnam. For the case when JVs turning to WOSs, there is evidence that 
these JVs experience a temporary negative shock in ROA in periods right before conversion. 
After carefully controlling for this Ashenfelter’s dip in financial performance before conversion 
and matching the converted WOSs with selected comparable continuing JVs, we do not find any 
persistent improvement in terms of financial profitability of the converted JV-to-WOSs 
compared to the matched continuing JVs in Vietnam. Besides, we also find some evidence of 
restructuring/adjustment in the converted WOSs in the first few years after conversion. 
Specifically, the converted WOSs have reduced their leverage levels and gradually improved 
fixed assets. Moreover, they have also slightly increased their employment scale and reduced the 
average wage bill per employee at the time of conversion.  
 For the case of JVs turning to DOMs, results suggested that the local owner has invested 
more on fixed assets after buying out a JV. There is an increasing trend in ROA of the converted 
DOMs from before to after conversion. However, there is no significant improvement in 
profitability of the converted JV-to-DOMs after conversion since the comparable continuing JVs 
also experience the same trend in ROA. Among other results, we also observe no significant 
changes in leverage ratio, sales, employment, average wage of the converted domestic firms.   
 Our study, hence, makes a contribution to the literatures on relative performance of 
foreign entry modes and joint venture evolution. It first implies that Chang et al. (2013)’s finding 
about the persistent improvement of converted WOSs compared to continuing JVs are only 
specific to the context of China. There used to be prior restricting requirement that foreign entry 
was only allowed through the form of JVs in China. After this country started permitting the 
presence of WOSs in 2001, some of these JVs now can convert into WOSs and enjoy persistent 
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improvement with this preferred entry mode – the one that they would have been chosen had 
they been free to choose when entering China (Chang et al., 2013). In the case of Vietnam where 
freedom in entry mode choice is afforded by Vietnamese legislation, most foreign companies 
already entered the market with their preferred ownership structure and partnership type (i.e. 
WOSs or JVs). Indeed, evidence shows that the converted JVs in Vietnam tend to be the ones 
having temporary negative shock in financial profitability (ROA). Hence, after controlling for 
this Ashenfelter’s dip in ROA, there is no evidence of persistent difference in performance 
observed between converted JV-to-WOSs and comparable continuing JVs and no superiority of 
WOSs as an organization mode in compared to JVs has been confirmed. Our study also 
contributes to the literature of joint venture evolution by exploring the consequences of the 
conversion of JVs to fully domestic firms (DOMs), a rather under-explored phenomenon. We 
find that the conversion of a JV to a DOM simply brings no effect in terms of financial 
profitability for the firm in Vietnam. 
 This study is not without limitations. In this study, we treat the conversions of JVs to 
either WOSs or DOMs separately as if they are independent, which is a crucial assumption in our 
analysis. One potential issue of concern is that the choice of switching from JVs to WOSs could 
not be independent from that of switching from JVs to DOMs86. It means that we may need to 
consider two treatments: JVs to WOSs and JVs to DOMs together. To address this issue, a 
bivariate probit model or a multinominal logit model could be employed to predict propensity 
scores. Besides matching converted JVs (to either WOSs or DOMs) with continuing JVs, we 
then can also match converted JV-to-WOSs against converted JV-to-DOMs, which is also really 
interesting. We leave this practice of matching with multiple treatments as a future research 
direction.   
  
                                                 
86 We would like to thank Marco Sanfillippo for pointing this out 
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Tables and figures 
Table 4.1 Probit model: JVs to WOSs 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Size  -0.01 0.05 -0.22 0.82 -0.12 0.09 
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.48 0.63 -0.04 0.03 
Average ROA -1.19** 0.55 -2.16 0.03 -2.26 -0.11 
Leverage Ratio 0.03 0.12 0.24 0.81 -0.21 0.27 
Export status -0.15 0.16 -0.98 0.33 -0.46 0.15 
Fixed assets Ratio 1.13*** 0.34 3.36 0.00 0.47 1.80 
State Joint venture -0.16 0.17 -0.91 0.36 -0.49 0.18 
Foreign Ownership 1.39** 0.57 2.44 0.02 0.27 2.51 
Pseudo-R2 0.17      
Chi-squared 95.75***      
N 1,702           
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed effects for year, industry (2-digit), region are omitted to save 
space. All independent variables except Average ROA are lagged one period. Average ROA is the three-year 
average of lags of ROA from t-1 to t-3. 
Table 4.2 Balancing test: JVs to WOSs 
  Mean  t-test 
 Sample Treated Control %bias    t p>|t| 
Size  Unmatched 8.448 8.676 -14.1 -1.12 0.264 
 Matched 8.448 8.710 -16.2 -0.84 0.401 
Age Unmatched 8.448 9.568 -25 -1.88 0.06 
 Matched 8.448 8.493 -1 -0.06 0.95 
Average  ROA Unmatched -0.018 0.081 -56.3 -4.26 0 
 Matched -0.018 -0.018 0.1 0 0.996 
Leverage Ratio Unmatched 0.684 0.504 31.9 2.94 0.003 
 Matched 0.684 0.704 -3.6 -0.18 0.86 
Export status Unmatched 0.463 0.470 -1.4 -0.11 0.91 
 Matched 0.463 0.373 17.9 1.05 0.297 
Fixed assets Ratio Unmatched 0.429 0.362 23.9 1.97 0.049 
 Matched 0.429 0.445 -5.8 -0.34 0.734 
State Joint venture Unmatched 0.522 0.646 -25.3 -2.08 0.038 
 Matched 0.522 0.582 -12.2 -0.69 0.491 
Foreign Ownership Unmatched 0.686 0.618 49.1 3.88 0 
 Matched 0.686 0.681 3.5 0.21 0.832 
Note: All independent variables except Average ROA are lagged one period. Average ROA is the three-year 
average of lags of ROA from t-1 to t-3. %bias is the standardized difference (or standardized bias) calculated 
following the formula from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).  
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Table 4.3 Changes in performance (ROA) by conditional DiD of JVs switching to WOSs 
A. Up to t+2 
 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ROA 
Mean outcome of Treatment group -0.001 -0.032 0.057 0.050 
Mean outcome of Control group -0.020 0.001 -0.006 0.031 
ATTa  -0.052 0.045** 0.001 
AI’s S.E.a   0.085 0.019 0.026 
# of match pairs: 67   Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
B. Up to t+3  
 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 t+3 
 Outcome: ROA 
Mean outcome of Treatment group -0.006 -0.051 0.060 0.059 0.00 
Mean outcome of Control group -0.033 -0.030 -0.012 -0.035 0.05 
ATTa  -0.049** 0.044 0.067 -0.08* 
AI’s S.E.a   0.023 0.028 0.059 0.046 
# of match pairs: 52   Unmatched (off support): 0   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the means of outcome by treatment group 
and control group observed at the given time. 
 aATT and its corresponding Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error (S.E.) are in italics. ATTs in terms of 
conditional DiD are calculated following formula (2). Given matched treatment and control groups, ATTk 
will be: 𝐴𝑇𝑇௞ =
ଵ
௡
∑ ൫𝑅𝑂𝐴 ௧ା௞௧௥௘௔௧௘ௗ − 𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ିଵ௧௥௘௔௧௘ௗ൯ −
ଵ
௡
∑ ൫𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ା௞௖௢௡௧௥௢௟ − 𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ିଵ௖௢௡௧௥௢௟൯  for k years after 
conversion (k=0, 1, 2, or 3). 
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Table 4.4 Changes in other strategic indicators of JVs switching to WOSs: Leverage Ratio, 
Sales, Fixed Assets 
  A. Leverage Ratio 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: Leverage Ratio 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.684 0.766 0.687 0.647 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.704 0.768 0.849 0.835 
ATTa  0.019 -0.141*** -0.168 
AI’s S.E.a   0.026 0.051 0.115 
# of match pairs: 67   Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
B. Sales     
     
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Sales)  
Mean outcome of Treatment group 8.129 8.102 8.263 8.297 
Mean outcome of Control group 8.134 8.145 8.167 8.063 
ATTa  -0.038 0.101 0.238 
AI’s S.E.a   0.118 0.097 0.146 
# of match pairs: 67   Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
C. Fixed assets     
     
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Fixed Assets) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 7.195 7.112 7.063 7.033 
Mean outcome of Control group 7.591 7.539 7.267 7.214 
ATTa  -0.030 0.193 0.215* 
AI’s S.E.a   0.103 0.142 0.115 
# of match pairs: 65   Unmatched (off support): 0 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes by treatment group 
and control group at the given time. 
aATT and its corresponding Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error (S.E.) are in italics.  
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Table 4.5 Changes in other strategic indicators of JVs to WOSs (cont’):  Employment, Average 
Wage per employee 
  A. Employment  
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Employment) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 4.833 4.916 4.949 4.938 
Mean outcome of Control group 4.745 4.769 4.781 4.770 
ATTa  0.058*** 0.080 0.080 
AI’s S.E.a   0.013 0.052 0.096 
# of match pairs: 67   Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
B. Average wage per employee     
     
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Average wage per employee) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 1.127 1.078 1.157 1.217 
Mean outcome of Control group 1.324 1.403 1.397 1.350 
ATTa  -0.127*** -0.043 0.064 
AI’s S.E.a   0.047 0.082 0.089 
# of match pairs: 67   Unmatched (off support): 0 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes by treatment group 
and control group at the given time. 
 aATT and its corresponding Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error(S.E.) are in italics. 
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Table 4.6 Probit model: JVs to DOMs 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Size  0.76** 0.38 1.98 0.05 0.01 1.51 
Size^2 -0.05** 0.02 -2.15 0.03 -0.10 0.00 
Age 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.59 -0.02 0.04 
ROA -0.22 0.26 -0.86 0.39 -0.74 0.29 
Leverage Ratio -0.25 0.21 -1.18 0.24 -0.67 0.17 
Export status 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00 -0.32 0.32 
Fixed assets Ratio 0.06 0.30 0.19 0.85 -0.53 0.65 
State Joint venture -0.10 0.17 -0.58 0.57 -0.43 0.23 
Foreign Ownership -0.87** 0.40 -2.20 0.03 -1.65 -0.09 
Pseudo-R2 0.15      
Chi-squared 75.47**      
N 2,846           
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed effects for year, industry (2-digit), region are omitted to save 
space. All independent variables are lagged one period.  
 
Table 4.7 Balancing test: JVs to DOMs 
    Mean  t-test 
  Sample Treated Control     %bias  t p>|t| 
Size  Unmatched 7.915 8.495 -34.9 -2.26 0.024 
 Matched 7.915 8.113 -11.9 -0.65 0.516 
Age Unmatched 7.865 8.408 -10.3 -0.76 0.449 
 Matched 7.843 7.000 16 0.84 0.402 
ROA Unmatched 0.026 0.053 -12.9 -0.72 0.472 
 Matched 0.025 0.023 1.1 0.09 0.926 
Leverage Ratio Unmatched 0.411 0.484 -20.9 -1.31 0.192 
 Matched 0.409 0.391 5.1 0.3 0.768 
Export status Unmatched 0.365 0.320 9.5 0.69 0.491 
 Matched 0.373 0.412 -8.2 -0.4 0.689 
Fixed assets Ratio Unmatched 0.369 0.398 -9.6 -0.68 0.495 
 Matched 0.375 0.376 -0.3 -0.02 0.986 
State Joint venture Unmatched 0.481 0.602 -24.5 -1.77 0.076 
 Matched 0.490 0.471 3.9 0.2 0.845 
Foreign Ownership Unmatched 0.544 0.605 -34.4 -2.73 0.006 
  Matched 0.546 0.567 -11.9 -0.61 0.541 
Note: All independent variables are lagged one period. %bias is the standardized difference (or standardized bias) 
calculated following the formula from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
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Table 4.8 Changes in performance (ROA) by conditional DiD of JVs switching to DOMs 
   
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ROA 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.025 0.051 0.100 0.081 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.023 0.073 0.062 0.067 
ATTa  -0.025 0.036 0.012 
S.E.a   0.036 0.041 0.033 
# of match pairs: 51   Unmatched (off support): 1 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes 
by treatment group and control group at the given time. 
 aATT and its standard error (S.E.) are in italics. S.E. does not take into account that the 
propensity score is estimated. They are obtained by running psmatch2 to perform one-
to-one PSM with replacement and with common support restriction.  
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Table 4.9 Changes in other strategic indicators of JVs switching to DOMs: Leverage Ratio, 
Sales, Fixed Assets 
A. Leverage Ratio 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: Leverage Ratio  
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.409 0.419 0.411 0.447 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.391 0.426 0.402 0.397 
ATT  -0.024 -0.009 0.033 
S.E.   0.049 0.054 0.061 
# of match pairs: 51   Unmatched (off support): 1 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes 
by treatment group and control group at the given time. 
 aATT and its standard error (S.E.) are in italics. S.E. does not take into account that the 
propensity score is estimated. They are obtained by running psmatch2 to perform one-to-
one PSM with replacement and with common support restriction.  
 
B. Sales 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Sales) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 7.605 7.594 7.819 7.712 
Mean outcome of Control group 7.394 7.538 7.619 7.657 
ATTb  -0.155 -0.012 -0.156 
AI’s S.Eb   0.220 0.213 0.280 
# of match pairs: 45   Unmatched (off support): 0 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of 
outcomes by treatment group and control group at the given time. 
 bATT and its corresponding Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error (S.E.) are in 
italics. 
 
C. Fixed assets     
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Fixed Assets) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 6.365 6.607 6.396 6.425 
Mean outcome of Control group 6.400 6.317 6.250 5.967 
ATTb  0.325 0.180 0.494*** 
AI’s S.Eb   0.264 0.182 0.083 
# of match pairs: 50   Unmatched (off support): 0 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes 
by treatment group and control group at the given time. 
 bATT and its corresponding Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error (S.E.) are in italics. 
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Table 4.10 Changes in other strategic indicators of JVs switching to DOMs (cont’):  
Employment, Average Wage per employee 
  A. Employment  
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Employment)  
Mean outcome of Treatment group 4.399 4.518 4.608 4.567 
Mean outcome of Control group 4.232 4.437 4.447 4.446 
ATTa  -0.087 -0.006 -0.046 
S.Ea   0.118 0.137 0.151 
# of match pairs: 51   Unmatched (off support): 1 
 
 B. Average wage per employee 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
Outcome: ln(Average wage per employee) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.942 0.900 0.894 0.947 
Mean outcome of Control group 1.204 1.244 1.185 1.278 
ATTa  -0.082 -0.029 -0.069 
S.Ea   0.121 0.137 0.121 
# of match pairs: 51   Unmatched (off support): 1 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes 
by treatment group and control group at the given time. 
 aATT and its standard error (S.E.) are in italics. S.E. does not take into account that the 
propensity score is estimated. They are obtained by running psmatch2 to perform one-
to-one PSM with replacement and with common support restriction.  
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Figure 4.1 Matrix of post-formation transformation of entry modes 
 
Transformation matrix Transformation after entry WOSs JVs 
Entry Mode WOSs Continuing WOSs WOSs convert to JVs JVs JVs convert to WOSs Continuing JVs 
 
Figure 4.2 Theoretical framework on the confounding factors that influence both switching 
decision of JVs and their performance 
 
  
Organization mode switch 
(JVs converting to either 
WOSs or DOMs) 
Organization performance 
 
Confounders that influence both organization 
mode switch and performance: 
 Transaction cost economics: intangible 
assets ratio, fixed assets ratio. 
 Learning: age, export. 
 Real option theory of joint venture: 
ROA, leverage ratio, and export status. 
 Theories about joint venture instability: a 
dummy for state joint venture, foreign 
ownership share.  
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Figure 4.3 Evidence of Ashenfelter’s dip (i.e. shocks in performance before switching) in treated 
group 
 
  
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
T - 3 T - 2 T - 1 T T + 1  T + 2
RO
A
JVs to WOSs JVs to DOMs
 159 
 
Figure 4.4 Propensity scores for treated and controls before and after match: JVs to WOSs 
 
 
 
 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Unmatched
1
2
3
4
5
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Treated Untreated
Matched
psmatch2: Propensity Score
 160 
 
Figure 4.5 Comparison of means of ROA by matched treated (JVs to WOSs) and control groups 
up to t+3 
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Figure 4.6 Propensity scores for treated and controls before and after match: JVs to DOMs 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Unmatched
0
5
10
15
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Treated Untreated
Matched
psmatch2: Propensity Score
 162 
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of means of ROA by JV-to-DOMs and matched control groups up to t+2 
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Appendixes  
A4.1 Data cleaning procedures 
We consider only foreign firms who are joint ventures at the time they first appear in our 
dataset. They include both the firms who are continuing joint ventures to their last appearance in 
the dataset and the ones who later convert. Like Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Chang et al. 
(2013), we also restrict our sample to firms with at least five consecutive years of observations. 
Firms need to remain in the dataset sufficiently long as we need compare changes in firm 
performance and other strategic indicators at least two years after conversion (t+1 and t+2) to the 
year before conversion (t-1). We identify the conversion of a JV when its registration type 
changes from JVs to either WOSs or DOMs (Please cross-reference to section 4.3.2). The 
registration system includes three types: domestic firms (DOMs), foreign joint ventures (JVs) 
and wholly-owned subsidiaries(WOSs), which reflects ownership classification of firms. We also 
drop JVs who change their registration type more than two times as they potentially involve 
errors in coding.  
To increase the precision of our matching practice, we further apply two slight different 
data cleaning procedures to derive two matching samples (i) between JVs switching to WOSs 
and continuing JVs and (ii) between JVs switching to DOMs and continuing JVs.  
 For the matching sample between JVs switching to WOSs and continuing JVs, we drop: 
- Observations with illogical data and extreme outliers. They are  
 the ones with negative total assets or fixed assets and the ones which fixed assets 
are greater than total assets, 
 the ones with return on assets (ROA) above 20 or less than -20, 
 the ones with leverage ratio (total debt over total assets) greater than 20 or less 
than 0. 
- Any JVs with foreign ownership share which are equal or greater than 90% (as these 
JVs lie near the borderline of classification between JVs and WOSs; hence, loosely 
speaking they could be considered as WOSs). A subset of these JVs which are the ones 
whose foreign ownership share in the JV changes from any level of above 90% to 
100% also not being considered as a JV-to-WOS switch and being dropped.  
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- Any observations of JVs in any two-digit VSIC sectors in which there is no conversion 
of JVs to WOSs occurring during the study period  
- Observations of JVs who later convert to DOMs since here we only consider the 
conversion from JVs to WOSs. 
- Observations of converted JVs after their switching to WOSs to prevent these 
observations of the now-being-WOSs from being used as controls. 
For the matching sample between JVs switching to DOMs and continuing JVs, we drop: 
- Observations with illogical data and extreme outliers. They are  
 the ones with negative total assets or fixed assets and the ones which fixed assets 
are greater than total assets, 
 the ones with return on assets (ROA) above 10 or less than -10. 
 the ones with leverage ratio (total debt over total assets) greater than 10 or less 
than 0. 
- Any observations of JVs in any two-digit VSIC sectors in which there is no conversion 
of JVs to DOMs occurring during the study period.  
- Observations of JVs who later convert to WOSs as here we only consider the 
conversion from JVs to DOMs.  
- Observations of converted JVs after their switching to DOMs to prevent these 
observations of the now-being-DOMs from being used as controls. Indeed, these 
observations are automatically dropped out of the sample since they have no 
information on foreign ownership share to perform matching. Only when a firm is a 
foreign invested firm (i.e. WOSs or JVs) that we have information on foreign 
ownership share; for fully domestic firms, this information is missing.   
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A4.2 Description of switching cases 
 
  Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total  
Of all 
years 
JVs to 
WOSs Total 10 2 9 11 8 17 17 11 13 14 16 23 151 
 Matched - - 4 9 5 12 10 8 9 10 - - 67 
 UnMatched (Off-support)                   -   - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 
  UnMatched (missing covariates/ not enough observations) - - 5 2 3 5 7 3 4 4 - - 45 
JVs to 
DOMs Total 6 3 1 1 4 5 13 15 14 14 14 13 103 
 Matched 3 0 1 0 3 1 11 9 12 11 - - 51 
 UnMatched (Off-support) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 - - 1 
  UnMatched (missing covariates/ not enough observations) 3 3 0 1 1 4 1 6 2 3 - -  24 
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A4.3 Probit models predicting JVs switching to WOSs with intangible assets ratio among 
predictors (2007-2012) 
  Model  
VARIABLES 1 2 3 
        
Size 0.39* 0.38* 0.40* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Size^2  -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA -0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Leverage ratio 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Export status -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Intangible assets ratio -0.16  -0.78 
 (0.81)  (0.92) 
Fixed assets ratio  0.47** 0.53** 
  (0.23) (0.24) 
State joint venture 0.15 0.12 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Foreign ownership 4.86*** 4.97*** 5.02*** 
 (1.58) (1.60) (1.61) 
Foreign ownership^2 -3.76*** -3.88*** -3.91*** 
 (1.17) (1.18) (1.19) 
Constant -4.98*** -5.10*** -5.18*** 
 (1.21) (1.22) (1.23) 
    
Observations 3,409 3,409 3,409 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed effects for year, 
industry (2-digit), region are omitted to save space. All 
independent variables are lagged one period.  
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A4.4 Diagnosis of the balance after matching: JVs switching to WOSs 
Figure 1 Kernel density distribution of size (ln(total assets)) at t-1 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Kernel density distribution of age at t-1 
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Figure 3 Kernel density distribution of average ROA from t-3 to t-1 
 
 
Figure 4 Kernel density distribution of leverage ratio at t-1 
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Figure 5 Kernel density distribution of fixed assets ratio at t-1 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Kernel density distribution of foreign ownership share at t-1 
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A4.5 Distribution of matched treated cases by region and sector: JVs switching to WOSs 
 
Sector 
(2-digit 
VSIC) 
Sector Name 
Greater 
Hanoi  
North 
-ern 
Coast 
Central 
High 
-land 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Greater 
HCM 
city 
Mekong 
Delta 
Total 
10 Manufacture of food products 0 0 1 2 1 1 5 
13 Manufacture of textiles 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 
16 
Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2 0 0 0 7 0 9 
21 
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 3 0 0 0 4 0 7 
23 Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products 3 0 0 0 3 0 6 
25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
2 2 0 0 5 0 9 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
31 Manufacture of furniture 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
32 Other manufacturing 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
42 Civil engineering 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
43 Specialized construction activities 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 
45 
Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
55 Accommodation 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
65 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension 
funding, except compulsory social 
security 
1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
  Total 23 3 2 4 32 3 67 
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A4.6 Diagnosis of the balance after matching: JVs switching to DOMs 
Figure 1 Kernel density distribution of size (ln(total assets)) at t-1 
 
Figure 2 Kernel density distribution of age at t-1 
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Figure 3 Kernel density distribution of ROA at t-1 
 
Figure 4 Kernel density distribution of leverage ratio at t-1 
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Figure 5 Kernel density distribution of fixed assets ratio at t-1 
 
Figure 6 Kernel density distribution of foreign ownership share at t-1 
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A4.7 Distribution of matched treated cases by region and sector: JVs switching to DOMs 
 
Sector 
(2-digit 
VSIC) 
Sector Name  Greater Hanoi 
North 
-ern 
Coast 
North  
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Greater 
HCM 
Mekong 
Delta Total 
10 Manufacture of food products 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 
11 Manufacture of beverages 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
13 Manufacture of textiles 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 
16 
Manufacture of wood and 
of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
21 
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
23 Manufacture of other non metallic mineral products 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 
25 
Manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
1 0 0 0 2 0 3 
26 
Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical 
products 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
29 
Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semitrailers 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
31 Manufacture of furniture 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
32 Other manufacturing 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
41 Construction of buildings 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
42 Civil engineering 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Sector 
(2-digit 
VSIC) 
Sector Name  Greater Hanoi 
North 
-ern 
Coast 
North  
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Greater 
HCM 
Mekong 
Delta Total 
55 Accommodation 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
62 
Computer programming, 
consultancy and related 
activities 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
65 
Insurance, reinsurance and 
pension funding, except 
compulsory social security 
2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
68 Real estate activities 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 
71 Architectural and engineering activities 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
93 
Sports activities and 
amusement and recreation 
activities 
1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Total   18 3 2 2 23 3 51 
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Appendix 4.8 Changes in performance and other strategic indicators by conditional DiD of 
JVs switching to DOMs (obtained by running teffects psmatch on a sample without the treated 
being off-support) 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ROA 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.025 0.051 0.100 0.081 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.001 0.042 0.050 0.052 
ATTa  -0.015 0.026 0.004 
AI’s S.Ea  0.040 0.041 0.042 
# of match pairs: 51 Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: Leverage Ratio 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.409 0.419 0.411 0.447 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.371 0.413 0.422 0.420 
ATTa  -0.031 -0.049** -0.010 
AI’s S.E.a  0.045 0.023 0.025 
# of match pairs: 51 Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 Outcome: ln(Employment) 
Mean outcome of Treatment group 4.399 4.518 4.608 4.567 
Mean outcome of Control group 4.588 4.611 4.597 4.568 
ATTa  0.095 0.199* 0.186 
AI’s S.E.a   0.092 0.112 0.133 
# of match pairs: 51 Unmatched (off support): 0 
 
 
Year t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
Outcome: ln(Average wage per employee)  
Mean outcome of Treatment group 0.942 0.900 0.894 0.947 
Mean outcome of Control group 0.993 1.126 1.166 1.184 
ATTa  -0.175 -0.221*** -0.186* 
AI’s S.E.a  0.121 0.080 0.101 
# of match pairs: 51 Unmatched (off support): 0 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The first two lines present the mean of outcomes 
by treatment group and control group at the given time. aATT and its corresponding 
Abadie-Imbens’ robust standard error (S.E.) are in italics.  
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